-
86In Defence of the Sensible Theory of IndeterminacyMetaphysica 14 (2): 239-252. 2013.Can the world itself _be_ vague, so that rather than vagueness be a deficiency in our mode of describing the world, it is a necessary feature of any true description of it? Gareth Evans famously poses this question in his paper ‘Can There Be Vague Objects’ (Analysis 38(4):208, 1978 ). In his recent paper ‘Indeterminacy and Vagueness: Logic and Metaphysics’, Peter van Inwagen ( 2009 ) elaborates the account of vagueness and, in particular, in the case of sentences, consequent indeterminacy in tru…Read more
-
223Plenitude, Pluralism, and Neo-Lockean PersonsJournal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12): 108-131. 2015.The paper discusses the arguments for and against animalism and concludes that a pluralist position which rejects animalism and embraces a multiplicity of thinkers is the best option.
-
15The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory, by Brian O'Shaughessy (review)Philosophy 57 (219): 140-142. 1982.
-
7The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 7: Theory of Knowledge (review)Philosophical Books 26 (2): 93-94. 1985.
-
114Does ontic indeterminacy in boundaries entail ontic indeterminacy in identity?Analysis 68 (2): 174-176. 2008.
-
184
-
41Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current ControversyPhilosophical Quarterly 48 (192): 302-318. 1998.My purpose is to explore the possible lines of reply available to a defender of the neo‐Lockean position on personal identity in response to the recently popular ‘animalist’ objection. I compare the animalist objection with an objection made to Locke by Bishop Butler, Thomas Reid and, in our own day, Sydney Shoemaker. I argue that the only possible response available to a defender of Locke against the Butler–Reid–Shoemaker objection is to reject Locke's official definition of a person as a think…Read more
-
11VI*—Names and BeliefProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1): 93-108. 1981.Harold Noonan; VI*—Names and Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 93–108, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.
-
1Kinds of Being By E. J. Lowe Basil Blackwell, 1989, pp. vi + 210, £25.00 (review)Philosophy 66 (256): 248-249. 1991.
-
217Relative IdentityPhilosophical Investigations 38 (1-2): 52-71. 2015.Examples suggest that one and the same A may be different Bs, and hence that there is some sort of incompleteness in the unqualified statement that x and y are the same which needs to be eliminated by answering the question “the same what?” One way to make this more precise is by appeal to Geach's idea that identity is relative. In this paper I evaluate Geach's relative identity thesis
-
131Personal Identity and Bodily Continuity: A Further Note on 'The Self and the Future'Analysis 43 (2): 98-104. 1983.
-
101Two Boxing is not the Rational OptionRatio 29 (2): 168-183. 2016.In the standard Newcomb scenario two-boxing is not the rational act and, in general, in Newcomb-style cases the ‘two-boxing’ choice is not the rational act. Hence any decision theory which recommends two-boxing is unacceptable.
-
31Can one thing become two?Philosophical Studies 33 (3): 203-227. 1978.I shall argue that (in a sense to be explained) one thing can become two.
-
7
-
16Mass Terms: Some Philosophical Problems, edited by F. J. Pelletier (review)Philosophical Quarterly 30 (120): 259-260. 1980.
-
102A Flaw in Kripke’s Modal Argument?Philosophia 41 (3): 841-846. 2013.The response to Kripke’s modal argument I wish to propose appeals to the distinction between indicative descriptions, i.e., descriptions formed using indicative verb forms, and what I shall call subjunctive descriptions, descriptions formed using non-indicative verb forms used in subjunctive conditionals. The contrast is between ‘the person who is richer than anyone else in the world’ and ‘the person who would have been richer than anyone else in the world’. The response to Kripke’s modal argume…Read more
-
423Coincidence comes in two varieties – permanent and temporary. Moderate monism is the position that permanent coincidence, but not temporary coincidence, entails identity. Extreme monism is the position that even temporary coincidence entails identity. Pluralists are opponents of monism tout court. The intuitively obvious, commonsensical position is moderate monism. It is therefore important to see if it can be sustained.
-
41Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kripke and Naming and NecessityRoutledge. 2012.Saul Kripke is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. His most celebrated work, Naming and Necessity , makes arguably the most important contribution to the philosophy of language and metaphysics in recent years. Asking fundamental questions – how do names refer to things in the world? Do objects have essential properties? What are natural kind terms and to what do they refer? – he challenges prevailing theories of language and conceptions of metaphysics, especially the…Read more
-
2The self and personal identityIn Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume, Continuum. pp. 167. 2012.