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9Determinism, Blameworthiness and Deprivation, by Martha Klein (review)Mind 101 (401): 178-179. 1992.
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35Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hume on KnowledgeRoutledge. 1999.David Hume was one of the most important British philosophers of the eighteenth century. The first part of his _Treatise on Human Nature_ is a seminal work in philosophy. _Hume on Knowledge_ introduces and assesses: * Humes life and the background of the _Treatise_ * The ideas and text in the _Treatise_ * Humes continuing importance to philosophy.
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34A flaw in Sider's vagueness argument for unrestricted mereological compositionAnalysis 70 (4): 669-672. 2010.
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73Tibbles the cat – reply to BurkePhilosophical Studies 95 (3): 215-218. 1999.In his interesting article, Michael Burke (1996) offers a novel solution to the puzzle of Tibbles, the cat, a solution he says, which is based on Aristotelian essentialism. In what follows I argue that, despite its ingenuity, Burke’s solution can be seen to be too implausible to be accepted once we extend it to a variant of the puzzle Burke himself suggests. The conclusion must be that one of the other solutions to the puzzle must be correct. Or, perhaps, that there is no correct solution and th…Read more
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213Indeterminate identity, contingent identity and Abelardian predicatesPhilosophical Quarterly 41 (163): 183-193. 1991.
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131E. J. Lowe on Vague Identity and Quantum IndeterminacyAnalysis 55 (1): 14-19. 1995.The paper defends Gareth Evan's argument against vague identity "de re" from a criticism that quantum mechanics provides actual counter-examples to its validity. A more general version of Evans's argument is stated in which identity involving properties are not essential and it is claimed that the scientific facts as so far known are consistent with the Evansian thesis that indeterminacy in truth-value must always be due to semantic indecision
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113Presentism and EternalismErkenntnis 78 (1): 219-227. 2013.How is the debate between presentism and eternalism to be characterized? It is usual to suggest that this debate about time is analogous to the debate between the actualist and the possibilist about modality. I think that this suggestion is right. In what follows I pursue the analogy more strictly than is usual and offer a characterization of what is at the core of the dispute between presentists and eternalists that may be immune to worries often raised about the substantiality of the debate. I…Read more
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78Two-Boxing is IrrationalPhilosophia 43 (2): 455-462. 2015.Philosophers debate whether one-boxing or two-boxing is the rational act in a Newcomb situation. I shall argue that one-boxing is the only rational choice. This is so because there is no intelligible aim by reference to which you can justify the choice of two-boxing over one-boxing once you have come to think that you will two-box. The only aim by which the agent in the Newcomb situation can justify his two-boxing is the subjunctively described aim of ‘getting more than I would if I were to one-…Read more
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7Reply to Leslie StevensonPhilosophical Books 23 (1): 7-12. 1982.I shall reply to Mr Stevenson's criticisms of my Objects & Identity (1980) in the order in which they occur in his review; mostly this will be a matter of clearing up obvious confusions.
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20Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, edited by Barry Loewer and Georges Rey (review)Philosophical Books 33 (4): 232-234. 1992.
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107A flawed argument for perdurance – reply to braddon-Mitchell and MillerAnalysis 65 (2): 164-166. 2005.
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127Identity, constitution and microphysical supervenienceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (3): 273-288. 1999.The aim of the paper is to discuss some recent variants of familiar puzzles concerning the relations of parts to wholes put forward by Trenton Merricks and Eric Olson. The argument is put forward that so long as the familiar distinction between 'loose and popular' and 'strict and philosophical' senses of identity claims is accepted the paradoxical conclusions at which Merricks and Olson arrive can be resisted. It is not denied that accepting the distinction between 'loose and popular' and 'stric…Read more
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247Perdurance, location and classical mereologyAnalysis 69 (3): 448-452. 2009.In his Ted Sider takes care to define the notion of a temporal part and his doctrine of perdurantism using only the temporally indexed notion of parthood – ‘ x is part of y at t’ – rather than the atemporal notion of classical mereology – ‘ x is a part of y’ – in order to forestall accusations of unintelligibility from his opponents. However, as he notes, endurantists do not necessarily reject the classical mereological notion as unintelligible. They allow that it makes sense and applies to atem…Read more
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47The Possibility of ReincarnationReligious Studies 26 (4): 483-491. 1990.Man has always hoped to survive his bodily death, and it is a central tenet of many religions that such survival is a reality. It has been supposed by many that one form such survival might take is reincarnation in another body. Subscribers to this view include Pythagoras, Plato sometimes, and a large number of Eastern thinkers. Other thinkers have, of course, disputed that reincarnation is a fact, and some have even denied that it is a possibility. But seldom has it been claimed by its opponent…Read more
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1Object-dependent thoughts: A case of superficial necessity but deep contingency?In Pascal Engel (ed.), Mental causation, Oxford University Press. 1995.
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49The Concept of IdentityPhilosophical Quarterly 34 (135): 175. 1984.In this book, Eli Hirsch focuses on identity through time, first with respect to ordinary bodies, then underlying matter, and eventually persons. These are linked at various points with other aspects of identity, such as the spatial unity of things, the unity of kinds, and the unity of groups. He investigates how our identity concept ordinarily operates in these respects. He also asks why this concept is so cental to our thinking and whether we can justify seeing the world in terms of such a con…Read more