• University of Helsinki
    Department of Philosophy (Theoretical Philosophy, Practical Philosophy, Philosophy in Swedish)
    Retired faculty
CV
  •  74
    Critical notices
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (2): 287-341. 1994.
    Rationality, Symbolism and Evolution The Nature of Rationality By Robert Nozick Princeton University Press, 1993. Pp. xvi + 226. ISBN 0–691–07424–0. £19.95 No Nonsense Rights The Realm of Rights By Judith Jarvis Thomson Harvard University Press, 1990. Pp. viii + 383. ISBN 0–674–74948–0. £27.95. In Search of the Common Mind The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics By Philip Pettit Oxford University Press, 1993. Pp. xvi + 365. ISBN 0–19–507818–7. £30. In elucidation of the com…Read more
  •  68
    Social action-functions
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 14 (2): 133-147. 1984.
  •  64
    Book reviews (review)
    with Finngeir Hiorth
    Philosophia 20 (3): 331-340. 1990.
  •  327
    Group knowledge analyzed
    Episteme 1 (2): 109-127. 2004.
    The main task of the present paper is to investigate the nature of collective knowledge and discuss what kind of justificatory aspects are involved in it to discuss it from collective belief. The central kind of collective knowledge investigated is normatively binding knowledge attributed to a social group. A distinction is made between natural knowledge and constitutive knowledge related to social (especially institutional) matters. In the case of the latter kind of knowledge, in contrast to th…Read more
  •  145
    Acting as a Group Member and Collective Commitment
    with Maj Tuomela
    ProtoSociology 18 7-65. 2003.
    In this paper we will study two central social notions, acting as a group member and collective commitment. Our study of the first of these notions is – as far as we know – the first systematic work on the topic. Acting as a group member is a central notion that obviously must be understood when speaking of the “we-perspective”, group life, and of social life more generally. Thus, not only philosophy of sociality, philosophy of social science, political and moral philosophy but also the various …Read more
  •  808
    We-intentions revisited
    Philosophical Studies 125 (3). 2005.
    This paper gives an up-to-date account of we-intentions and responds to some critics of the author’s earlier work on the topic in question. While the main lines of the new account are basically the same as before, the present account considerably adds to the earlier work. For one thing, it shows how we-intentions and joint intentions can arise in terms of the so-called Bulletin Board View of joint intention acquisition, which relies heavily on some underlying mutually accepted conceptual and sit…Read more
  •  85
    On the eliminative explanation of social theories
    Studia Logica 42 (2-3). 1983.
    The paper discusses eliminative explanation in which a (social) successor theory correctively explains and, as a consequence, eliminates its predecessor theory. Technical concepts and results from general logic are applied to the explication of corrective explanation, especially to the notion of framework translation that it involves.
  •  81
    Contemporary Action Theory
    with Ghita Holmström-Hintikka
    Springer. 1997.
    Contemporary Action Theory, Volume I is concerned with topics in philosophical action theory such as reasons and causes of action, intentions, freedom of will and of action, omissions and norms in legal and ethical contexts, as well as activity, passivity and competence from medical points of view. Cognitive trying, freedom of the will and agent causation are challenges in the discussion on computers in action. The Volume consists of contributions by leading experts in the field written specific…Read more
  •  1
    The We-mode and the I-mode
    In Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social Reality, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 93--127. 2003.
  •  32
    Dispositions (edited book)
    Springer Verlag. 2013.
    This anthology consists of a collection of papers on the nature of dis positions and the role of disposition concepts in scientific theories. I have tried to make the collection as representative as possible, except that problems specifically connected with dispositions in various special sciences are relatively little discussed. Most of these articles have been previously published. The papers by Mackie, Essler and Trapp, Fetzer (in Section 11), Levi, and Tuomela appear here for the first time,…Read more
  •  230
    Methodological individualism and explanation
    Philosophy of Science 57 (1): 133-140. 1990.
    This critical note concerns Harold Kincaid's "Reduction, Explanation and Empiricism" (this journal, December 1986). Kincaid criticizes methodological individualism on several grounds. The present note argues that Kincaid fails at least in his attempt to show that it is false that individualistic theory suffices to fully explain social phenomena. Kincaid's main reason for claiming that individualistic theory is insufficient is that it cannot adequately explain social kinds. The present note conte…Read more
  •  12
    The fate of folk psychology'
    In Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.), Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience, Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 227--248. 1994.
  • Can collectives have beliefs?
    Acta Philosophica Fennica 49 454-72. 1990.
  •  216
    This volume presents a systematic philosophical theory related to the collectivism-versus-individualism debate in the social sciences. A weak version of collectivism (the "we-mode" approach) that depends on group-based collective intentionality is developed in the book. The we-mode approach is used to account for collective intention and action, cooperation, group attitudes, social practices and institutions as well as group solidarity
  •  136
    Collective Acceptance and Social Reality
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 11 161-171. 2001.
    Many social properties and notions are collectively made. Two collectively created aspects of the social world have been emphasized in recent literature. The first is that of the performative character of many social things (entities, properties). The second is the reflexive nature of many social concepts. The present account adds to this list a third feature, the collective availability or “for-groupness” of collective social items. It is a precise account of social notions and social facts in …Read more
  •  188
    Review: Scientific Realism and Perception (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1). 1978.
  • Folk psychology
    In Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.), Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience, Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 227. 1994.
  •  172
    In current philosophical research the term 'philosophy of social action' can be used - and has been used - in a broad sense to encompass the following central research topics: 1) action occurring in a social context; this includes multi-agent action; 2) joint attitudes (or "we-attitudes" such as joint intention, mutual belief) and other social attitudes needed for the explication and explanation of social action; 3) social macro-notions, such as actions performed by social groups and properties …Read more
  •  142
    A person can intend to achieve his own personal aims and ends, but he can also intend to promote the goals of his groups or collectives. In many cases of collective action these two types of intention will coincide, but they need not, and when they clash, collective action dilemmas, like free-riderism, will emerge. In this paper we discuss and analyze a central kind of group-intentions termed we-intentions, and distinguish between absolute and conditional we-intentions. The analyses of the latte…Read more
  •  52
    Dynamics in Action, Intentional Behavior as a Complex System
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2): 494-497. 2003.
    There are three parts and altogether fourteen chapters in the book. The parts are: I Why Action Theory Rests on a Mistake, II Dynamical Systems Theory and Human Action, and III Explaining Human Action: Why Dynamics Tells Us That Stories Are Necessary. The first part gives a survey of some historical views of causation and explanation. It also surveys current philosophical action theory especially from the point of view of its treatment of mental causation and related themes. This part is meant t…Read more
  •  4
    On Acting for a Reason
    Acta Philosophica Fennica 78 187. 2006.
  •  42
    Eine Theorie des Gemeinschaftlichen
    Facta Philosophica 1 (1): 55-76. 1999.
  •  59
    The social dimension of action theory
    Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 3 145-158. 1991.
  •  109
    Corporate intention and corporate action
    Analyse & Kritik 15 (1): 11-21. 1993.
    This paper comments on Coleman's account of group action , and his view is compared with the present author's largely complementary view . Some criticisms concerning Coleman's linear system of action are presented. One of the main points made is that a viable theory of social action must make use of a notion of joint intention and that Coleman's theory is deficient on this score
  •  109
    Theory-distance and verisimilitude
    Synthese 38 (2). 1978.
    Measures of theory-Distance are defined for theories formalizable within first-Order predicate logic by using distributive normal forms. The account is applied to give measures of verisimilitude