•  17
    Chateaubriand on the slingshot arguments
    Manuscrito 27 (1): 201-209. 2004.
    The purpose of this paper is to discuss Chateaubriand’s criticism of the so-called slingshot arguments, particularly of those versions proposed by Church and by Gödel . I concentrate on two critical points made by Chateaubriand, and argue that they are not decisive against these versions of the slingshot. I also discuss Chateaubriand’s hybrid theory of definite descriptions and argue that, despite its intrinsic interest, it cannot avoid the conclusion of the slingshot
  • O Verdadeiro, O Bom E O Belo Em Frege
    O Que Nos Faz Pensar 27-44. 2006.
  •  124
    Fregean propositions, belief preservation and cognitive value
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1): 217-236. 2007.
    In this paper I argue indirectly for Frege's semantics, in particular for his conception of propositions, by reviewing some difficulties faced by one of the main contemporary alternative approaches, i.e., the direct reference theory. While Frege's semantics can yield an explanation of cognitive value and belief-preservation, the alternative approach seems to run into trouble here. I shall also briefly consider the question of whether epistemic issues should be of any concern for semantics, i.e.,…Read more
  •  75
    The Primacy of Concepts and the Priority of Judgments in Frege's Logic
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 56 (1): 73-90. 1998.
    The paper presents a historical account of the primacy of concepts in Frege's conception of logic. Moreover, it argues that Frege's priority-thesis (i.e., the assumption that judgeable contents are prior to concepts) does not imply that sentential logic is more basic than the logic of concepts in his thought.