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140Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Fixity of the PastPhilosophia 39 (3): 461-474. 2011.I seek to clarify the notion of the fixity of the past appropriate to Pike’s regimentation of the argument for the incompatibility of God’s foreknowledge and human freedom. Also, I discuss Alvin Plantinga’s famous example of Paul and the Ant Colony in light of Pike’s argument
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15The Cards that are Dealt YouThe Journal of Ethics 10 (1-2): 107-129. 2006.Various philosophers have argued that in order to be morally responsible, we need to be the "ultimate sources'' of our choices and behavior. Although there are different versions of this sort of argument, I identify a "picture'' that lies behind them, and I contend that this picture is misleading. Joel Feinberg helpfully suggested that we scale down what might initially be thought to be legitimate demands on "self-creation,'' rather than jettison the idea that we are truly and robustly responsib…Read more
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17Epicureanism About Death and ImmortalityThe Journal of Ethics 10 (4): 355-381. 2006.In this paper I discuss some of Martha Nussbaum’s defenses of Epicurean views about death and immortality. Here I seek to defend the commonsense view that death can be a bad thing for an individual against the Epicurean; I also defend the claim that immortality might conceivably be a good thing. In the development of my analysis, I make certain connections between the literatures on free will and death. The intersection of these two literatures can be illuminated by reference to my notion of a D…Read more
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101Epicureanism About Death and ImmortalityThe Journal of Ethics 10 (4): 355-381. 2006.In this paper I discuss some of Martha Nussbaum's defenses of Epicurean views about death and immortality. Here I seek to defend the commonsense view that death can be a bad thing for an individual against the Epicurean; I also defend the claim that immortality might conceivably be a good thing. In the development of my analysis, I make certain connections between the literatures on free will and death. The intersection of these two literatures can be illuminated by reference to my notion of a D…Read more
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30The Free will RevolutionThe Journal of Ethics 10 (3): 315-345. 2006.I seek to reply to the thoughtful and penetrating comments by William Rowe, Alfred Mele, Carl Ginet, and Ishtiyaque Haji. In the process, I hope that my overall approach to free will and moral responsibility is thrown into clearer relief. I make some suggestions as to future directions of research in these areas.
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138The Cards that are Dealt YouThe Journal of Ethics 10 (1-2): 107-129. 2006.Various philosophers have argued that in order to be morally responsible, we need to be the "ultimate sources'' of our choices and behavior. Although there are different versions of this sort of argument, I identify a "picture'' that lies behind them, and I contend that this picture is misleading. Joel Feinberg helpfully suggested that we scale down what might initially be thought to be legitimate demands on "self-creation,'' rather than jettison the idea that we are truly and robustly responsib…Read more
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31Warren Facing Death. Epicurus and his Critics. Pp. x + 240. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. Cased, £30. ISBN: 0-19-925289-0 (review)The Classical Review 56 (1): 67-69. 2006.
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91Replies to critics (review)Philosophical Studies 158 (3): 529-540. 2012.Replies to critics Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9669-y Authors John Martin Fischer, University of California, Riverside, CA USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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92The Truth about Freedom: A Reply to MerricksPhilosophical Review 120 (1): 97-115. 2011.In his recent essay in the Philosophical Review, “Truth and Freedom,” Trenton Merricks contends (among other things) that the basic argument for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human freedom is question-begging. He relies on a “truism” to the effect that truth depends on the world and not the other way around. The present essay argues that mere invocation of this truism does not establish that the basic argument for incompatibilism is question-begging. Further, it seeks to clarify…Read more
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43Near-Death Experiences: Understanding Visions of the AfterlifeOxford University Press USA. 2016.Near-death experiences offer a glimpse not only into the nature of death but also into the meaning of life. They are not only useful tools to aid in the human quest to understand death but are also deeply meaningful, transformative experiences for the people who have them. In a unique contribution to the growing and popular literature on the subject, philosophers John Martin Fischer and Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin examine prominent near-death experiences, such as those of Pam Reynolds, Eben Alexand…Read more
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49Contribution on Martha Nussbaum’s The Therapy of Desire (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3): 787. 1999.
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27Review Essay: The Metaphysics of ControlThe Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on ControlPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4): 955. 1997.
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57Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility and HistoryResponsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2): 453. 2000.
