Walter Glannon

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Walter Glannon WHAT LITERARY THEORY MISSES IN WITTGENSTEIN Wittgenstein's stock is rising in literary criticism. The market value of expressions such as "language games" and "form oflife" is increasing in that they seem to lend themselves to the notion of interpretive communities endorsed by diose of reader-response persuasion.1 Wittgenstein's style is also apparently at a premium, in light of a recent attempt by a proponent of deconstruction to relate the philosopher's writing to that movement's use of rhetorical strategies in dealing with texts.2 There are affinities between Wittgenstein's repudiation (in the Investigations and the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics) of the metaphysical realism in the Tractatus and die arguments from reader-response critics against the notion of unmediated facts, as well as the rejection of the metaphysics of presence by deconstructionists. All diree oppose the idea that truth and falsity are conferred on our statements about the world by properties independent of diese statements. Insofar as these two critical schools are concerned primarily with language, they share Wittgenstein's aspiration to "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (PI, I, § 116), for we can arrest the tendency to postulate objective, unmediated facts by "looking into the workings of our language" (PI, I, § 109). Moreover, Wittgenstein avoids psychology which involves the mental faculties. Presumably, this puts him at one with die concerted effort of many critics to rid texts of die author and with it the problem of intentionality. At first blush, then, the relation between Wittgenstein and literary criticism appears to be an attractive one. Yet Wittgenstein's antirealism does not militate against his passion for truth, that is, his intense desire to achieve complete understanding in the areas ofphilosophy that vexed him most.3 Nor does it debar him from thinking about the inexpressible realm 263 264Philosophy and Literature of the mystical, since, despite his concern for language, Wittgenstein never ceased being attracted to "things that cannot be put into words" (TLP, 6.522). This is not at all congenial to die purpose ofliterary theory, which admits ofno such shadowy domain beyond words and our linguistic practices. Indeed, I shall illustrate that Wittgenstein's resdess search for truth, spiritual concerns, and the dialectical structure of his works for the most part put him radically at odds with a critical enterprise whose aversion to truth and penchant for rhetorical analysis and conventions blinds it to both his view of literature and his aim in doing philosophy. I Since die advent of the New Criticism, literary theory has in great measure addressed itself to die discourse ramer than the story in texts. With the focus on literature as a rhetorical construct, more traditional humanistic interpretations have been excised. A more recent development of this shift to the discursive side of diings has been the effort to blur the distinction between literature and philosophy.4 With neidier discipline having a privileged status, both have been reduced to a textual discourse with no lines ofdemarcation, a reduction diat is at variance with Wittgenstein on two counts. First, he compartmentalized literature and philosophy as having distinct purposes: the literary works that interested him were stories ofmoral import; philosophy was to be practiced for the sake of clarity in thought. To the extent diat such clarity, if attainable, pointed toward an ethical dimension that lay beyond the bounds of language, literature and philosophy for him did have a common goal; but the paths leading to it were distinct. Second, and more importantly, Wittgenstein had no concern for the discourse of the literature diat he read. Rather, it was the moral import of the stories that attracted him. Most noteworthy on this score were the writings of Tolstoy, who had a profound influence on Wittgenstein's view oflife, and Dostoevsky.5 Wittgenstein often recommended Tolstoy's Twenty-three Tales to his friends, and while a schoolmaster in Lower Austria from 1920 to 1926, he constantly read The Brothers Karamazov, doing so aloud on one occasion in die presence of the village priest. He was especially impressed with Dostoevsky's character the Elder Zossima, "who could see into people's hearts and direct diem" (Rhees...

This title was first published in 2002: This book is an analysis of the ways in which mental states ground attributions of responsibility to persons. Particular features of the book include: attention to the agent's epistemic capacity for beliefs about the foreseeable consequences of actions and omissions; attention to the essential role of emotions in prudential and moral reasoning; a conception of personal identity that can justify holding persons responsible at later times for actions performed at earlier times; an emphasis on neurobiology as the science that should inform our thinking about free will and responsibility; and the melding of literature on free will and responsibility in contemporary analytic philosophy with legal cases, abnormal psychology, neurology and psychiatry, which offers a richer texture to the general debate on the relevant issues.

We have only a limited understanding of how the brain enables thought and behavior and how it becomes dysfunctional in neuropsychiatric disorders. Research in cognitive psychology, psychiatry, neurology, neurosurgery and nuclear medicine has been critical to our current understanding of the brain. Continued research is necessary to gain more knowledge of the etiology and pathophysiology of brain disorders and develop therapies to safely and effectively control and possibly prevent them. Yet mapping the brain through neuroimaging and intervening in the brain with psychotropic drugs, growth factors or implantable neuromodulating devices entail certain risks for research subjects participating in clinical trials. These risks need to be weighed against the potential benefit of knowledge gained from the outcomes of these trials to millions of people suffering from psychiatric and neurological diseases. The risks in neuroscience research are greater than in any other area of medicine and biotechnology because the brain is the source of the mind and the psychological properties that define persons. Can patients with neuropsychiatric disorders give informed consent to participate in neuroscience research? If they cannot consent, then can others give proxy consent on their behalf? What are the obligations of investigators recruiting and monitoring research subjects? In discussing the ethical issues in this research, this chapter focuses on neuroimaging to assess patients with severe brain injuries, neuromodulating techniques such as deep brain stimulation in neurology and psychiatry and brain-computer interfaces to bypass brain and spinal cord injury in restoring movement and communication.

The Neuroethics of Memory is a thematically integrated analysis and discussion of neuroethical questions about memory capacity and content, as well as interventions to alter it. These include: how does memory function enable agency, and how does memory dysfunction disable it? To what extent is identity based on our capacity to accurately recall the past? Could a person who becomes aware during surgery be harmed if they have no memory of the experience? How do we weigh the benefits and risks of brain implants designed to enhance, weaken or erase memory? Can a person be responsible for an action if they do not recall it? Would a victim of an assault have an obligation to retain a memory of this act, or the right to erase it? This book uses a framework informed by neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy combined with actual and hypothetical cases to examine these and related questions.

Some cognitive neuroscientists and psychologists claim that our conscious mental states and actions can be explained entirely in terms of unconscious mechanical processes in the brain. This suggests that our belief in free will is an illusion and that we cannot be responsible for our actions. I argue that neuroscience as such does not threaten free and responsible agency. The real threat to free will is not normal brain function but brain dysfunction that impairs or undermines our capacity for agency

Testa and colleagues argue that evaluation for suitability for living donor surgery is rooted in paternalism in contrast with the evaluation for most operative interventions which is rooted in the autonomy of patients. We examine two key ethical concepts that Testa and colleagues use: paternalism and autonomy, and two related ethical concepts, moral agency and shared decision making. We show that moving the conversation from paternalism, negative autonomy and informed consent to moral agency, relational autonomy and shared decision making, one better understands why the arguments give by Testa and colleagues fail.

If the new and rapidly expanding discipline of neuroethics is to have a signii cant impact on patient care, the neuroscience clinicians must become familiar with the discipline, and be competent and comfortable in applying its cognitive base and principles to clinical decisionmaking. Familiarity with and practical experience in the application of basic biomedical knowledge and principles to clinical decision- making in the neurosciences becomes the essential foundation on which to begin to integrate neuroethics into medical education. The place where the building of this foundation and the initial exposure to neuroethics must begin is in the residency program. This article describes the approach developed in the neurology residency education program at the University of Calgary to move toward achieving this goal. The key elements for the development and successful implementation of the program are outlined and a brief overview of the topics covered in the sessions is described

All psychiatric disorders have a neurobiological basis. This has led to a better understanding of these disorders and a reduction in the social stigma associated with them. But the claim that mental states can be explained entirely in neurobiological terms may give us de-stigmatization at the cost of de-personalization. A holistic view of the mind as distributed among the brain, body and environment provides the best model to guide interventions that will have the most salutary ef ects on the brain and the mind

This work is an analysis of the metaphysical, psychological, and normative conditions that are necessary and sufficient for individual persons to be morally responsible. It takes the content of responsibility, that is, what persons are responsible for, to include mental states as well as actions, omissions, and the consequences of actions and omissions. I hold that moral responsibility entails causal responsibility. A person is causally responsible for mental states, actions, and states of affairs just in case he has the capacity to respond to practical reasoning, to translate reasons into action, and to respond to theoretical reasoning concerning the likely consequences of what he does or fails to do. He is morally responsible if, in addition to these capacities, he has the normative capacity to respond to moral reasons for the right sorts of action. ;In Chapters One and Two, I examine the three psychological capacities necessary for moral responsibility. In Chapter Three, I challenge three principles that have figured prominently in the debate on moral responsibility. I argue that persons may be responsible for actions they are forced to perform, for failing to perform actions they are unable to perform, and for consequences that are not directly sensitive to their actions. In Chapter Four, I show how causal determinism is compatible with the notion that persons can act freely and responsibly. Three main theses distinguish this work from other work on the subject. First, the mental basis on which we act is at least as important as our actions themselves in explaining why we are responsible. Second, normative competence involves the capacity to have certain emotions, together with the capacity for practical and theoretical reasoning. Third, it is not the ability to do otherwise but rather the autonomy and causal efficacy of our motivational states and actions which can make us responsible even in a deterministic world.