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156Tollensing van InwagenPhilosophia 42 (4): 1055-1061. 2014.Van Inwagen has an ingenious argument for the non-existence of human artefacts . But the argument cannot be accepted, since human artefacts are everywhere. However, it cannot be ignored. The proper response to it is to treat it as a refutation of its least plausible premise, i.e., to ‘tollens’ it. I first set out van Inwagen’s argument. I then identify its least plausible premise and explain the consequence of denying it, that is, the acceptance of a plenitudinous, pluralist ontology. I argue th…Read more
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44Determinism, Blameworthiness and Deprivation, by Martha Klein (review)Mind 101 (401): 178-179. 1992.
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186Personal Identity (2nd edition)Routledge. 2003.Personal Identity is a comprehensive introduction to the nature of the self and its relation to the body. Harold Noonan places the problem of personal identity in the context of more general puzzles about identity, discussing the major historical theories and more recent debates. The second edition of Personal Identity contains a new chapter on 'animalism' and a new section on vagueness
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158Two-Boxing is IrrationalPhilosophia 43 (2): 455-462. 2015.Philosophers debate whether one-boxing or two-boxing is the rational act in a Newcomb situation. I shall argue that one-boxing is the only rational choice. This is so because there is no intelligible aim by reference to which you can justify the choice of two-boxing over one-boxing once you have come to think that you will two-box. The only aim by which the agent in the Newcomb situation can justify his two-boxing is the subjunctively described aim of ‘getting more than I would if I were to one-…Read more
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212A flawed argument for perdurance – reply to braddon-Mitchell and MillerAnalysis 65 (2): 164-166. 2005.
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Identity and the first personIn Cora Diamond & Jenny Teichman (eds.), Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honor of G. E. M. Anscombe, Cornell University Press. 1979.
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241What is a one-level criterion of identity?Analysis 69 (2): 274-277. 2009.Standardly, a one-level criterion of identity 1 is given in the form: ∀ x∀ y )where ‘ K’ denotes the kind of thing for which the criterion is being given and ‘ R’ denotes the criterial relation.Thus, we have, for example, the criterion of identity for sets: ∀ x∀ y))and for composites: ∀ x∀ y))and for events: ∀ x∀ y)). is equivalent to the conjunction of: ∀ x and ∀ x )),which just give two necessary 2 conditions for application of the predicate ‘ K’. 3Consider now the reading of ‘ Kx’ as ‘ x is a…Read more
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421Constitution is identityMind 102 (405): 133-146. 1993.In his interesting article 'Constitution is not Identity' (1992), Mark Johnston argues that (in a sense soon to be explained) constitution is distinct from identity. In what follows, I dispute Johnston's contention.
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91The Passage of TimeMetaphysica 16 (1). 2015.Eric Olson argues that the dynamic view of time must be false. It requires that the question ‘How fast does time pass?’ has an answer. But its only possible answer, one second per second, is not an answer. I argue that Olson has failed to identify what is wrong with talk of time’s passage. Then I argue that, nonetheless, he is right to reject it. To say that time passes is analogous to saying that space is dense, and to ask about the rate of time’s passage is analogous to asking how dense space …Read more
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392Animalism versus Lockeanism: Reply to MackiePhilosophical Quarterly 51 (202): 83-90. 2001.I respond to criticisms by David Mackie of my previous paper on animalism and Lockeanism. I argue that the ‘transplant intuition’, that a person goes where his brain (or cerebrum) goes, is compatible both with animalism and Lockeanism. I give three arguments for this conclusion, two of them developing lines of thought in Parfit's work. However, I accept that animalism and Lockeanism are incompatible, and I go on to consider the difficulties for Lockeanism that this raises. The principal difficu…Read more
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572Presentism and EternalismErkenntnis 78 (1): 219-227. 2013.How is the debate between presentism and eternalism to be characterized? It is usual to suggest that this debate about time is analogous to the debate between the actualist and the possibilist about modality. I think that this suggestion is right. In what follows I pursue the analogy more strictly than is usual and offer a characterization of what is at the core of the dispute between presentists and eternalists that may be immune to worries often raised about the substantiality of the debate. I…Read more
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152The Concept of IdentityPhilosophical Quarterly 34 (135): 175. 1984.In this book, Eli Hirsch focuses on identity through time, first with respect to ordinary bodies, then underlying matter, and eventually persons. These are linked at various points with other aspects of identity, such as the spatial unity of things, the unity of kinds, and the unity of groups. He investigates how our identity concept ordinarily operates in these respects. He also asks why this concept is so cental to our thinking and whether we can justify seeing the world in terms of such a con…Read more
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100Introducing PersonsPhilosophical Quarterly 38 (150): 123. 1988.This is an elegant and clear tour through many of the issues in philosophy of mind that have occupied philosophers of this century. The topics covered include the problem of other minds, arguments for and against the existence of the soul, a discussion of the bundle theory of the mind, behaviorism, functionalism, mind/brain identity, the argument against the possibility of private language, personal identity and the possibility of after-life, and the question of whether animals and computers can…Read more
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230E. J. Lowe on Vague Identity and Quantum IndeterminacyAnalysis 55 (1): 14-19. 1995.The paper defends Gareth Evan's argument against vague identity "de re" from a criticism that quantum mechanics provides actual counter-examples to its validity. A more general version of Evans's argument is stated in which identity involving properties are not essential and it is claimed that the scientific facts as so far known are consistent with the Evansian thesis that indeterminacy in truth-value must always be due to semantic indecision
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82Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kripke and Naming and NecessityRoutledge. 2012.Saul Kripke is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. His most celebrated work, Naming and Necessity , makes arguably the most important contribution to the philosophy of language and metaphysics in recent years. Asking fundamental questions – how do names refer to things in the world? Do objects have essential properties? What are natural kind terms and to what do they refer? – he challenges prevailing theories of language and conceptions of metaphysics, especially the…Read more
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162VI*—Names and BeliefProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1): 93-108. 1981.Harold Noonan; VI*—Names and Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 93–108, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.
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404Perdurance, location and classical mereologyAnalysis 69 (3): 448-452. 2009.In his Ted Sider takes care to define the notion of a temporal part and his doctrine of perdurantism using only the temporally indexed notion of parthood – ‘ x is part of y at t’ – rather than the atemporal notion of classical mereology – ‘ x is a part of y’ – in order to forestall accusations of unintelligibility from his opponents. However, as he notes, endurantists do not necessarily reject the classical mereological notion as unintelligible. They allow that it makes sense and applies to atem…Read more
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160A Flaw in Kripke’s Modal Argument?Philosophia 41 (3): 841-846. 2013.The response to Kripke’s modal argument I wish to propose appeals to the distinction between indicative descriptions, i.e., descriptions formed using indicative verb forms, and what I shall call subjunctive descriptions, descriptions formed using non-indicative verb forms used in subjunctive conditionals. The contrast is between ‘the person who is richer than anyone else in the world’ and ‘the person who would have been richer than anyone else in the world’. The response to Kripke’s modal argume…Read more
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1Object-dependent thoughts: A case of superficial necessity but deep contingency?In Pascal Engel (ed.), Mental causation, Oxford University Press. 1995.