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Marco Ruffino

University of Campinas
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    37
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 More details
  • University of Campinas
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
  • University of Campinas
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
University of California, Los Angeles
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1996
Campinas, São Paulo, Brazil
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Science, Logic, and Mathematics
History of Western Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language
20th Century Philosophy
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Science, Logic, and Mathematics
History of Western Philosophy
  • All publications (37)
  •  198
    The context principle and Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's theory of types
    Synthese 98 (3). 1994.
    In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.
    Ludwig WittgensteinPhilosophy of Language, MiscType Theory in MathematicsRussell: Theory of Types
  •  92
    Frege's view on vagueness
    Manuscrito 26 (2): 253-277. 2003.
    The purpose of this paper is to discuss Frege’s view on vagueness, and to draw some relevant consequences of it. By examining what exactly Frege has in mind each time he complains about vagueness and advocates the sharpness requirement, I argue that he shows preoccupation with different kinds of vagueness in different periods of his thought. I also discuss the scope of the sharpness requirement, and argue that it is intended as applying primarily to mathematics and logic. Finally, I try and argu…Read more
    The purpose of this paper is to discuss Frege’s view on vagueness, and to draw some relevant consequences of it. By examining what exactly Frege has in mind each time he complains about vagueness and advocates the sharpness requirement, I argue that he shows preoccupation with different kinds of vagueness in different periods of his thought. I also discuss the scope of the sharpness requirement, and argue that it is intended as applying primarily to mathematics and logic. Finally, I try and argue that some of Frege’s remarks on incomplete functions suggest a view that is close in spirit to the contemporary supervaluationist approach to vagueness
    Vagueness and IndeterminacyFrege: Vagueness
  •  36
    Church’s and Gödel’s Slingshot Arguments
    Abstracta 1 (1): 23-39. 2004.
    Philosophy of Language
  • O Verdadeiro, O Bom E O Belo Em Frege
    O Que Nos Faz Pensar 27-44. 2006.
  •  123
    Deferred Utterances and Proper Contexts
    Disputatio 4 (34): 807-822. 2012.
    Ruffino-Marco_Deferred-utterances-and-proper-contexts
  •  133
    The Primacy of Concepts and the Priority of Judgments in Frege's Logic
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 56 (1): 73-90. 1998.
    The paper presents a historical account of the primacy of concepts in Frege's conception of logic. Moreover, it argues that Frege's priority-thesis (i.e., the assumption that judgeable contents are prior to concepts) does not imply that sentential logic is more basic than the logic of concepts in his thought.
    Frege: Conception of LogicFrege: Functions and Concepts
  •  110
    Review of J. R. Brown, Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction to the World of Proofs and Pictures (review)
    Erkenntnis 54 (3): 403-407. 2001.
    Philosophy of Mathematics, General Works
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