Douglas Moggach

This paper disputes Habermas' accounts of labor as monological expressivist-aesthetic or instrumental action. It shows how tensions in Kant's account of experience, as developed by Fichte and Hegel, enable Marx to formulate two distinct intersubjective models of labor, teleological and structural. Marx elaborates the former in the 1844 Manuscripts, and the latter in the German Ideology. He combines the two models the two models in Capital. Each model has normative implications for theories of intersubjectivity and democracy

Bruno Bauer has been the subject of intense controversies since the 1830s, yet his work remains inaccessible and his meaning elusive. He is most familiar as the object of Marx’s sharp polemical attacks in the Holy Family and the German Ideology, though Albert Schweitzer, in his widely-noted Quest of the Historical Jesus, gives him a receptive and sensitive reading. Bauer is a far more complex figure than the caricature that Marx’s denunciations make of him. In the decisive political circumstances of the German Vormärz, the prelude to the revolutions of March 1848, Bauer, inspired by Hegel, speaks for an original republicanism. He is a theorist of revolution, of its causes and its failures. Analyzing the political and social crisis of the Restoration, he criticizes both the old order and the oppositional currents of liberalism and socialism. Bauer attributes an epochal significance to the revolution he theorizes. It is a fundamental political, social, and cultural transformation that completes the unfinished tasks of the French Revolution; but it also addresses the unprecedented challenges posed by the emergence of modern civil society. Its aim is the creation of a republican league of equal right, eliminating irrational privileges, refashioning social relations, and eradicating religious and political alienation. As the culmination of modernity’s emancipatory strivings, it fulfills the promise of the transcendental project initiated by Kant and perfected by Hegel. This post-Kantian philosophical context shapes Bauer’s understanding of the political struggle. His ethical idealism has as its object the unity of thought and being, to be secured by reshaping the forms of objective life in accordance with the insights of critical judgment. Based on history as the record of self-consciousness, the judgment takes a special form. Our purpose here is to analyze this judgment.

Ludwig Landgrebe interprète les réductions phénoménolo- gique et eidétique de Husserl comme théorie de la corporéité, du travail et de la société, pour situer le sujet actif dans le monde naturel et historico-culturel. Cette théorie repose toujours sur un individualisme aprioriste. Une ontologie sociale, inspirée surtout des derniers ouvrages de Lukacs, cherche le principe de synthèse des dimensions concrètes et structurelles de l'expérience dans la logique dialectique du processus de travail lui-même, plutôt que dans la corporéité, et reformule ainsi le problème de la constitution transcendantale.Ludwig Landgrebe interprets Husserl's phenomenological and eidetic reductions as a theory of corporeality, labour and society in order to situate the active subject in the natural and historico- cultural world. He remains committed, however, to an a priori individualism. A social ontology inspired by Lukacs's final writings seeks to synthesize the concrete and structural dimensions of experience not in corporeality as such, but in the dialectical logic of the labour process itself, thus giving a new formulation to the problem of transcendental constitution

This chapter discusses the developments of Young Hegelianism in Restoration Prussia, with a special focus on Max Stirner’s radical critique of Hegelian thinking. It presents an overview of the history of Hegelianism in the 1830s and 1840s, and addresses the theoretical issues raised by Stirner’s attack in 1844. It examines important aspects of Young Hegelianism, including ideas of a modernized civic humanism and emancipation, and traces the Young Hegelians’ reconfiguration of Hegel’s thought in order to eliminate what they saw as its conservative or insufficiently critical elements. The refurbished republicanism of the Young Hegelians took up the new challenges of the industrial age that was dawning in Germany, with special attention to the social question and the intransigent conflicting interests that typified the emergent economic order. Stirner’s critique is framed by its anti-humanist repudiation of Left Hegelian emancipatory projects.

This is a comprehensive study in English of Bruno Bauer, a leading Hegelian philosopher of the 1840s. Inspired by the philosophy of Hegel, Bauer led an intellectual revolution that influenced Marx and shaped modern secular humanism. In the process he offered a republican alternative to liberalism and socialism, criticized religious and political conservatism and set out the terms for the development of modern mass and industrial society. Based on in-depth archival research this book traces the emergence of republican political thought in Germany before the revolutions of 1848. Professor Moggach examines Bauer's republicanism and his concept of infinite self-consciousness. He also explores the more disturbing aspects of Bauer's critique of modernity, such as his anti-Semitism. This book will be eagerly sought out by professionals in political philosophy, political science and intellectual history.

