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264Bodily Feeling in Depersonalization: A Phenomenological AccountEmotion Review 4 (2): 145-150. 2012.This paper addresses the phenomenology of bodily feeling in depersonalization disorder. We argue that not all bodily feelings are intentional states that have the body or part of it as their object. We distinguish three broad categories of bodily feeling: noematic feeling, noetic feeling, and existential feeling. Then we show how an appreciation of the differences between them can contribute to an understanding of the depersonalization experience.
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38Emotion Experience (edited book)Imprint Academic. 2005.Emotion experience has failed to date to gain a central place in the study of consciousness. This special issue of the _Journal of Consciousness Studies_ presents the most recent views on the matter, with discussions of several aspects of emotion experience. Contributors from different disciplines address links between feelings, brain, body and world. What happens in the brain and in the body when we have feelings? How do feelings relate to our understanding of the world? The contributors also a…Read more
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378Appraising valenceJournal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10): 8-10. 2005.‘Valence’ is used in many different ways in emotion theory. It generally refers to the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ character of an emotion, as well as to the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ character of some aspect of emotion. After reviewing these different uses, I point to the conceptual problems that come with them. In particular, I dis- tinguish: problems that arise from conflating the valence of an emotion with the valence of its aspects, and problems that arise from the very idea that an emotion (an…Read more
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923Il corpo e il vissuto affettivo: verso un approccio «enattivo» allo studio delle emozioniRivista di Estetica 37 77-96. 2008.Introduzione Lo studio delle emozioni è stato caratterizzato per molti anni da una netta separazione fra mente e corpo. Negli anni Sessanta e Settanta – l’epoca aurea del cognitivismo – le teorie delle emozioni si occupavano soprattutto degli antecedenti cognitivi dell’emozione, le cosiddette “valutazioni”. I processi corporei erano visti essenzialmente come sottoprodotti della cognizione, e come troppo poco specifici per poter contribuire alla varietà dell’esperienza emotiva. La cognizione e...
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268Emotion and ethics: An inter-(en) active approach (review)Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4): 505-526. 2009.In this paper, we start exploring the affective and ethical dimension of what De Jaegher and Di Paolo (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6:485–507, 2007 ) have called ‘participatory sense-making’. In the first part, we distinguish various ways in which we are, and feel, affectively inter-connected in interpersonal encounters. In the second part, we discuss the ethical character of this affective inter-connectedness, as well as the implications that taking an ‘inter-(en)active approach’ h…Read more
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
| Emotions |
| Phenomenology |
| Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Biology |
| Continental Philosophy |
| Phenomenology |
| Emotions |