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324Bird against the HumeansRatio 23 (1): 73-86. 2010.Debate between Humean contingentists and anti-Humean necessitarians in the philosophy of science is ongoing. One of the most important contemporary anti-Humeans is Alexander Bird. Bird calls the particular version of Humeanism he is opposed to 'categoricalism'. In his paper (2005) and in Chapter 4 of his book (2007) Bird argues against categoricalism about properties and laws. His arguments against categoricalism about properties are intended to support the necessitarian position he calls dispos…Read more
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134What is a one-level criterion of identity?Analysis 69 (2): 274-277. 2009.Standardly, a one-level criterion of identity 1 is given in the form: ∀ x∀ y )where ‘ K’ denotes the kind of thing for which the criterion is being given and ‘ R’ denotes the criterial relation.Thus, we have, for example, the criterion of identity for sets: ∀ x∀ y))and for composites: ∀ x∀ y))and for events: ∀ x∀ y)). is equivalent to the conjunction of: ∀ x and ∀ x )),which just give two necessary 2 conditions for application of the predicate ‘ K’. 3Consider now the reading of ‘ Kx’ as ‘ x is a…Read more
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224Plenitude, Pluralism, and Neo-Lockean PersonsJournal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12): 108-131. 2015.The paper discusses the arguments for and against animalism and concludes that a pluralist position which rejects animalism and embraces a multiplicity of thinkers is the best option.
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15The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory, by Brian O'Shaughessy (review)Philosophy 57 (219): 140-142. 1982.
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53The Passage of TimeMetaphysica 16 (1). 2015.Eric Olson argues that the dynamic view of time must be false. It requires that the question ‘How fast does time pass?’ has an answer. But its only possible answer, one second per second, is not an answer. I argue that Olson has failed to identify what is wrong with talk of time’s passage. Then I argue that, nonetheless, he is right to reject it. To say that time passes is analogous to saying that space is dense, and to ask about the rate of time’s passage is analogous to asking how dense space …Read more
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86In Defence of the Sensible Theory of IndeterminacyMetaphysica 14 (2): 239-252. 2013.Can the world itself _be_ vague, so that rather than vagueness be a deficiency in our mode of describing the world, it is a necessary feature of any true description of it? Gareth Evans famously poses this question in his paper ‘Can There Be Vague Objects’ (Analysis 38(4):208, 1978 ). In his recent paper ‘Indeterminacy and Vagueness: Logic and Metaphysics’, Peter van Inwagen ( 2009 ) elaborates the account of vagueness and, in particular, in the case of sentences, consequent indeterminacy in tru…Read more
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7The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 7: Theory of Knowledge (review)Philosophical Books 26 (2): 93-94. 1985.
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114Does ontic indeterminacy in boundaries entail ontic indeterminacy in identity?Analysis 68 (2): 174-176. 2008.
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1Kinds of Being By E. J. Lowe Basil Blackwell, 1989, pp. vi + 210, £25.00 (review)Philosophy 66 (256): 248-249. 1991.
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217Relative IdentityPhilosophical Investigations 38 (1-2): 52-71. 2015.Examples suggest that one and the same A may be different Bs, and hence that there is some sort of incompleteness in the unqualified statement that x and y are the same which needs to be eliminated by answering the question “the same what?” One way to make this more precise is by appeal to Geach's idea that identity is relative. In this paper I evaluate Geach's relative identity thesis
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41Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current ControversyPhilosophical Quarterly 48 (192): 302-318. 1998.My purpose is to explore the possible lines of reply available to a defender of the neo‐Lockean position on personal identity in response to the recently popular ‘animalist’ objection. I compare the animalist objection with an objection made to Locke by Bishop Butler, Thomas Reid and, in our own day, Sydney Shoemaker. I argue that the only possible response available to a defender of Locke against the Butler–Reid–Shoemaker objection is to reject Locke's official definition of a person as a think…Read more
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11VI*—Names and BeliefProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1): 93-108. 1981.Harold Noonan; VI*—Names and Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 93–108, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.
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131Personal Identity and Bodily Continuity: A Further Note on 'The Self and the Future'Analysis 43 (2): 98-104. 1983.
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101Two Boxing is not the Rational OptionRatio 29 (2): 168-183. 2016.In the standard Newcomb scenario two-boxing is not the rational act and, in general, in Newcomb-style cases the ‘two-boxing’ choice is not the rational act. Hence any decision theory which recommends two-boxing is unacceptable.
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31Can one thing become two?Philosophical Studies 33 (3): 203-227. 1978.I shall argue that (in a sense to be explained) one thing can become two.
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16Mass Terms: Some Philosophical Problems, edited by F. J. Pelletier (review)Philosophical Quarterly 30 (120): 259-260. 1980.