John Fischer

In a recent article in this journal, “Destinism,” Andrew Bailey presents a puzzle for “Destinism,” the view that the only things we can do are those we in fact do. The puzzle is intriguing and important in part because it challenges a doctrine that many philosophers think could be true compatibly with our being morally responsible. Destinism is at least a viable view. Bailey’s puzzle derives from very plausible assumptions, but I argue that these assumptions are not as plausible as they appear. Interpreted in a way that renders one of them acceptable makes another problematic. There is no one interpretation on which the puzzling arguments are uncontrovertibly sound.

In this paper I discuss some of Martha Nussbaum’s defenses of Epicurean views about death and immortality. Here I seek to defend the commonsense view that death can be a bad thing for an individual against the Epicurean; I also defend the claim that immortality might conceivably be a good thing. In the development of my analysis, I make certain connections between the literatures on free will and death. The intersection of these two literatures can be illuminated by reference to my notion of a Dialectical Stalemate.

I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible, unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that we can see this from the “ultimate perspective.” In reply, I explore the nature of “zooming” arguments, and I contend that even from a somewhat more detached perspective, important features that distinguish us from mere animals can be discerned (even in a causally deterministic universe). Finally, I seek to address Perry’s defense of classical compatibilism. My main objection to his form of compatbilism is that agents must be construed as having a certain kind of “baggage”—even on his own account.

Przekład na podstawie: „Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility”, w: Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, red. Ferdinand Schoeman, 81–106; przedruk w: John Martin Fischer, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, 63–83. Przekład za zgodą Autora. Autor przedstawia model odpowiedzialności moralnej oparty na faktycznej sekwencji i pojęciu zdolności reagowania na racje, a następnie przeprowadza analogię między tym modelem a opracowanym przez Roberta Nozicka modelem wiedzy opartej na faktycznej sekwencji, oraz wprowadza pojęcie semikompatybilizmu.

In this collection of essays on the metaphysical issues pertaining to death, the meaning of life, and freedom of the will, John Martin Fischer argues that death can be a bad thing for the individual who dies. He defends the claim that something can be a bad thing--a misfortune--for an individual, even if he never experiences it as bad. Fischer also defends the commonsense asymmetry in our attitudes toward death and prenatal nonexistence: we are indifferent to the time before we are born, but we regret that we do not live longer. Further, Fischer argues, that immortal life could be desirable, and shows how the defense of the badness of death and the goodness of immortality exhibit a similar structure; on Fischer's view, the badness of death and the goodness of life can be represented on spectra that display certain continuities. Building on Fischer's previous book, My Way a major aim of this volume is to show important connections between issues relating to life and death and issues relating to free will. More specifically, Fischer argues that we endow our lives with a certain distinctive kind of meaning--an irreducible narrative dimension of value--by exhibiting free will. Thus, in acting freely, we transform our lives so that our stories matter.

Various philosophers have argued that in order to be morally responsible, we need to be the "ultimate sources'' of our choices and behavior. Although there are different versions of this sort of argument, I identify a "picture'' that lies behind them, and I contend that this picture is misleading. Joel Feinberg helpfully suggested that we scale down what might initially be thought to be legitimate demands on "self-creation,'' rather than jettison the idea that we are truly and robustly responsible. I follow Feinberg in rejecting various "inflated'' demands on "origination,'' "initiation,'' or ultimate sourcehood.

Fantastyka naukowa (ang. science fiction, w skrócie - SF) jest często przedstawianajako gatunek literacki dobrze przystosowany do spekulacji filozoficznej. SF i filozofia dzielą zainteresowanie kwestią nieśmiertelności, a ich ujęcia tego tematu można zestawić i porównać. Proponujemy tutaj zarys taksonomii różnych modeli czy wizji nieśmiertelności oferowanych przez filozofów i autorów fantastyki naukowej. Po wskazaniu istotnych rozbieżności między tymi modelami przedstawiamy sugestię, że pewne problemy oraz wątpliwości wysuwane przez pisarzy SF i filozofów wynikają z pomieszania różnych modeli. Mamy nadzieję, że te porównania pokażą wstępnie, w jakim sensie można powiedzieć, że fantastyka naukowa funkcjonuje jako dyskurs filozoficzny.