David Teira

Este artículo estudia la justificación normativa de la adopción de los ensayos clínicos aleatorizados por parte de las autoridades sanitarias británicas como estándar metodológico en 1946. A partir de un análisis de los distintos intereses de los participantes en el proceso (pacientes, médicos, farmacéuticas y el propio Estado) argumentamos que la aleatorización se adoptó como mecanismo de asignación imparcial de tratamientos, aunque sus propiedades estadísticas no fueran bien comprendidas. Tal justificación permanece aún vigente

La renta básica se nos presenta en la obra de Philippe van Parijs como una propuesta política filosóficamente argumentada, de modo tal que convencerá tanto al teórico de la justicia como al ciudadano que votará su implantación. En este artículo analizamos la argumentación de van Parijs mostrando cómo la efectividad política de sus tesis sólo se sostiene a costa de reducir el debate sobre la renta básica a los términos de su propia concepción de la ética. Ponemos en duda, por nuestra parte, el alcance de esta reducción sobre un doble plano: diluye por completo la dimensión prudencial de toda argumentación política, y no deja más alternativa que la educación sentimental para quienes no se dejen convencer por el equilibrio reflexivo

Why scientists reach an agreement on new experimental methods when there are conflicts of interest about the evidence they yield? I argue that debiasing methods play a crucial role in this consensus, providing a warrant about the impartiality of the outcome regarding the preferences of different parties involved in the experiment. From a contractarian perspective, I contend that an epistemic pre-requisite for scientists to agree on an experimental method is that this latter is neutral regarding their competing interests. I present two medical experiments (on smallpox inoculation and Mesmerism) in which debiasing procedures such as blinding and data tabulation provided warrants of impartiality that made people agree on the experimental design even if they disagreed on the outcome.

In this article we explore an argumentative pattern that provides a normative justification for expected utility functions grounded on empirical evidence, showing how it worked in three different episodes of their development. The argument claims that we should prudentially maximize our expected utility since this is the criterion effectively applied by those who are considered wisest in making risky choices (be it gamblers or businessmen). Yet, to justify the adoption of this rule, it should be proven that this is empirically true: i.e. that a given function allows us to predict the choices of that particular class of agents. We show how expected utility functions were introduced and contested in accordance with this pattern in the 18th century and how it recurred in the 1950s when Allais made his case against the neo-Bernoullians

In this paper I explore a positivist methodological tradition in early demand theory, as exemplified by several common traits that I draw from the works of V. Pareto, H. L. Moore and H. Schultz. Assuming a current approach to explanation in the social sciences, I will discuss the building of their various explanans, showing that the three authors agreed on two distinctive methodological features: the exclusion of any causal commitment to psychology when explaining individual choice and the mandate to test the truth of demand theory on aggregate data by statistical means. However, I also contend, from an epistemological point of view, that the truth of demand theory was conceived of in three different ways by our authors. Inspired by Poincaré, Pareto assumed that many different theories could account for the same data on individual choice, coming close to a kind of conventionalism -though I prefer to refer to this position as theoreticism. Moore was himself akin to Pearson's approach, which could be named descriptivist insofar as it resolved scientific laws into statistical descriptions of the data. Finally, Schultz tried to reconcile both approaches in an adequationist stance with no success, as we shall see.

In this paper I offer an account of the normative dimension implicit in D. Bernoulli’s expected utility functions by means of an analysis of the juridical metaphors upon which the concept of mathematical expectation was moulded. Following a suggestion by the late E. Coumet, I show how this concept incorporated a certain standard of justice which was put in question by the St. Petersburg paradox. I contend that Bernoulli would have solved it by introducing an alternative normative criterion rather than a positive model of decision making processes

A la vista del catálogo de nuestro Instituto Nacional de Estadística, quién dejará de sorprenderse al descubrir entre las colecciones auspiciadas por el INED francés una dedicada a los Clásicos de la economía y la población, con cuidadísimas ediciones de Condorcet, Süssmilch, Quesnay, Graunt... A esta colección se suma ahora, bajo la dirección de Eric Brian, otra serie de Estudios e investigaciones históricas, cuyo primer volumen comentamos aquí. Matemáticas y acción política, compilado por Thierry Martin, es, además, una excelente representación de los trabajos que en Francia se desarrollan en torno a la matemática social desde múltiples enfoques.