•  24
    Eternal God (review)
    Faith and Philosophy 8 (3): 398-402. 1991.
  •  220
    Divine Simplicity and Divine Freedom
    Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 89 45-56. 2015.
    I explain the doctrine of divine simplicity, and reject what is now the standard way to explicate it in analytic philosophy. I show that divine simplicity imperils the claim that God is free, and argue against a popular proposal for dealing with the problem.
  •  35
    Divine Action and Embodiment
    Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 71 113-124. 1997.
  •  33
    Divinity and Maximal Greatness (review)
    Faith and Philosophy 25 (4): 455-461. 2008.
  •  222
    Divine Simplicity
    Faith and Philosophy 23 (4): 365-380. 2006.
    Augustine, Aquinas and many other medievals held the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) -that God has no parts of any sort. Augustine took this to imply that for any non-relational attribute F, if God is F, God = Fness. This can seem to create three problems. I set them out. Having done so, I show that Augustine's DDS is set within a view of attributes now unfamiliar to us. When we bring this into the picture, it turns out that two of the problems do not really arise and the third is not reall…Read more
  •  64
    Composition and Christology
    Faith and Philosophy 28 (3): 310-322. 2011.
    One central claim of orthodox Christianity is that in Jesus of Nazareth, God became man. On Chalcedonian orthodoxy, this involves one person, God the Son, having two natures, divine and human. If He does, one person has two properties, deity and humanity. But the Incarnation also involves concrete objects, God the Son (GS), Jesus’s human body (B) and—I will assume—Jesus’s human soul (S). If God becomes human, GS, B and S somehow become one thing. It would be good to have a metaphysical account o…Read more
  •  17
    Change, Cause and Contradiction
    Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176): 406. 1994.
  • Divine Action
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71 113-124. 1997.
  •  11
    A timeless God incarnate
    In Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall & Gerald O'Collins (eds.), The Incarnation, Oxford Up. pp. 273--299. 2002.
  •  50
  •  3
    Anti social trinitarianism
    In Trinity, The, Oxford University Press. pp. 203-249. 1999.
  •  3
    Anselm's perfect being theology
    In The Cambridge Companion to Anselm, Cambridge University Press. pp. 132--156. 2004.
  •  24
    Anselm on the Cost of Salvation
    Medieval Philosophy & Theology 6 (1): 73-92. 1997.
    This paper examines Anselm’s reply to this argument in order to shed light on a number of issues in philosophical theology, including the metaphysics of the Incarnation, the relation between perfect being theology and the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement, the senses in which the Christian God might be impassible, and the nature of God’s perfect rationality and wisdom. (edited)
  •  168
    Anselmian polytheism
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 23 (2). 1988.
  •  175
    Anselmian Presentism
    Faith and Philosophy 26 (3): 297-319. 2009.
    I rebut four claims made in a recent article by Katherin Rogers. En route I discuss how a timeless God might perceive all of “tensed” time at once.
  •  137
    Aquinas on Time and Eternity
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 64 (3): 387-399. 1990.
  •  77
    Aquinas on the Infinite
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2 27-38. 1999.
    Both Copleston and Duhem—I believe—claim that for Thomas Aquinas, there cannot be an infinity of anything. In this essay I argue that Thomas allows that there can be an infinity of some sorts of item and, more, that there actually are infinities of some items.
  •  67
    Anselm on the Necessity of the Incarnation
    Religious Studies 31 (2). 1995.
    Anselm's "Cur Deus" Homo argues that only by the Incarnation can God save humanity. This seems to sit ill with the claim that God is omnipotent and absolutely free, for this entails that God could save humanity in other ways. I show that features of Anselm's concept of God and treatment of necessity make the claim that the Incarnation is a necessary means of salvation problematic. I then show that for Anselm, all conditions which make the Incarnation necessary for human salvation stem from God's…Read more
  •  70
    Anselm on the Beauty of the Incarnation
    Modern Schoolman 72 (2-3). 1995.
    Among the objections to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation which Anselm takes up in ’Cur Deus Nomo’ is an argument that a wise God would not act so, because it is inefficient. I explicate Anselm’s reply to this. It is (I argue) that the Incarnation is an elegant way to achieve a large set of goods including human salvation, and that God might well be wise to treat a sort of beauty the Incarnation involves as a value more important than efficiency
  •  93
    Aquinas on God and Modal Truth
    Modern Schoolman 82 (3): 171-200. 2005.
  •  124
    Anselm on Omnipresence
    New Scholasticism 63 (3): 326-357. 1989.
  •  12
    An Essay on Facts
    International Philosophical Quarterly 30 (4): 508-510. 1990.
  •  261
    Anselm's neglected argument
    Philosophy 77 (3): 331-347. 2002.
    Anselm is commonly credited with two a priori arguments for God's existence, the non-modal argument of Proslogion 2 and a modal argument some find in Proslogion 3. But his Reply to Gaunilo contains a third. The argument as Anselm gives it has flaws, but they are not fatal, and its main premise can serve as the basis of a simpler, stronger argument.
  •  283
    A Leibnizian cosmological argument
    Philosophical Studies 57 (2). 1989.
    I explicate and defend leibniz's argument from "eternal truths" to the existence of god. I argue that necessary beings can be caused to exist, Showing how one can apply a counterfactual analysis to such causation, Then argue that if such beings can be caused to exist, They are
  •  213
    A Latin Trinity
    Faith and Philosophy 21 (3): 304-333. 2004.
    Latin models of the Trinity begin from the existence of one God, and try to explain how one God can be three Persons. I offer an account of this based on an analogy with time-travel. A time-traveler returning to the same point in time repeatedly might have three successive events in his/her life occurring at that one location in public time. So too, God’s life might be such that three distinct parts of His life are always occurring at once, though without any succession between them, and this mi…Read more
  •  274
    A modal cosmological argument
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 24 (3). 1988.
  •  11
    Agency and Integrality (review)
    International Philosophical Quarterly 28 (4): 467-469. 1988.
  •  2
    Against deity theories
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2 105-60. 2010.
  • . 2002.