Marco Ruffino

In this paper I discuss Chateaubriand’s notion of senses. His notions retains the spirit of the original Fregean notion, but differ from it in some fundamental ways. I compare both notions, especially concerning the issue of indirect reference, and also concerning their explanatory power in epistemic matters. Finally, I raise some worries concerning the semantic role played by Chateaubriand’s senses, as well as the notion of judgment that his notion of thoughts seems to imply.Neste artigo, discuto a noção de sentido de Chateaubriand. Sua noção retém o espírito da noção Fregeana original, mas difere da mesma em alguns aspectos fundamentais. Eu comparo ambas as noções, especialmente no que diz respeito à questão da referência indireta, e também no que concerne ao seu poder explicativo em questões epistêmicas. Por fim, levanto algumas preocupações sobre o papel semântico desempenhado pelos sentidos de Chateaubriand, bem como a forma dos juízos que a sua noção de pensamento implica

The purpose of this paper is to discuss Frege’s view on vagueness, and to draw some relevant consequences of it. By examining what exactly Frege has in mind each time he complains about vagueness and advocates the sharpness requirement, I argue that he shows preoccupation with different kinds of vagueness in different periods of his thought. I also discuss the scope of the sharpness requirement, and argue that it is intended as applying primarily to mathematics and logic. Finally, I try and argue that some of Frege’s remarks on incomplete functions suggest a view that is close in spirit to the contemporary supervaluationist approach to vagueness