Elster's work unstably combines Leibnizian and utilitarian conceptions of action and offers various deconstructions of rationality and individuality. His method ological individualism gives an inadequate account of its privileged object, individual teleologies, and a distorted account of the relational framework of social reproduction and transformation. Elster has not properly conceptualized the relation of the teleological act to patterns of material and social causality, and his rational choice theory proves unable to accommodate the interactions of his postulated monadic individuals. His most recent work dearly illustrates the limits of an individualist approach, while remaining committed to its principles.

The period from 1780 to 1850 witnessed an unprecedented explosion of philosophical creativity in the German territories. In the thinking of Kant, Schiller, Fichte, Hegel, and the Hegelian school, new theories of freedom and emancipation, new conceptions of culture, society, and politics, arose in rapid succession. The members of the Hegelian school, forming around Hegel in Berlin and most active in the 1830’s and 1840’s, are often depicted as mere epigones, whose writings are at best of historical interest. In _Politics, Religion, and Art: Hegelian Debates, _Douglas Moggach moves the discussion past the Cold War–era dogmas that viewed the Hegelians as proto-Marxists and establishes their importance as innovators in the fields of theology, aesthetics, and ethics and as creative contributors to foundational debates about modernity, state, and society.

Bruno Bauer’s response to Max Stirner’s Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (1845) is here examined closely, for the first time. In working out their concepts of freedom and self-determination, the Hegelian Left stressed different elements in the synthesis which Hegel himself had effected. Options appear that can be described as generally Fichtean or Spinozistic; each has distinct political and ethical implications. Bauer’s claim is that Stirner “Unique One” is to be understood as a version of Spinozist substance, which fails to rise to the Fichtean-Hegelian standpoint of rational subjectivit y which his own thought represents. The paper endorses Bauer’s conclusion that essential differences between his republicanism and universalism, as opposed to Stirner’s anarchism and particularism, can be traced to divergent receptions of Fichte and Spinoza, as mediated through Hegel. With references to Hegel’s critiques of Spinoza, the paper reconstructs Bauer’s argumentation on the inadequacies of a merely substantial view of freedom.

This paper examines whether Bruno Bauer's critical assessment of Jewish emancipation in Prussia is consistent with his other republican writings in the 1840s. It argues that Bauer's political position is a form of republican rigorism, according to which human emancipation requires identification with universal interests, and not the defence of particular identities. Rigorism involves the elimination of internal as well as external heteronomous influences, and implies shifting the boundaries between the juridical and the moral realms as defined by Kant. Subjects' incentives for adopting the maxims that govern their external action are taken to be relevant to the assessment of the emancipatory potential of their deeds and claims. The paper distinguishes degrees of rigorism, and shows that Bauer's specific conclusions on the Jewish question, while not entirely unfounded by his political logic, are not strictly implied by his premises. Contrasting positions in his work are illustrated.

“To understand Bauer, one must understand our time. What is our time? It is revolutionary.” So wrote Edgar Bauer of his brother Bruno in October 1842. The literature on the Hegelian Left has depicted this revolution in diverse ways: as abstract-utopian posturing, as a religious crisis, or as cultural degradation or transformation. More recent commentators stress the political dimensions of the crisis, and the interest of the Left Hegelians in developing a theory of popular sovereignty, citizenship, and republicanism.

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article explore les liens entre la Wissenschaftslehre de Fichte, en 1794-1795, et ses Fondements du droit naturel de 1796-1797. Nous examinons la façon dont le concept de réciprocité dans WL aide à expliquer la pensée développée par Fichte dans GNR au sujet de l’action intersubjective et de la sphère du droit, et montrons que certaines difficultés conceptuelles dans le premier texte expliquent des tensions irrésolues dans le second. Hans-Jürgen Verweyen a identifié une conception large et une conception étroite de l’intersubjectivité dans GNR, la première impliquant la réciprocité comme causalité mutuelle, tandis que la seconde l’implique comme limitation mutuelle. Pour expliquer cette dualité, nous entreprenons une analyse détaillée de l’action réciproque dans WL, établissant d’abord sa place et sa fonction dans l’idéalisme critique de Fichte, et procédant ensuite à l’examen de son application à l’intersubjectivité juridique dans GNR. Cette approche clarifie également le rapport de Fichte à Kant et à Hegel.