Alex Rosenberg

For Sober and Wilson, the key to group selection is the persistence of within-group behaviours that are individually altruistic -- the so-called ‘primary behaviours'. In the absence of kin-relatedness, such primary behaviours will render the group liable to invasion by non-cooperative strategies unless ‘secondary behaviours’ are in place. Secondary behaviour must in effect make the costs of deviation from the primary altruistic behaviour greater than the benefits of deviation. The secondary behaviour in effect enforces the primary behaviour. Secondary behaviour is also behaviour which is altruistic from the point of view of the individual, whenever enforcement has some costs and lower benefits to the enforcer. Enforcement always has some cost, when imposed. However, it increases the rate of cooperative primary behaviour and so has benefits for the group as a whole, whence its status as altruistic. When altruism and enforcement both emerge, altruism is amplified

Sober 2011 argues that, contrary to Hume, some causal statements can be known a priori to be true—notably, some ‘would promote’ statements figuring in causal models of natural selection. We find Sober's argument unconvincing. We regard the Humean thesis as denying that causal explanations contain any a priori knowable statements specifying certain features of events to be causally relevant. We argue that not every ‘would promote’ statement is genuinely causal, and we suggest that Sober has not shown that his examples of ‘would promote’ statements manage to achieve a priori status without sacrificing their causal character.

This review of recent work in the philosophy of science motivated by a commitment to 'naturalism' begins by identifying three key axioms and one theorem shared by philosophers thus self-styled. Owing much to Quine and Ernest Nagel, these philosophers of science share a common agenda with naturalists elsewhere in philosophy. But they have disagreed among themselves about how the axioms and the theorems they share settle long-standing disputes in the philosophy of science. After expounding these disagreements in the work of Boyd, Giere, Laudan, and Kitcher, I argue that naturalism needs to look for more than mere consistency in its foundations

In several places we have argued that ‘fitness’ is a primitive term with respect to the theory of evolution properly understood. These arguments have relied heavily on the axiomatization of the theory provided by one of us. In contrast, both John Beatty and Robert Brandon have separately argued for a “propensity“ interpretation of “fitness” ; and in Brandon and Beatty they attack our view that “fitness“ is a primitive term in evolutionary theory, concluding that a definition by way of propensities is possible and preferable. Here we reply to their criticisms, and argue that, at most, the view that fitness is a statistical propensity is a terminological variant on our thesis that it is a primitive in evolutionary theory.

This paper defends and extends Quine’s version of a naturalistic epistemology, and defends it against criticism, especially that offered by Kim, according to which Quine’s naturalism deprives epistemology of its normative role, and indeed of its relevance to psychological states, such as beliefs, whose warrant epistemology aims to assess. I defend Quinean epistemology’s objections to the epistemic pluralism associated with other self-styled naturalistic epistemologies, and show how recent theories in the philosophy of psychology which fail to account for the intentionality of psychological states in fact provide a cognitive foundation for an eliminativist epistemology which both honors Quine’s strictures and helps us accommodate important findings and results in experimental psychology and cognitive science

It seems to be almost a given of contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy that the just society is obligated to establish and ensure the equality of its members. Debate begins when we come to delineate the forms and limits of the equality society is obligated to underwrite. In this essay I offer the subversive suggestion that equality is not something the just society should aim for. Instead I offer another objective, one which is to be preferred both because it is more attainable and because it is morally more defensible than equality, either as an ideal or as an operative principle. The demand for equality of treatment, of opportunity, or of outcome, is a distraction from morally more significant aims

It is argued that the assessment of the strength of the evidence for the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection offered by Michael Ruse in the Philosophy of Biology is in one respect too weak and in the other too strong. His claim that artificial selection provides at best analogical evidence for the theory is shown to rest on a spurious distinction between artificial and natural selection. His argument that Darwinian theory, unlike its competitors, accounts for the cytological and genetic data is demonstrated to be unwarranted and fails to differentiate the actual degrees of evidential support provided by cytology and genetics for parts of differing and competing theories of evolution. The evidentially secure foundations of Darwin's theory are not challenged in this paper, only Ruse's account of their nature.

The discussion of Darwinism's past--of what Charles Darwin wrote and thought--is crucial to an understanding of the history and philosophy of biology, but largely irrelevant to assessing its current warrant and its future prospects. In this paper the structure, and the credibility of the theory are defended against a variety of criticisms both of biologists and anti-Darwinians. It is argued that many features of the theory often treated as defects, like its generality and neutrality, its openness to realization at many levels of organization, its lack of specific predictive content, and its anomalous relation to taxonomy, are in fact important strengths that any theory with the range and bearing of the theory of natural selection must have. These strengths are specifically related, in the latter portion of the paper, to the evolutionary discoveries we can expect from the revolutionary developments in molecular biology.