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84Prenatal and Posthumous Non-Existence: A Reply to JohanssonThe Journal of Ethics 18 (1): 1-9. 2014.We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general (and arguably rational) asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves a crucial and illicit switch in temporal perspectives in the process of considering modal claims (sending us to other possible world…Read more
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30Our Fate: Essays on God and Free WillOxford University Press USA. 2016.Our Fate is a collection of John Martin Fischer's previously published articles on the relationship between God's foreknowledge and human freedom. The book contains a new introductory essay that places all of the chapters in the book into a cohesive framework. The introductory essay also provides some new views about the issues treated in the book, including a bold and original account of God's foreknowledge of free actions in a causally indeterministic world. The focus of the book is a powerful…Read more
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116My Way and Life’s Highway: Replies to Steward, Smilansky, and Perry (review)The Journal of Ethics 12 (2). 2008.I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that her view here is no more plausible than the view that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible, unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that we can see this from t…Read more
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16My Way and Life’s Highway: Replies to Steward, Smilansky, and PerryThe Journal of Ethics 12 (2): 167-189. 2008.I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible, unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that we…Read more
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242Morally responsible people without freedomIn John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Cambridge University Press. 1998.In this brief concluding chapter we first wish to present the overall argument of the book in a concise, nontechnical way. We hope this will provide a clear view of the argument. We shall then point to some of the distinctive--and attractive--features of our approach. Finally, we shall offer some preliminary thoughts about extending the account of moral responsibility to apply to emotions.
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137My compatibilismIn Paul Russell & Oisin Deery (eds.), The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings From the Contemporary Debates, Oxford University Press. 2013.
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297Moral responsibility and the metaphysics of free will: Reply to Van InwagenPhilosophical Quarterly 48 (191): 215-220. 1998.In _The Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997), pp. 373-381, van Inwagen argues in a critical notice of my book _The Metaphysics of Free Will that the impression that Frankfurt-type examples show that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities results from insufficient analytical precision. He suggests various precise principles which imply that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities. In reply, I seek to defend the conclusion I have drawn from Frankfurt-type exa…Read more
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31Metaphilosophy and Free Will (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4): 1083-1086. 1999.
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27Libertarianism and Avoid AbilityFaith and Philosophy 12 (1): 119-125. 1995.In previous work, I have claimed that the Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities work even in a world in which the actual sequence proceeds in a manner congenial to the libertarian. In “Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions,” Widerker criticizes this claim. Here I cast some doubt upon the criticism. Widerker’s critique depends on the falsity of a view held by Molina (and others) about the possibility of non-deterministic grounds for “would-c…Read more
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32I. Molinism and its roleIn Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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11International Phenomenological SocietyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 1004-1007. 1992.
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Introduction: Responsibility and freedomIn John Martin Fischer (ed.), Moral responsibility, Cornell University Press. 1986.
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2Indeterminism and control: An approach to the problem of luckIn Michael Freeman (ed.), Law and Neuroscience: Current Legal Issues, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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God, foreknowledge and freedomRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 180 (4): 728-729. 1990.
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11God, Time, and Knowledge by William Hasker and The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes by Edward R. Wierenga (review)Journal of Philosophy 88 (8): 427-433. 1991.
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |