Jonathan Lear

This paper argues that if one considers just a single clinical moment there may be no principled way to choose among different approaches to psychoanalytic technique. One must in addition take into account what Aristotle called the final cause of psychoanalysis, which this paper argues is freedom. However, freedom is itself an open-ended concept with many aspects that need to be explored and developed from a psychoanalytic perspective. This paper considers one analytic moment from the perspectives of the techniques of Paul Gray, Hans Loewald, the contemporary Kleinians and Jacques Lacan. It argues that, if we are to evaluate these techniques, we must take into account the different conceptions of freedom they are trying to facilitate.

Morality exercises a deep and questionable influence on the way we live our lives. The influence is deep both because moral injunctions are embedded in our psyches long before we can reflect on their status and because even after we become reflective agents, the question of how we should live our lives among others is intimately bound up with the more general question of how we should live our lives: our stance toward morality and our conception of our lives as having significance are of a piece. The influence is questionable because morality pretends to a level of objectivity that it may not possess. Moral injunctions are meant to be binding on us in some way that is independent of the desires or preferences we may happen to have. When one asserts that a certain action is morally worthy or shameful one is, prime facie, doing more than merely expressing approval or disapproval or trying to get others to act as instruments of one's own will. If moral assertions were shown, at bottom, to be merely such exhortations, then they would be shown to wear a disguise. Morality would be revealed as pretending to an objectivity it does not have, and such a revelation could not but have a profound impact on our lives. It is doubtful that such a revelation could be kept locked up inside our studies.

Aristotelian theory of virtue and of happiness assumes a moral psychology in which the parts of the soul, rational and non-rational, can communicate well with each other. But if Aristotle cannot give a robust account of what communicating well consists in, he faces Bernard Williams's charge that his moral psychology collapses into a moralizing psychology, assuming the very categories it seeks to vindicate. This paper examines the problem and proposes a way forward, namely, that Freudian psychoanalysis provides the resources for the development of a satisfying Aristotelian moral psychology

In this fully updated second edition, Jonathan Lear clearly introduces and assesses all of Freud's thought, focusing on those areas of philosophy on which Freud is acknowledged to have had a lasting impact. These include the philosophy of mind, free will and determinism, rationality, the nature of the self and subjectivity, and ethics and religion. He also considers some of the deeper issues and problems Freud engaged with, brilliantly illustrating their philosophical significance: human sexuality, the unconscious, dreams, and the theory of transference. Lear’s approach emphasizes the philosophical significance of Freud’s fundamental rule – to say whatever comes to mind without censorship or inhibition. This binds psychoanalysis to the philosophical exploration of self-consciousness and truthfulness, as well as opening new paths of inquiry for moral psychology and ethics. The second edition includes a new Introduction and Conclusion. The text is revised throughout, including new sections on psychological structure and object relations and on Freud’s critique of religion and morality. One of the most important introductions and contributions to understanding this great thinker to have been published for many years, _Freud, second edition_ will be essential reading for anyone in the humanities, social sciences and beyond with an interest in Freud or philosophy.

Ein zentrales Anliegen Richard Wollheims war es, Erkenntnisse der Psychoanalyse für die Philosophie fruchtbar zu machen. Mit dem Konzept des „körperlichen Ich” verweist Wollheim auf die mannigfaltigen Aspekte der körperlichen Repräsentation geistiger Zustände. Sei es, dass psychische Zustände durch körperliche Metaphern ausgedrückt werden, sei es, dass sie als physische Ereignisse repräsentiert oder halluziniert werden und als solche ihre Wirkung entfalten. Diese Repräsentationen eröffnen überraschende Zugänge zu den Funktionsweisen des menschlichen Geistes

Whether aristotle wrote a work on mathematics as he did on physics is not known, and sources differ. this book attempts to present the main features of aristotle's philosophy of mathematics. methodologically, the presentation is based on aristotle's "posterior analytics", which discusses the nature of scientific knowledge and procedure. concerning aristotle's views on mathematics in particular, they are presented with the support of numerous references to his extant works. his criticism of his predecessors is added at the end