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22Context and quantifier domainManuscrito 32 (1): 283-307. 2009.There are some salient explanatory models for the semantic phenomenon known as quantifier domain restriction. Each of these models sees the context of utterance as playing a different role. A particularly clear and helpful way of organizing the issue is offered by Stanley and Szabó , who distinguish three kinds of approaches, and argue for one of them in particular . In this paper, I argue that neither Stanley and Szabó’s arguments against the rival approaches nor their arguments for the semanti…Read more
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10Matthias Schirn (ed.), Frege: Importance and Legacy.(Perspektiven der Analytischen Philosophie/Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy, Vol. 13.) (review)Erkenntnis 49 (1): 115-122. 1998.
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82Extensions as representative objects in Frege's logicErkenntnis 52 (2): 239-252. 2000.Matthias Schirn has argued on a number of occasions against the interpretation of Frege's ``objects of a quite special kind'' (i.e., the objects referred to by names like `the concept F') as extensions of concepts. According to Schirn, not only are these objects not extensions, but also the idea that `the concept F' refers to objects leads to some conclusions that are counter-intuitive and incompatible with Frege's thought. In this paper, I challenge Schirn's conclusion: I want to try and argue …Read more
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130The context principle and Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's theory of typesSynthese 98 (3). 1994.In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.
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50Review of J. R. Brown, Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction to the World of Proofs and Pictures (review)Erkenntnis 54 (3): 403-407. 2001.
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17Chateaubriand on the slingshot argumentsManuscrito 27 (1): 201-209. 2004.The purpose of this paper is to discuss Chateaubriand’s criticism of the so-called slingshot arguments, particularly of those versions proposed by Church and by Gödel . I concentrate on two critical points made by Chateaubriand, and argue that they are not decisive against these versions of the slingshot. I also discuss Chateaubriand’s hybrid theory of definite descriptions and argue that, despite its intrinsic interest, it cannot avoid the conclusion of the slingshot
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Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
History of Western Philosophy |