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63Micro-based properties and the supervenience argument: A response to KimProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1): 115-18. 1999.Paul Noordhof; Discussion: Micro-Based Properties and the Supervenience Argument: A Response to Kim, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 99, Issue 1.
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55The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of beliefPhilosophical Studies 177 (5): 1213-1227. 2020.We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth—it is permissible to believe that p if and only if p is true—is unable to explain Transparency in doxastic deliberation, a task for which it is claimed to be equipped. In addition, the failure of the norm to do this work undermines the most plausible account of how the norm guides belief formation at all. Those attracted to normativism about belief for its perceived explanatory credentials had better look elsewhere.
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48Personal dualism and the argument from differential vaguenessPhilosophical Papers 31 (1): 63-86. 2002.Abstract In Causing Actions, Pietroski defends a distinctive view of the relationship between mind and body which he calls Personal Dualism. Central to his defence is the Argument from Differential Vagueness. It moves from the claim that mental events have different vagueness of spatiotemporal boundaries from neural events to the claim that mental events are not identical to neural events. In response, I argue that this presupposes an ontological account of vagueness that there is no reason to b…Read more
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45Emergent Causation and Property CausationIn Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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45Epiphenomenalism and causal asymmetryIn Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, Routledge. 2003.
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42More in pain … 153Analysis 62 (2): 153-154. 2002.In his response, Michael Tye writes as if I reject Representationalism about pain. But in my original paper (Noordhof 2001) I hoped to make clear that I did not. For instance, I remarked that I had sympathy with the position (95) and, on the subsequent page, outlined what I thought the Represen- tationalist should say. My proposal was that when we experience a pain in the finger, the experience is veridical only if the cause of this experience is a disordered state of the finger. My appeal to th…Read more
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41Ramachandran's four counterexamplesMind 109 (434): 315-324. 2000.Murali Ramachandran has kindly provided me with four (alleged) counterexamples to the theory of causation which I recently put forward in Mind (Ramachandran 2000; Noordhof 1999). Space is limited for a response. Since this note will be published Ramachandran's paper, I will not set out the cases he gives. I refer the reader to the appropriate descriptions. I will also presume knowledge of the framework of my paper and just give page references in case this is helpful. I will try to couch the dis…Read more
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40The good in the right: A theory of intuition and intrinsic value - by Robert AudiPhilosophical Books 49 (2): 175-178. 2008.
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38The transmogrification of a posteriori knowledge: reply to BruecknerAnalysis 65 (1): 88-89. 2005.
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33The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic DelusionIn Paul Henne & Samuel Murray (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action, Routledge. 2023.
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24Something Like AbilityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1): 21-40. 2003.One diagnosis of what is wrong with the Knowledge Argument rests on the Ability Hypothesis. This couples an ability analysis of knowing what an experience is like together with a denial that phenomenal propositions exist. I argue against both components. I consider three arguments against the existence of phenomenal propositions and find them wanting. Nevertheless I deny that knowing phenomenal propositions is part of knowing what an experience is like. I provide a hybrid account of knowing what…Read more
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23A Variety of CausesOxford University Press. 2020.The book provides an analysis of a key notion in our lives, causation: what its nature is; how we should characterise it in language, how it relates to laws of nature, how causes differ from their effects and why they tend to occur earlier than their effects.
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23Art and Belief (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2017.Art and Belief presents new work at the intersection of philosophy of mind and philosophy of art. Topics include the cognitive contributions artworks can make, the phenomenon of fictional persuasion, and the nature of aesthetic testimony, and the relation between belief and truth in our experience of art.
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22Explaining impossible and possible imaginings of painRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 12 (2): 173-182. 2021.: Jennifer Radden argues that it is impossible to imagine sensuously pain and explains this by noting that pains are sensory qualities for which there is no distinction between appearance and reality. By contrast, I argue that only basic sensuous imaginings of pain from the first person perspective are, with some qualifications, impossible. Non-basic sensuous imaginings of pain from the first person perspective are possible. I explain the extent to which imagining pain is impossible in terms of …Read more
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22Paul Pietroski’s book Causing
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19Discussion: Micro-Based Properties and the Supervenience Argument: A Response to KimProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1): 109-114. 1999.Paul Noordhof; Discussion: Micro-Based Properties and the Supervenience Argument: A Response to Kim, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 99, Issue 1.
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18Accidental associations, local potency, and a dilemma for DretskeMind and Language 11 (2): 216-22. 1996.I argue that Fred Dretske's account of the causal relevance of content only works if another account works better, that put forward by Gabriel Segal and Elliot Sober. Dretske needs to appeal to it to deal with two problems he faces: one arising because he accepts that the mere association between indicators and indicated is causally relevant to the recruitment of indicators in causing behaviour, the other from the need to explain how a present token of a certain type of content is causally relev…Read more
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16Revisiting Maher’s One-Factor Theory of Delusion, AgainNeuroethics 17 (1): 1-8. 2024.Chenwei Nie ([22]) argues against a Maherian one-factor approach to explaining delusion. We argue that his objections fail. They are largely based on a mistaken understanding of the approach (as committed to the claim that anomalous experience is sufficient for delusion). Where they are not so based, they instead rest on misinterpretation of recent defences of the position, and an underestimation of the resources available to the one-factor theory.
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15Reviews (review)Mind and Language 18 (5). 2003.Books reviewed in this article: Michael Tye, Consciousness, Color and Content J. C. King, Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account.
Areas of Specialization
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Aesthetics |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Metaphysics of Mind |
Mental Causation |
Imagination |
Motivation and Will |
Areas of Interest
Aesthetics |