Max De Gaynesford

This paper draws attention to the fact that works of philosophy are often judged by aesthetic criteria. This raises the question of whether philosophical writings may properly be regarded as suitable objects of aesthetic judgement in a strong sense; namely, that judging their worth qua works of philosophy is an aesthetic endeavour. The paper argues in the affirmative with the aid of a Kantian account of aesthetic judgement. Judging a work of philosophy by the means chosen may be regarded as subjecting it to criticism by criteria established within a philosophical aesthetic.

What is at stake when J. L. Austin calls poetry ‘non-serious’, and sidelines it in his speech act theory?. Standard explanations polarize sharply along party lines: poets and critics are incensed, while philosophers deny cause. Neither line is consistent with Austin's remarks, whose allusions to Plato, Aristotle and Frege are insufficiently noted. What Austin thinks is at stake is confusion, which he corrects apparently to the advantage of poets. But what is actually at stake is the possibility of commitment and poetic integrity. We should reject what Austin offers.

If philosophy and poetry are to illuminate each other, we should first understand their tendencies to mutual antipathy. Examining mutual misapprehension is part of this task. J. L. Austin's remarks on poetry offer one such point of entry: they are often cited by poets and critics as an example of philosophy's blindness to poetry. These remarks are complex and their purpose obscure—more so than those who take exception to them usually allow or admit. But it is reasonable to think that, for all his levity at their expense, what Austin offers poets is exemption from forms of commitment. Since such exemption is precisely what poets and critics have sought, this diagnosis is eirenic. This exemption has a price, but it may be affordable.