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29The Case for PerduranceIn Gerhard Preyer & Frank Siebelt (eds.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2001.
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82Locke on Personal IdentityPhilosophy 53 (205): 343-351. 1978.In part I of this paper I defend Locke's account of personal identity against three well-known objections; in part II, I put forward a criticism of my own
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The commonalities between proper names and natural kind terms : a Fregean perspectiveIn Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, Routledge. pp. 84-103. 2010.
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123The Four-Dimensional WorldAnalysis 37 (1): 32-39. 1976.This paper defends the view of continuants as 'four-dimensional worms' against an argument of Geach's. This is to the effect that if continuants are four-dimensional worms then their stages either do, or do not, fall under the very general terms satisfied by the continuants themselves (a stage of a man either is, or is not, a man); but that either alternative is untenable. I try to show how the former alternative may be defended by appealing to some of Geach's own ideas about identity; then go o…Read more
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220Count Nouns and Mass NounsAnalysis 38 (4): 167-172. 1978.The paper argues that one distinction between concrete count nouns and concrete mass nouns is that geach's derelativization thesis is valid for the former but not valid for the latter. That is, Where 'f' is a concrete count noun 'x is (an) f' means 'for some y, X is the same f as y', But where 'f' is a concrete mass noun this is not so; rather, In this case, 'x is f' is tantamount to 'for some y, X is the f of y'. It is further suggested that abstract nouns are in this respect to be grouped with…Read more
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242
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54Relative identity: a reply to Nicholas GriffinMind 89 (353): 96-98. 1980.In the October 1978 issue of Mind, Nicholas Griffin puts forward a criticism of one of my arguments in 'Wiggins on Identity'. Although I would not now wish to defend everything I said in that paper, the argument Griffin attacks still seems to me to be a good one. In what follows, I explain why I think his criticism fails to strike home.
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31Animalism versus Lockeanism: Reply to MackiePhilosophical Quarterly 51 (202): 83-90. 2001.I respond to criticisms by David Mackie of my previous paper on animalism and Lockeanism. I argue that the ‘transplant intuition’, that a person goes where his brain (or cerebrum) goes, is compatible both with animalism and Lockeanism. I give three arguments for this conclusion, two of them developing lines of thought in Parfit's work. However, I accept that animalism and Lockeanism are incompatible, and I go on to consider the difficulties for Lockeanism that this raises. The principal difficu…Read more
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121Tollensing van InwagenPhilosophia 42 (4): 1055-1061. 2014.Van Inwagen has an ingenious argument for the non-existence of human artefacts . But the argument cannot be accepted, since human artefacts are everywhere. However, it cannot be ignored. The proper response to it is to treat it as a refutation of its least plausible premise, i.e., to ‘tollens’ it. I first set out van Inwagen’s argument. I then identify its least plausible premise and explain the consequence of denying it, that is, the acceptance of a plenitudinous, pluralist ontology. I argue th…Read more
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28Introducing PersonsPhilosophical Quarterly 38 (150): 123. 1988.This is an elegant and clear tour through many of the issues in philosophy of mind that have occupied philosophers of this century. The topics covered include the problem of other minds, arguments for and against the existence of the soul, a discussion of the bundle theory of the mind, behaviorism, functionalism, mind/brain identity, the argument against the possibility of private language, personal identity and the possibility of after-life, and the question of whether animals and computers can…Read more
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10Introducing Persons, by Peter Carruthers (review)Philosophical Quarterly 38 (50): 123-127. 1988.
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41Frege: A Critical IntroductionPolity. 2001.This new book offers a comprehensive and accessible introduction to Frege's remarkable philosophical work, examining the main areas of his writings and demonstrating the connections between them. Frege's main contribution to philosophy spans philosophical logic, the theory of meaning, mathematical logic and the philosophy of mathematics. The book clearly explains and assesses Frege's work in these areas, systematically examining his major concepts, and revealing the links between them. The empha…Read more
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142Objects and identity: an examination of the relative identity thesis and its consequencesMartinus Nijhoff. 1980.In the first twelve chapters of this book, I am concerned with the Fregean notion of an object (the reference of a proper name) and its connection with the notion of identity. The rest of the book is devoted to a discussion of the problem of personal identity.
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146The Adequacy of Genuine Modal RealismMind 123 (491): 851-860. 2014.What are the requirements on an adequate genuine modal realist analysis of modal discourse? One is material adequacy: the modal realist must provide for each candidate analysandum an analysans in the language of counterpart theory which by his lights has the same truth value as the candidate analysandum. Must the material biconditional joining these be necessarily true? This is the requirement of strict adequacy. It is not satisfied if Lewis’s 1968 scheme provides the analysis. John Divers puts …Read more
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291Constitution is identityMind 102 (405): 133-146. 1993.In his interesting article 'Constitution is not Identity' (1992), Mark Johnston argues that (in a sense soon to be explained) constitution is distinct from identity. In what follows, I dispute Johnston's contention.
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324Bird against the HumeansRatio 23 (1): 73-86. 2010.Debate between Humean contingentists and anti-Humean necessitarians in the philosophy of science is ongoing. One of the most important contemporary anti-Humeans is Alexander Bird. Bird calls the particular version of Humeanism he is opposed to 'categoricalism'. In his paper (2005) and in Chapter 4 of his book (2007) Bird argues against categoricalism about properties and laws. His arguments against categoricalism about properties are intended to support the necessitarian position he calls dispos…Read more
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134What is a one-level criterion of identity?Analysis 69 (2): 274-277. 2009.Standardly, a one-level criterion of identity 1 is given in the form: ∀ x∀ y )where ‘ K’ denotes the kind of thing for which the criterion is being given and ‘ R’ denotes the criterial relation.Thus, we have, for example, the criterion of identity for sets: ∀ x∀ y))and for composites: ∀ x∀ y))and for events: ∀ x∀ y)). is equivalent to the conjunction of: ∀ x and ∀ x )),which just give two necessary 2 conditions for application of the predicate ‘ K’. 3Consider now the reading of ‘ Kx’ as ‘ x is a…Read more