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21This paper offers a critical discussion of Searle's account of collective intentionality. It argues Bratman's alternative account avoids some of the shortcomings of Searle's account, over-intellectualizes collective intentionality and imposes an excessive cognitive burden on participating agents.Tthe capacities needed to sustain collective intentionality are examined in an attempt to show that we can preserve the gist of Bratman's account in a cognitively more parsimonious way.
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20Perception, Emotions and Delusions: The Case of the Capgras DelusionIn Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernàndez (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation, Psychology Press. pp. 107-125. 2008.The paper discusses the role affective factors may play in explaining why, in Capgras'delusion, the delusional belief once formed is maintained and argues that there is an important link between the modularity of the relevant emotional system and the persistence of the delusional belief.
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17Pensée, langage et communautéMichel Seymour Collection «Analytiques», vol. 7Montréal, Bellarmin; Paris, Vrin, 1994, 342 p (review)Dialogue 35 (3): 641-645. 1996.
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10Commitments in Human-Robot InteractionAI-HRI 2019 Proceedings. 2019.An important tradition in philosophy holds that in order to successfully perform a joint action, the participants must be capable of establishing commitments on joint goals and shared plans. This suggests that social robotics should endow robots with similar competences for commitment management in order to achieve the objective of performing joint tasks in human-robot interactions. In this paper, we examine two philosophical approaches to commitments. These approaches, we argue, emphasize diffe…Read more
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10Naturaliser l'intentionnalité: essai de philosophie de la psychologiePresses Universitaires de France - PUF. 1993.'' L'intentionnalité est traditionnellement considérée comme la marque distinctive du mental. Peut-on en faire une théorie naturaliste? À quelles exigences une telle théorie devrait-elle satisfaire? L'intentionnalité comporte-t-elle, au contraire, une dimension essentiellement normative?''--
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9Reply to John CampbellIn Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. pp. 45--255. 2002.
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9James Russell claims that executive difficulties in both autism and schizophrenia are likely to be due to impairments of action monitoring at "a fairly high level". I argue that there is room for some 'intermediate' level of action-monitoring in between the higher and lower levels he distinguishes and that impairments at this intermediate level may play an important role in explaining some of the difficulties encountered by both schizophrenic patients and subjects with autism.
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8Théories représentationnelles de l'intentionnalité perceptive et "Leibhaftigkeit" de l'objet dans la perceptionArchives de Philosophie 58 (n/a): 577. 1995.Cet article examine un problème particulier posé par une approche naturaliste et représentationnaliste de la perception: lui est-il ou non possible de rendre compte d'une caractéristique que Husserl considérait comme constitutive de la perception, à savoir le fait que l'objet dans la perception est comme donné en personne (leibhaftig). La première section donne un bref aperçu des motivations qui sont à l'origine de l'intérêt actuellement suscité dans les sciences cognitives par l'intentionnalité…Read more
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1Monothematic delusions, empiricism, and framework beliefsPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1): 1. 2004.
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1Key Elements for Human-Robot Joint ActionIn Raul Hakli & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Sociality and Normativity for Robots. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality., Springer. 2017.
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Perception, Emotions and Delusions: The Case of the Capgras DelusionIn , Psychology Press. pp. 107-125. 2009.
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Volition. Time to act : the dynamics of agentive experiencesIn Patrick Haggard & Baruch Eitam (eds.), The Sense of Agency, Oxford University Press Usa. 2015.
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Robots and Resentment: Commitments, Recognition and Social Motivation in HRIIn Catrin Misselhorn, Tom Poljanšek, Tobias Störzinger & Maike Klein (eds.), Emotional Machines: Perspectives from Affective Computing and Emotional Human-Machine Interaction, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. pp. 183-216. 2023.To advance the task of designing robots capable of performing collective tasks with humans, studies in human–robot interaction often turn to psychology, philosophy of mind and neuroscience for inspiration. In the same vein, this chapter explores how the notion of recognition and commitment can help confront some of the current problems in addressing robot-human interaction in joint tasks. First, we argue that joint actions require mutual recognition, which cannot be established without the attri…Read more
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Reply to Joint Attention and SimulationIn Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. 2002.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |