•  511
    Responsibility and manipulation
    The Journal of Ethics 8 (2): 145-177. 2004.
    I address various critiques of the approach to moral responsibility sketched in previous work by Ravizza and Fischer. I especially focus on the key issues pertaining to manipulation.
  •  277
    Responsibility and self-expression
    The Journal of Ethics 3 (4): 277-297. 1999.
    I present two different models of moral responsibility -- two different accounts of what we value in behavior for which the agent can legitimately be held morally responsible. On the first model, what we value is making a certain sort of difference to the world. On the second model, which I favor, we value a certain kind of self-expression. I argue that if one adopts the self-expression view, then one will be inclined to accept that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities…Read more
  •  312
    Responsibility and the Kinds of Freedom
    The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4). 2008.
    In this paper I seek to identify different sorts of freedom putatively linked to moral responsibility; I then explore the relationship between such notions of freedom and the Consequence Argument, on the one hand, and the Frankfurt-examples, on the other. I focus (in part) on a dilemma: if a compatibilist adopts a broadly speaking "conditional" understanding of freedom in reply to the Consequence Argument, such a theorist becomes vulnerable in a salient way to the Frankfurt-examples
  •  102
    Responsibility, Autonomy, and the Zygote Argument
    The Journal of Ethics 21 (3): 223-237. 2017.
    In this paper I argue that the distinction between moral responsibility and autonomy can illuminate various debates about the Zygote Argument. Having made this distinction, one can see how these manipulation arguments are unsuccessful. Building on previous work, I also argue that this distinction can provide a framework for understanding other important work in agency theory, including that of Harry Frankfurt and Gary Watson.
  •  663
    Responsibility and control
    Journal of Philsophy 79 (January): 24-40. 1982.
  •  1858
    This book provides a comprehensive, systematic theory of moral responsibility. The authors explore the conditions under which individuals are morally responsible for actions, omissions, consequences, and emotions. The leading idea in the book is that moral responsibility is based on 'guidance control'. This control has two components: the mechanism that issues in the relevant behavior must be the agent's own mechanism, and it must be appropriately responsive to reasons. The book develops an acco…Read more
  •  65
    Reason and Action
    Philosophical Review 88 (3): 453. 1979.
  •  75
    Responsibility and Control
    Journal of Philosophy 79 (1): 24-40. 1982.
  •  38
    Replies
    Social Theory and Practice 37 (1): 143-181. 2011.
    I am very grateful to the thoughtful and probing critical discussions by the nine authors who have discussed themes from my two collections, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, and Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. In this essay I seek to respond to some of the points raised in these essays. I am unable to address all of the critiques, but I have certainly learned a great deal from these extremely insightful and generous papers, and I hope to address more of the issues in fu…Read more
  •  175
    Replies (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1): 267-278. 2009.
    I am very grateful to the thoughtful and probing critical discussions by the nine authors who have discussed themes from my two collections, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, and Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. In this essay I seek to respond to some of the points raised in these essays. I am unable to address all of the critiques, but I have certainly learned a great deal from these extremely insightful and generous papers, and I hope to address more of the issues in fu…Read more
  •  262
    Replies
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2): 467-480. 2000.
    I am very grateful to the thoughtful and probing critical discussions by the nine authors who have discussed themes from my two collections, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, and Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. In this essay I seek to respond to some of the points raised in these essays. I am unable to address all of the critiques, but I have certainly learned a great deal from these extremely insightful and generous papers, and I hope to address more of the issues in fu…Read more
  •  58
    Power over the Past
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (4): 335. 1984.
    I distinguish two versions of the "basic" argument for the incompatibility of god's foreknowledge and human freedom to do otherwise. I discuss various examples which purport to show that the first version is unsound. These examples seem to be cases in which an agent can do something, And if he were to do that thing, The past would have been different from what it actually was. I argue that these examples apply only to the first, And not to the second version of the incompatibilities argument
  •  126
    Problems with actual-sequence incompatibilism
    The Journal of Ethics 4 (4): 323-328. 2000.
  •  137
    Quinn on doing and allowing
    Philosophical Review 101 (2): 343-352. 1992.
  •  268
    Perspectives on moral responsibility (edited book)
    Cornell University Press. 1993.
    Explores aspects of responsibility, including moral accountability; hierarchy, rationality, and the real self; and ethical responsibility and alternative possibilities.
  •  205
  •  145
    Pike's Ockhamism
    Analysis 46 (1). 1986.
  •  1
    Putting Molinism in its Place
    In Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, Oxford University Press. 2011.
  •  113
    Power necessity
    Philosophical Topics 14 (2): 77-91. 1986.
  •  125
    Prenatal and Posthumous Non-Existence: A Reply to Johansson
    with Anthony L. Brueckner
    The Journal of Ethics 18 (1): 1-9. 2014.
    We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general (and arguably rational) asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves a crucial and illicit switch in temporal perspectives in the process of considering modal claims (sending us to other possible world…Read more
  •  59
    The church-going philosopher who settles in for an extended reading of Dan Dennett’s new book will find himself in a familiar circumstance. What one confronts is a lot more like an extended sermon than it is a typical philosophical treatise. And, whatever one’s Sunday morning habits, one can’t help but admire the preaching skills artfully displayed. The delivery is powerful and assured; the argument is streamlined, peppered with evocative and delightful illustrations that will be recalled long a…Read more