Douglas Moggach

Bruno Bauer’s response to Max Stirner’s Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (1845) is here examined closely, for the first time. In working out their concepts of freedom and self-determination, the Hegelian Left stressed different elements in the synthesis which Hegel himself had effected. Options appear that can be described as generally Fichtean or Spinozistic; each has distinct political and ethical implications. Bauer’s claim is that Stirner “Unique One” is to be understood as a version of Spinozist substance, which fails to rise to the Fichtean-Hegelian standpoint of rational subjectivit y which his own thought represents. The paper endorses Bauer’s conclusion that essential differences between his republicanism and universalism, as opposed to Stirner’s anarchism and particularism, can be traced to divergent receptions of Fichte and Spinoza, as mediated through Hegel. With references to Hegel’s critiques of Spinoza, the paper reconstructs Bauer’s argumentation on the inadequacies of a merely substantial view of freedom.

This paper examines whether Bruno Bauer's critical assessment of Jewish emancipation in Prussia is consistent with his other republican writings in the 1840s. It argues that Bauer's political position is a form of republican rigorism, according to which human emancipation requires identification with universal interests, and not the defence of particular identities. Rigorism involves the elimination of internal as well as external heteronomous influences, and implies shifting the boundaries between the juridical and the moral realms as defined by Kant. Subjects' incentives for adopting the maxims that govern their external action are taken to be relevant to the assessment of the emancipatory potential of their deeds and claims. The paper distinguishes degrees of rigorism, and shows that Bauer's specific conclusions on the Jewish question, while not entirely unfounded by his political logic, are not strictly implied by his premises. Contrasting positions in his work are illustrated.

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article explore les liens entre la Wissenschaftslehre de Fichte, en 1794-1795, et ses Fondements du droit naturel de 1796-1797. Nous examinons la façon dont le concept de réciprocité dans WL aide à expliquer la pensée développée par Fichte dans GNR au sujet de l’action intersubjective et de la sphère du droit, et montrons que certaines difficultés conceptuelles dans le premier texte expliquent des tensions irrésolues dans le second. Hans-Jürgen Verweyen a identifié une conception large et une conception étroite de l’intersubjectivité dans GNR, la première impliquant la réciprocité comme causalité mutuelle, tandis que la seconde l’implique comme limitation mutuelle. Pour expliquer cette dualité, nous entreprenons une analyse détaillée de l’action réciproque dans WL, établissant d’abord sa place et sa fonction dans l’idéalisme critique de Fichte, et procédant ensuite à l’examen de son application à l’intersubjectivité juridique dans GNR. Cette approche clarifie également le rapport de Fichte à Kant et à Hegel.

Bruno Bauer has been the subject of intense controversies since the 1830s, yet his work remains inaccessible and his meaning elusive. He is most familiar as the object of Marx’s sharp polemical attacks in the Holy Family and the German Ideology, though Albert Schweitzer, in his widely-noted Quest of the Historical Jesus, gives him a receptive and sensitive reading. Bauer is a far more complex figure than the caricature that Marx’s denunciations make of him. In the decisive political circumstances of the German Vormärz, the prelude to the revolutions of March 1848, Bauer, inspired by Hegel, speaks for an original republicanism. He is a theorist of revolution, of its causes and its failures. Analyzing the political and social crisis of the Restoration, he criticizes both the old order and the oppositional currents of liberalism and socialism. Bauer attributes an epochal significance to the revolution he theorizes. It is a fundamental political, social, and cultural transformation that completes the unfinished tasks of the French Revolution; but it also addresses the unprecedented challenges posed by the emergence of modern civil society. Its aim is the creation of a republican league of equal right, eliminating irrational privileges, refashioning social relations, and eradicating religious and political alienation. As the culmination of modernity’s emancipatory strivings, it fulfills the promise of the transcendental project initiated by Kant and perfected by Hegel. This post-Kantian philosophical context shapes Bauer’s understanding of the political struggle. His ethical idealism has as its object the unity of thought and being, to be secured by reshaping the forms of objective life in accordance with the insights of critical judgment. Based on history as the record of self-consciousness, the judgment takes a special form. Our purpose here is to analyze this judgment.

The paper examines the political implications of Schiller's On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795). Schiller's thought has frequently been depicted as a flight from contemporary conditions of revolution and war, but his aesthetic ideas are closely connected to his assessment of political emancipation and they contribute to a new kind of republican thought. While earlier eighteenth-century republicanisms had presupposed, or attempted to enforce, homogeneity of interest among the citizen body, Schiller acknowledges modern diversity, resulting from new relationships in civil society and the division of labour. He advocates a politics of mutual recognition, compatible with modern individuality and its differentiated forms. His aesthetic approach seeks harmony through reciprocal interaction and mutual adjustment, without producing uniformity or suppressing spontaneity. This approach represents an important innovation in the republican and Kantian traditions

The period leading up to the Revolutions of 1848 was a seminal moment in the history of political thought, demarcating the ideological currents and defining the problems of freedom and social cohesion which are among the key issues of modern politics. This 2006 anthology offers research on Hegel's followers in the 1830s and 1840s. With essays by philosophers, political scientists, and historians from Europe and North America, it pays special attention to questions of state power, the economy, poverty, and labour, as well as to ideas on freedom. The book examines the political and social thought of Eduard Gans, Ludwig Feuerbach, Max Stirner, Bruno and Edgar Bauer, the young Engels, and Marx. It places them in the context of Hegel's philosophy, the Enlightenment, Kant, the French Revolution, industrialization, and urban poverty. It also views Marx and Engels in relation to their contemporaries and interlocutors in the Hegelian school.

Recent literature on the Young Hegelians attests to a renewed appreciation of their philosophical and political significance. Important new studies have linked them to the literary and political currents of their time, traced the changing patterns of their relationships with early French socialism, and demonstrated the affinity of their thought with Hellenistic theories of self-consciousness. The conventional interpretative context, which focuses on the left-Hegelian critique of religion and the problem of the realisation of philosophy, has also been decisively challenged. Ingrid Pepperle emphasizes instead the centrality of practical philosophy, notably Hegel's dialectic of objectification, arguing that Bruno Bauer in particular derives from this a doctrine of autonomy with politically revolutionary implications.

This paper disputes Habermas' accounts of labor as monological expressivist-aesthetic or instrumental action. It shows how tensions in Kant's account of experience, as developed by Fichte and Hegel, enable Marx to formulate two distinct intersubjective models of labor, teleological and structural. Marx elaborates the former in the 1844 Manuscripts, and the latter in the German Ideology. He combines the two models the two models in Capital. Each model has normative implications for theories of intersubjectivity and democracy