-
70
-
119The Four-Dimensional WorldAnalysis 37 (1): 32-39. 1976.This paper defends the view of continuants as 'four-dimensional worms' against an argument of Geach's. This is to the effect that if continuants are four-dimensional worms then their stages either do, or do not, fall under the very general terms satisfied by the continuants themselves (a stage of a man either is, or is not, a man); but that either alternative is untenable. I try to show how the former alternative may be defended by appealing to some of Geach's own ideas about identity; then go o…Read more
-
219Count Nouns and Mass NounsAnalysis 38 (4): 167-172. 1978.The paper argues that one distinction between concrete count nouns and concrete mass nouns is that geach's derelativization thesis is valid for the former but not valid for the latter. That is, Where 'f' is a concrete count noun 'x is (an) f' means 'for some y, X is the same f as y', But where 'f' is a concrete mass noun this is not so; rather, In this case, 'x is f' is tantamount to 'for some y, X is the f of y'. It is further suggested that abstract nouns are in this respect to be grouped with…Read more
-
242
-
51Relative identity: a reply to Nicholas GriffinMind 89 (353): 96-98. 1980.In the October 1978 issue of Mind, Nicholas Griffin puts forward a criticism of one of my arguments in 'Wiggins on Identity'. Although I would not now wish to defend everything I said in that paper, the argument Griffin attacks still seems to me to be a good one. In what follows, I explain why I think his criticism fails to strike home.
-
7The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 7: Theory of Knowledge (review)Philosophical Books 26 (2): 93-94. 1985.
-
108Does ontic indeterminacy in boundaries entail ontic indeterminacy in identity?Analysis 68 (2): 174-176. 2008.
-
1Kinds of Being By E. J. Lowe Basil Blackwell, 1989, pp. vi + 210, £25.00 (review)Philosophy 66 (256): 248-249. 1991.
-
212Relative IdentityPhilosophical Investigations 38 (1-2): 52-71. 2015.Examples suggest that one and the same A may be different Bs, and hence that there is some sort of incompleteness in the unqualified statement that x and y are the same which needs to be eliminated by answering the question “the same what?” One way to make this more precise is by appeal to Geach's idea that identity is relative. In this paper I evaluate Geach's relative identity thesis
-
37Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current ControversyPhilosophical Quarterly 48 (192): 302-318. 1998.My purpose is to explore the possible lines of reply available to a defender of the neo‐Lockean position on personal identity in response to the recently popular ‘animalist’ objection. I compare the animalist objection with an objection made to Locke by Bishop Butler, Thomas Reid and, in our own day, Sydney Shoemaker. I argue that the only possible response available to a defender of Locke against the Butler–Reid–Shoemaker objection is to reject Locke's official definition of a person as a think…Read more
-
10VI*—Names and BeliefProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1): 93-108. 1981.Harold Noonan; VI*—Names and Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 93–108, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.
-
130Personal Identity and Bodily Continuity: A Further Note on 'The Self and the Future'Analysis 43 (2): 98-104. 1983.
-
101Two Boxing is not the Rational OptionRatio 29 (2): 168-183. 2016.In the standard Newcomb scenario two-boxing is not the rational act and, in general, in Newcomb-style cases the ‘two-boxing’ choice is not the rational act. Hence any decision theory which recommends two-boxing is unacceptable.
-
30Can one thing become two?Philosophical Studies 33 (3): 203-227. 1978.I shall argue that (in a sense to be explained) one thing can become two.
-
16Mass Terms: Some Philosophical Problems, edited by F. J. Pelletier (review)Philosophical Quarterly 30 (120): 259-260. 1980.
-
7
-
406Coincidence comes in two varieties – permanent and temporary. Moderate monism is the position that permanent coincidence, but not temporary coincidence, entails identity. Extreme monism is the position that even temporary coincidence entails identity. Pluralists are opponents of monism tout court. The intuitively obvious, commonsensical position is moderate monism. It is therefore important to see if it can be sustained.