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32Precis of Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral ResponsibilityResponsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2): 441. 2000.The leading idea of our theory of moral responsibility is that responsibility is associated with control. But we contend that there are two distinct kinds of control. Regulative control involves alternative possibilities: it is a kind of dual power of free action. In contrast, guidance control does not, by its nature, involve alternative possibilities. Whereas typically it might be thought that regulative and guidance control go together, the Frankfurt-type cases show that they are separate and …Read more
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33Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will * By John Martin Fischer (review)Analysis 70 (1): 196-198. 2010.In Our Stories, John Martin Fischer offers readers a characteristically thoughtful and engaging presentation of his views on a variety of topics, most notably death, immortality and self-expression. Having come to this collection familiar primarily with Fischer's work on freedom and responsibility, I was impressed with the range of issues treated in this latest volume. While each essay is independently appealing, perhaps the most compelling aspect of Our Stories is its cohesiveness. Fischer disc…Read more
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5Deep Control: A Theory of Moral ResponsibilityOxford University Press USA. 2011.In this collection of essays -- a follow up to My Way and Our Stories -- John Martin Fischer defends the contention that moral responsibility is associated with "deep control." Fischer defines deep control as the middle ground between two untenable extreme positions: "superficial control" and "total control."Our freedom consists of the power to add to the given past, holding fixed the laws of nature, and therefore, Fischer contends, we must be able to interpret our actions as extensions of a lin…Read more
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Freedom and determinismIn Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Ethics, Garland Publishing. pp. 385--388. 1992.
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In Fischer, Kane et alIn John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom & Manuel Vargas (eds.), Four Views on Free Will, Wiley-blackwell. 2007.
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The direct argument: You say goodbye, I say helloIn Nick Trakakis & Daniel Cohen (eds.), Essays on free will and moral responsibility, Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 209--223. 2008.
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15The importance of frankfurt‐style argumentPhilosophical Quarterly 57 (228): 464-471. 2007.I reply to the challenges to Frankfurt‐style compatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility presented in Daniel Speak's paper ‘The Impertinence of Frankfurt‐Style Argument’. I seek to show how Speak's critiques rest on an ‘all‐or‐nothing’ attitude in various ways, and I attempt to defend the importance of Frankfurt‐style argumentation in defence of compatibilism.
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17Précis of "Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4): 1-2. 2017.
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231My way: essays on moral responsibilityOxford University Press. 2006.This is a selection of essays on moral responsibility that represent the major components of John Martin Fischer's overall approach to freedom of the will and moral responsibility. The collection exhibits the overall structure of Fischer's view and shows how the various elements fit together to form a comprehensive framework for analyzing free will and moral responsibility. The topics include deliberation and practical reasoning, freedom of the will, freedom of action, various notions of control…Read more
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63Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and ValueOup Usa. 2012.Fischer here defends the contention that moral responsibility is associated with "deep control", which is "in-between" two untenable extreme positions: "superficial control" and "total control". He defends this "middle way" against the proponents of more--and less--robust notions of the freedom required for moral responsibility. Fischer offers a new solution to the Luck Problem, as well as providing a defense of the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility
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641IntroductionIn John Martin Fischer & Patrick Todd (eds.), Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 01-38. 2015.This Introduction has three sections, on "logical fatalism," "theological fatalism," and the problem of future contingents, respectively. In the first two sections, we focus on the crucial idea of "dependence" and the role it plays it fatalistic arguments. Arguably, the primary response to the problems of logical and theological fatalism invokes the claim that the relevant past truths or divine beliefs depend on what we do, and therefore needn't be held fixed when evaluating what we can do. W…Read more
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98The Truth about ForeknowledgeFaith and Philosophy 30 (3): 286-301. 2013.In this paper we critically evaluate Trenton Merricks’s recent attempt to provide a “new” way of defending compatibilism about divine foreknowledge and human freedom. We take issue with Merricks’s claim that his approach is fundamentally different from Ockhamism. We also seek to highlight the implausibility of Merricks’s rejection of the assumption of the fixity of the past, and we also develop a critique of the Merricks’s crucial notion of “dependence.”
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47The Metaphysics of Free Will: A Reply to My CriticsJournal of Social Philosophy 29 (2): 157-167. 1998.
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |