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369Responsibility and manipulationThe Journal of Ethics 8 (2): 145-177. 2004.I address various critiques of the approach to moral responsibility sketched in previous work by Ravizza and Fischer. I especially focus on the key issues pertaining to manipulation.
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37Responsibility and FailureProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86. 1986.John Martin Fischer; XIV*—Responsibility and Failure, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 251–272, https://doi.org/1.
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1Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophical Quarterly 49 (197): 543-545. 1999.
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55Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (2): 459-466. 1998.
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65Responsibility, Autonomy, and the Zygote ArgumentThe Journal of Ethics 21 (3): 223-237. 2017.In this paper I argue that the distinction between moral responsibility and autonomy can illuminate various debates about the Zygote Argument. Having made this distinction, one can see how these manipulation arguments are unsuccessful. Building on previous work, I also argue that this distinction can provide a framework for understanding other important work in agency theory, including that of Harry Frankfurt and Gary Watson.
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944Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral ResponsibilityCambridge University Press. 1998.This book provides a comprehensive, systematic theory of moral responsibility. The authors explore the conditions under which individuals are morally responsible for actions, omissions, consequences, and emotions. The leading idea in the book is that moral responsibility is based on 'guidance control'. This control has two components: the mechanism that issues in the relevant behavior must be the agent's own mechanism, and it must be appropriately responsive to reasons. The book develops an acco…Read more
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6RepliesSocial Theory and Practice 37 (1): 143-181. 2011.I am very grateful to the thoughtful and probing critical discussions by the nine authors who have discussed themes from my two collections, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, and Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. In this essay I seek to respond to some of the points raised in these essays. I am unable to address all of the critiques, but I have certainly learned a great deal from these extremely insightful and generous papers, and I hope to address more of the issues in fu…Read more
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83Responsibility and autonomy: The problem of mission creepPhilosophical Issues 22 (1): 165-184. 2012.
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51Replies (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1): 267-278. 2009.I am very grateful to the thoughtful and probing critical discussions by the nine authors who have discussed themes from my two collections, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, and Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. In this essay I seek to respond to some of the points raised in these essays. I am unable to address all of the critiques, but I have certainly learned a great deal from these extremely insightful and generous papers, and I hope to address more of the issues in fu…Read more
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42Responsibility and agent-causationIn David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, Ashgate. 2003.
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56Replies (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2): 467-480. 2000.I am very grateful to the thoughtful and probing critical discussions by the nine authors who have discussed themes from my two collections, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, and Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. In this essay I seek to respond to some of the points raised in these essays. I am unable to address all of the critiques, but I have certainly learned a great deal from these extremely insightful and generous papers, and I hope to address more of the issues in fu…Read more
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39Precis, our stories: essays on life, death, and free will (review)Philosophical Studies 158 (3): 503-506. 2012.
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24Power over the PastPacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (4): 335. 1984.I distinguish two versions of the "basic" argument for the incompatibility of god's foreknowledge and human freedom to do otherwise. I discuss various examples which purport to show that the first version is unsound. These examples seem to be cases in which an agent can do something, And if he were to do that thing, The past would have been different from what it actually was. I argue that these examples apply only to the first, And not to the second version of the incompatibilities argument
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113Precis of my way: Essays on moral responsibility (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1): 229-241. 2009.
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Putting Molinism in its PlaceIn Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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84Prenatal and Posthumous Non-Existence: A Reply to JohanssonThe Journal of Ethics 18 (1): 1-9. 2014.We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general (and arguably rational) asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves a crucial and illicit switch in temporal perspectives in the process of considering modal claims (sending us to other possible world…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |