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119The Four-Dimensional WorldAnalysis 37 (1): 32-39. 1976.This paper defends the view of continuants as 'four-dimensional worms' against an argument of Geach's. This is to the effect that if continuants are four-dimensional worms then their stages either do, or do not, fall under the very general terms satisfied by the continuants themselves (a stage of a man either is, or is not, a man); but that either alternative is untenable. I try to show how the former alternative may be defended by appealing to some of Geach's own ideas about identity; then go o…Read more
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219Count Nouns and Mass NounsAnalysis 38 (4): 167-172. 1978.The paper argues that one distinction between concrete count nouns and concrete mass nouns is that geach's derelativization thesis is valid for the former but not valid for the latter. That is, Where 'f' is a concrete count noun 'x is (an) f' means 'for some y, X is the same f as y', But where 'f' is a concrete mass noun this is not so; rather, In this case, 'x is f' is tantamount to 'for some y, X is the f of y'. It is further suggested that abstract nouns are in this respect to be grouped with…Read more
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51Relative identity: a reply to Nicholas GriffinMind 89 (353): 96-98. 1980.In the October 1978 issue of Mind, Nicholas Griffin puts forward a criticism of one of my arguments in 'Wiggins on Identity'. Although I would not now wish to defend everything I said in that paper, the argument Griffin attacks still seems to me to be a good one. In what follows, I explain why I think his criticism fails to strike home.
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83Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hume on KnowledgeRoutledge. 1999.David Hume was one of the most important British philosophers of the eighteenth century. The first part of his _Treatise on Human Nature_ is a seminal work in philosophy. _Hume on Knowledge_ introduces and assesses: * Humes life and the background of the _Treatise_ * The ideas and text in the _Treatise_ * Humes continuing importance to philosophy.
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31A flaw in Sider's vagueness argument for unrestricted mereological compositionAnalysis 70 (4): 669-672. 2010.
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70Tibbles the cat – reply to BurkePhilosophical Studies 95 (3): 215-218. 1999.In his interesting article, Michael Burke (1996) offers a novel solution to the puzzle of Tibbles, the cat, a solution he says, which is based on Aristotelian essentialism. In what follows I argue that, despite its ingenuity, Burke’s solution can be seen to be too implausible to be accepted once we extend it to a variant of the puzzle Burke himself suggests. The conclusion must be that one of the other solutions to the puzzle must be correct. Or, perhaps, that there is no correct solution and th…Read more
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212Indeterminate identity, contingent identity and Abelardian predicatesPhilosophical Quarterly 41 (163): 183-193. 1991.
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88Two-Boxing is IrrationalPhilosophia 43 (2): 455-462. 2015.Philosophers debate whether one-boxing or two-boxing is the rational act in a Newcomb situation. I shall argue that one-boxing is the only rational choice. This is so because there is no intelligible aim by reference to which you can justify the choice of two-boxing over one-boxing once you have come to think that you will two-box. The only aim by which the agent in the Newcomb situation can justify his two-boxing is the subjunctively described aim of ‘getting more than I would if I were to one-…Read more
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125E. J. Lowe on Vague Identity and Quantum IndeterminacyAnalysis 55 (1): 14-19. 1995.The paper defends Gareth Evan's argument against vague identity "de re" from a criticism that quantum mechanics provides actual counter-examples to its validity. A more general version of Evans's argument is stated in which identity involving properties are not essential and it is claimed that the scientific facts as so far known are consistent with the Evansian thesis that indeterminacy in truth-value must always be due to semantic indecision
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499Presentism and EternalismErkenntnis 78 (1): 219-227. 2013.How is the debate between presentism and eternalism to be characterized? It is usual to suggest that this debate about time is analogous to the debate between the actualist and the possibilist about modality. I think that this suggestion is right. In what follows I pursue the analogy more strictly than is usual and offer a characterization of what is at the core of the dispute between presentists and eternalists that may be immune to worries often raised about the substantiality of the debate. I…Read more
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7Reply to Leslie StevensonPhilosophical Books 23 (1): 7-12. 1982.I shall reply to Mr Stevenson's criticisms of my Objects & Identity (1980) in the order in which they occur in his review; mostly this will be a matter of clearing up obvious confusions.
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111A flawed argument for perdurance – reply to braddon-Mitchell and MillerAnalysis 65 (2): 164-166. 2005.
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20Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, edited by Barry Loewer and Georges Rey (review)Philosophical Books 33 (4): 232-234. 1992.
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253Perdurance, location and classical mereologyAnalysis 69 (3): 448-452. 2009.In his Ted Sider takes care to define the notion of a temporal part and his doctrine of perdurantism using only the temporally indexed notion of parthood – ‘ x is part of y at t’ – rather than the atemporal notion of classical mereology – ‘ x is a part of y’ – in order to forestall accusations of unintelligibility from his opponents. However, as he notes, endurantists do not necessarily reject the classical mereological notion as unintelligible. They allow that it makes sense and applies to atem…Read more