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18What Moral Responsibility is NotIn James F. Childress & Michael Quante (eds.), Thick (Concepts of) Autonomy: Personal Autonomy in Ethics and Bioethics, Springer Verlag. pp. 1-16. 2021.Moral responsibility and autonomy are closely related structurally and contentwise: they are both members of the “freedom family”. Here I argue that because of these similarities, they are often conflated or at least not carefully separated, and that this has resulted in confusions in important contemporary debates. Autonomy and moral responsibility involve the agent’s identification with the sources of her actions; but autonomy-identification is more robust than responsibility-identification.
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17Précis of "Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4): 1-2. 2017.
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16Zdolność reagowania na racje a odpowiedzialność moralnaRoczniki Filozoficzne 69 (4): 467-496. 2021.Przekład na podstawie: „Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility”, w: Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, red. Ferdinand Schoeman, 81–106; przedruk w: John Martin Fischer, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, 63–83. Przekład za zgodą Autora. Autor przedstawia model odpowiedzialności moralnej oparty na faktycznej sekwencji i pojęciu zdolności reagowania na racje, a następnie przeprowadza analogię między tym modelem a opracowanym przez Roberta Nozicka mod…Read more
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16Epicureanism About Death and ImmortalityThe Journal of Ethics 10 (4): 355-381. 2006.In this paper I discuss some of Martha Nussbaum’s defenses of Epicurean views about death and immortality. Here I seek to defend the commonsense view that death can be a bad thing for an individual against the Epicurean; I also defend the claim that immortality might conceivably be a good thing. In the development of my analysis, I make certain connections between the literatures on free will and death. The intersection of these two literatures can be illuminated by reference to my notion of a D…Read more
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16My Way and Life’s Highway: Replies to Steward, Smilansky, and PerryThe Journal of Ethics 12 (2): 167-189. 2008.I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible, unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that we…Read more
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15Freedom from Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of ResponsibilityPhilosophical Review 99 (4): 649. 1990.
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15The importance of frankfurt‐style argumentPhilosophical Quarterly 57 (228): 464-471. 2007.I reply to the challenges to Frankfurt‐style compatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility presented in Daniel Speak's paper ‘The Impertinence of Frankfurt‐Style Argument’. I seek to show how Speak's critiques rest on an ‘all‐or‐nothing’ attitude in various ways, and I attempt to defend the importance of Frankfurt‐style argumentation in defence of compatibilism.
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15Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of DeathPhilosophical Review 102 (3): 416. 1993.
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15Review of Michael J. Zimmerman: An essay on moral responsibility (review)Ethics 101 (2): 408-409. 1991.
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14The Cards that are Dealt YouThe Journal of Ethics 10 (1-2): 107-129. 2006.Various philosophers have argued that in order to be morally responsible, we need to be the "ultimate sources'' of our choices and behavior. Although there are different versions of this sort of argument, I identify a "picture'' that lies behind them, and I contend that this picture is misleading. Joel Feinberg helpfully suggested that we scale down what might initially be thought to be legitimate demands on "self-creation,'' rather than jettison the idea that we are truly and robustly responsib…Read more
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14Metaphilosophy and Free WillPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (4): 1083-1086. 1996.
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14Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free WillOxford University Press USA. 2009.In this collection of essays on the metaphysical issues pertaining to death, the meaning of life, and freedom of the will, John Martin Fischer argues that death can be a bad thing for the individual who dies. He defends the claim that something can be a bad thing--a misfortune--for an individual, even if he never experiences it as bad. Fischer also defends the commonsense asymmetry in our attitudes toward death and prenatal nonexistence: we are indifferent to the time before we are born, but we …Read more
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138. Freedom and ActualityIn Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, Cornell University Press. pp. 236-254. 1988.
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12On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the Concordia) (review)Philosophical Review 101 (2): 387-391. 1992.
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12The Non-Reality of Free Will, by Richard DoublePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 1004-1007. 1992.
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12The Non-Reality of Free Will, by Richard Double (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 1004-1007. 1992.
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11International Phenomenological SocietyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 1004-1007. 1992.
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |