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178Ultimacy and alternative possibilitiesPhilosophical Studies 144 (1): 15-20. 2009.I explore a key feature of Robert Kane’s libertarianism. Kane claims that we should separate issues of alternative possibilities from issues of ultimacy, but he further argues that they are connected in a certain way. I call into question this connection, and I continue to argue for a strict separation of considerations pertaining to alternative possibilities and “actual-sequence” considerations
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969 The Transfer of NonresponsibilityIn Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Freedom and Determinism, Bradford Book/mit Press. 2004.
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173The Non-Reality of Free Will, by Richard DoublePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 1004-1007. 1992.
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2270The Metasphysics of Free Will: An Essay on ControlWiley-Blackwell. 1994.The Metaphysics of Free Will provides a through statement of the major grounds for skepticism about the reality of free will and moral responsibility. The author identifies and explains the sort of control that is associated with personhood and accountability, and shows how it is consistent with causal determinism. In so doing, out view of ourselves as morally responsible agents is protected against the disturbing changes posed by science and religion
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84The Mirror-Image Argument: An Additional Reply to JohanssonThe Journal of Ethics 18 (4): 325-330. 2014.We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves an inappropriate conflation of the time from which the relevant asymmetry emerges and the time of the badness of death
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6The Metaphysics of Free Will: an Essay on ControlPhilosophical Quarterly 47 (188): 373-381. 1997.
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123The inevitableAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4). 1992.This Article does not have an abstract
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219The importance of Frankfurt-style argumentPhilosophical Quarterly 57 (228). 2007.I reply to the challenges to Frankfurt-style compatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility presented in Daniel Speak's paper 'The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument'. I seek to show how Speak's critiques rest on an 'all-or-nothing' attitude in various ways, and I attempt to defend the importance of Frankfurt-style argumentation in defence of compatibilism
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745The Frankfurt cases: The moral of the storiesPhilosophical Review 119 (3): 315-336. 2010.The Frankfurt cases have been thought by some philosophers to show that moral responsibility does not require genuine metaphysical access to alternative possibilities. But various philosophers have rejected this putative "lesson" of the cases, and they have put forward a powerful "Dilemma Defense." In the last decade or so, many philosophers have been persuaded by the Dilemma Defense that the Frankfurt cases do not show what Frankfurt (and others) thought they show. This essay presents a templat…Read more
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417The deterministic horn of the dilemma defence: a reply to Widerker and GoetzAnalysis 73 (3): 489-496. 2013.I have argued that a proponent of the Frankfurt Cases as showing that the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is false can successfully reply to the Dilemma Defense. In their 2013 paper, Widerker and Goetz offer a critique of my view, especially as regards the deterministic horn of the dilemma. Here I clarify my strategy of response to the Dilemma Defense and reply to the critique developed by Widerker and Goetz
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118The Evil of Death: A Reply to YiPhilosophia 42 (3): 741-748. 2014.In previous work we have presented a reply to the Lucretian Symmetry, which has it that it is rational to have symmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous nonexistence. Our reply relies on Parfit-style thought-experiments. Here we reply to a critique of our approach by Huiyuhl Yi, which appears in this journal: Brueckner and Fischer on the evil of death. We argue that this critique fails to attend to the specific nature of the thought-experiments (and our associated argument). More specif…Read more
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420Semicompatibilism and Its RivalsThe Journal of Ethics 16 (2): 117-143. 2012.In this paper I give an overview of my “framework for moral responsibility,” and I offer some reasons that commend it. I contrast my approach with indeterministic models of moral responsibility and also other compatibilist strategies, including those of Harry Frankfurt and Gary Watson
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79Stories and the Meaning of LifePhilosophic Exchange 39 (1). 2009.This paper argues that the value of acting freely and responsibly is a species of the value of self-expression. When I act freely, I write a sentence in the story of my life, and this gives my life the shape of a narrative, which, in turn, gives my life a unique sort of meaning and value.
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195Soft Facts and Harsh Realities: Reply to William CraigReligious Studies 27 (4). 1991.. In a number of papers I have sought to discuss and cast some doubt on a certain strategy of response to an argument that purports to show that God's foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. This argument proceeds from the alleged ‘fixity of the past’ to the conclusion that God's foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. William Lane Craig has criticized my approach to these issues. Here I should like to respond to some of Craig's claims. My goal is to attempt to achieve a clea…Read more
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201Recent Work on God and FreedomAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2). 1992.This is a survey of recent work on God and human freedom. A version of the "basic" argument for the incompatibility of God's omniscience and human freedom is presented. Various possible responses are developed and discussed
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182Reply: The free will revolutionPhilosophical Explorations 8 (2). 2005.This Article does not have an abstract
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298Responsibility, control, and omissionsThe Journal of Ethics 1 (1): 45-64. 1997.Previously, I have argued that moral responsibility for actions is associated with guidance control. This sort of control does not necessarily involve the freedom to do otherwise. In this paper I extend the view to apply to omissions. That is, moral responsibility for an omission is associated with guidance control of that omission. This helps to provide a systematic, unified account of moral responsibility.
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268Responsibility, Freedom, and Reason:Freedom Within Reason. Susan WolfEthics 102 (2): 368-. 1992.
Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics and Epistemology |
| Value Theory |
Areas of Interest
| Metaphysics and Epistemology |
| Value Theory |