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11[Book review] the importance of us, a philosophical study of basic social notions (review)In Stephen Everson (ed.), Ethics, Cambridge University Press. pp. 108--4. 1998.
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86Ruben and the metaphysics of the social worldBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2): 261-273. 1989.
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76We-intentions, free-riding, and being in reserveErkenntnis 36 (1). 1992.A person can intend to achieve his own personal aims and ends, but he can also intend to promote the goals of his groups or collectives. In many cases of collective action these two types of intention will coincide, but they need not, and when they clash, collective action dilemmas, like free-riderism, will emerge. In this paper we discuss and analyze a central kind of group-intentions termed we-intentions, and distinguish between absolute and conditional we-intentions. The analyses of the latte…Read more
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38On the eliminative explanation of social theoriesStudia Logica 42 (2-3). 1983.The paper discusses eliminative explanation in which a (social) successor theory correctively explains and, as a consequence, eliminates its predecessor theory. Technical concepts and results from general logic are applied to the explication of corrective explanation, especially to the notion of framework translation that it involves.
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19Social Action: A Teleological AccountAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2): 300-301. 2003.Book Information Social Action: A Teleological Account. By Seumas Miller. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 2001. Pp. xi + 308. Hardback, £45. Paperback, £16.95.
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30Morgan on deductive explanation: A rejoinder (review)Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (4). 1976.This paper is mainly a response to Charles Morgan's criticisms (this journal, pp. 511-25) of the author's model of the (formal aspects of) explanation. It is claimed in the paper that with two modifications and some additional specifications the model withstands Morgan's criticisms
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32Theoretical conceptsSpringer Verlag. 1973.to that goal, and it is hoped that it will incorporate further works dealing in an exact way with interesting philosophical issues. Zurich, April 1973 Mario Bunge Preface In this book I have investigated the logical and methodological role of the much debated theoretical concepts in scientific theories. The philosophical viewpoint underlying my argumentation is critical scientific realism. My method of exposition has been to express ideas first in general terms and then to develop and elaborate …Read more
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732Cooperation and trust in group contextMind and Society 4 (1): 49-84. 2005.This paper is mainly about cooperation as a collective action in a group context (acting in a position or participating in the performance of a group task, etc.), although the assumption of the presence of a group context is not made in all parts of the paper. The paper clarifies what acting as a group member involves, and it analytically characterizes the ‘‘we-mode’’ (thinking and acting as a group member) and the ‘‘I-mode’’ (thinking and acting as a private person).
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7Review of Keith Graham, Practical Reasoning in a Social World (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (9). 2002.
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23Collective acceptance and collective attitudes: on the socialIn Uskali Mäki (ed.), Fact and Fiction in Economics: Models, Realism and Social Construction, Cambridge University Press. pp. 269. 2002.
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305We will do it: An analysis of group-intentionsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2): 249-277. 1991.
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267Group beliefsSynthese 91 (3): 285-318. 1992.It is argued in this paper that there can be both normative and nonnormative, merely factual group beliefs. The former involve the whole social group in question, while the latter only relate to the distributions of personal beliefs within the group. The paper develops a detailed theory, called the positional account of group beliefs, to explicate normative, group-involving group beliefs. Normative group beliefs are characterized within this approach in terms of joint acceptances of views by the…Read more
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89Philosophy and distributed artificial intelligence: The case of joint intentionIn N. Jennings & G. O'Hare (eds.), Foundations of Distributed Artificial Intelligence, Wiley. 1996.In current philosophical research the term 'philosophy of social action' can be used - and has been used - in a broad sense to encompass the following central research topics: 1) action occurring in a social context; this includes multi-agent action; 2) joint attitudes (or "we-attitudes" such as joint intention, mutual belief) and other social attitudes needed for the explication and explanation of social action; 3) social macro-notions, such as actions performed by social groups and properties …Read more
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1Douglas Walton: Practical reasoning, Goal-driven, knowledge-based, action-guiding argumentation (review)Theoria 58 (1): 92. 1992.
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David Braybrooke, ed., Social Rules: Origin; Character; Logic; Change Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 17 (1): 3-5. 1997.
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25Kommunikatives Handeln und kooperative ZieleAnalyse & Kritik 19 (2): 153-172. 1997.In this paper an account of communicative action is given from the point of view of communication as a cooperative enterprise. It is argued that there is communication both on the basis of shared collective goals and without them. It is also claimed that people can communicate without specifically formed illocutionary communicative intentions. Finally, the paper compares the account given in the article with Habermas’ theory of communicative action.
Raimo Tuomela
(1940 - 2020)
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University of HelsinkiDepartment of Philosophy (Theoretical Philosophy, Practical Philosophy, Philosophy in Swedish)Retired faculty