Max De Gaynesford

Claudia Bianchi defends what she calls ‘MacKinnon's claim’: that ‘works of pornography can be understood as illocutionary acts of subordinating women, or illocutionary acts of silencing women’ in response to Saul, and by appeal to the formulations of Langton, Hornsby and Hornsby and Langton. I think Bianchi has two different claims in mind, and that it is important to distinguish the two, since the argument offered for either claim frustrates the aim sought by the other.Bianchi expresses the first claim when she says ‘pornography is the subordination of women’, and that it subordinates ‘by conditioning people to regard women as willing sexual objects’. Call this Subordination. She expresses the second claim when she says pornography ‘silences women’, and that it does so …

If philosophy and poetry are to illuminate each other, we should first understand their tendencies to mutual antipathy. Examining mutual misapprehension is part of this task. J. L. Austin's remarks on poetry offer one such point of entry: they are often cited by poets and critics as an example of philosophy's blindness to poetry. These remarks are complex and their purpose obscure—more so than those who take exception to them usually allow or admit. But it is reasonable to think that, for all his levity at their expense, what Austin offers poets is exemption from forms of commitment. Since such exemption is precisely what poets and critics have sought, this diagnosis is eirenic. This exemption has a price, but it may be affordable.

Philosophy has tended to regard poetry primarily in terms of truth and falsity, assuming that its business is to state or describe states of affairs. Speech act theory transforms philosophical debate by regarding poetry in terms of action, showing that its business is primarily to do things. The proposal can sharpen our understanding of types of poetry; examples of the ‘Chaucer-Type’ and its variants demonstrate this. Objections to the proposal can be divided into those that relate to the agent of actions associated with a poem, those that relate to the actions themselves, and those that relate to the things done. These objections can be answered. A significant consequence of the proposal is that it gives prominence to issues of responsibility and commitment. This prominence brings philosophical debate usefully into line with contemporary poetry, whose concern with such issues is manifest in characteristic forms of anxiety.

Consensus identifies an underlying continuity to Wittgenstein's treatment of the self and 'I', despite certain obvious surface variations and revisions. Almost all Wittgenstein's arguments and observations concerning 'I' and the self in the Tractatus are arranged as attempts to explicate. The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world, not a part of it. The picture that forms around the consensus view is certainly enlightening about Wittgenstein on 'I' and the self, but this is so because rather than in spite of the difficulties we face in making it match. Contrary to the consensus view, there is little or no 'denigrating' of the first person in his thought, whether of the reductionist or eliminativist kind, and where it may be manifest limited uses only, and by contrast with the general case.

Putnam is one of the most influential philosophers of recent times, and his authority stretches far beyond the confines of the discipline. However, there is a considerable challenge in presenting his work both accurately and accessibly. This is due to the width and diversity of his published writings and to his frequent spells of radical re-thinking. But if we are to understand how and why philosophy is developing as it is, we need to attend to Putnam's whole career. He has had a dramatic influence on theories of meaning, semantic content, and the nature of mental phenomena, on interpretations of quantum mechanics, theory-change, logic and mathematics, and on what shape we should desire for future philosophy. By presenting the whole of his career within its historical context, de Gaynesford discovers a basic unity in his work, achieved through repeated engagements with a small set of hard problems. By foregrounding this integrity, the book offers an account of his philosophy that is both true to Putnam and helpful to readers of his work.

John McDowell has set the philosophical world alight with arevolutionary approach to the subject, illuminating old problemswith dazzling particularity. In this welcome introduction to hiswork, Maximilian de Gaynesford puts writing within comfortablereach of non-specialists. The guiding argument of the book is that the variety of McDowell'sinterests disguises a core concern with a single basic goal:'giving philosophy peace'. Since the dawn of the subject,philosophy has struggled with the question: can our experience ofthe world give rational support to what we think and say; and ifso, how? McDowell claims that philosophy has itself to blame ifthese questions seem problematic, and this book's animating purposeis to see what sense can be made of this notorious claim. InMcDowell's view, the illusion that our fundamental relations withthe world are truly problematic is traceable to false views aboutnature. We should give proper weight to a natural fact about theworld: that human beings are of a kind that is naturally placedwithin the natural order. De Gaynesford analyses McDowell's densely argued and meticulouswork in a lucid, balanced and engaging way, that will proveinvaluable for all students and scholars of McDowell andphilosophy.

Reflecting a recent flourishing of creative thinking in the field, _Agents and Their Actions_ presents seven newly commissioned essays by leading international philosophers that highlight the most recent debates in the philosophy of action Features seven internationally significant authors, including new work by two of philosophy's ‘super stars’, John McDowell and Joseph Raz Presents the first clear indication of how John McDowell is extending his path-breaking work on intentionality and perceptual experience towards an account of action and agency Covers all the major interconnections between action-agency and central areas of Philosophy: Metaphysics, Epistemology, History of Philosophy, Ethics, Logic, Philosophy of Language Provides a snapshot of current debate on the subject, which is fresh, enlightening, and fruitful.

This paper is about how action and perception are related in self–awareness. The main positive claim is that bodily awareness may consist in perceptual experiences that are sufficient to provide corporeal objects with introspective self–awareness. The short–term goal is to examine the grounds and motivations for strong versions of the claim that the self–awareness of corporeal objects is dependent on the exercise of their agency. As examples of ‘patient perceivers’ show, we should not underestimate the resources that perceptual experience alone offers to corporeal selves.