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88The Consequential Conception of Doxastic ResponsibilityTheoria 82 (4): 4-28. 2016.We are occasionally responsible for our beliefs. But is this doxastic responsibility analogous to any non-attitudinal form of responsibility? What I shall call the consequential conception of doxastic responsibility holds that the kind of responsibility that we have for our beliefs is indeed analogous to the kind of responsibility that we have for the consequences of our actions. This article does two things, both with the aim of defending this somewhat unsophisticated but intuitive view of doxa…Read more
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Responsabilité de croire et impossibilité de croire à volontéIn Laurent Jaffro (ed.), Croit-on comme on veut? Histoire d'une controverse. Collection: Analyse et Philosophie, Vrin. pp. 223-239. 2013.Sommes-nous, au moins occasionnellement, responsables de nos croyances ? Une chose est sûre, en pratique, nous considérons souvent que tel est le cas. Mais l’attribution d’une telle responsabilité est problématique dans la mesure où les croyances ne sont pas des états mentaux que nous contrôlons comme nous contrôlons, par exemple, nos actions. Cet article est consacré à préciser, à expliquer et à défendre l’affirmation selon laquelle les croyances ne sont pas des états mentaux que nous pouvons …Read more
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36Foundations of an Ethics of BeliefDe Gruyter. 2013.In the course of our daily lives we make lots of evaluations of actions. We think that driving above the speed limit is dangerous, that giving up one’s bus seat to the elderly is polite, that stirring eggs with a plastic spoon is neither good nor bad. We understand too that we may be praised or blamed for actions performed on the basis of these evaluations. The same is true in the case of certain beliefs. Sometimes we blame people for what they believe falsely or irrationally. On occasion, we pr…Read more
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71Epistemic Circularity and the Problem of Cheap CreditPhilosophical Papers 40 (3): 327-340. 2011.Abstract This article raises a worry concerning Ernest Sosa's way of solving the problem of epistemic circularity. Sosa's solution to the problem of epistemic circularity relies on the following claim of sufficiency: for S to deserve to be credited for his true belief, it is sufficient that his belief is, in a sense to be made clear, ?apt?. I argue that this solution undersells the notion of credit. I present three kinds of cases in which the attribution of credit to a believer requires more tha…Read more
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La justification des croyances. Mentalisme, accessibilisme et déontologismeRepha 5 1-13. 2012.L’objectif de cet article est de clarifier les relations qu’entretiennent trois théories de la justification des croyances, toutes considérées comme des théories internalistes 1 : la conception déontique (le déontologisme), la conception accessibiliste (l’accessibilisme) et la conception mentaliste (le mentalisme). Nous expliquerons qu’en dépit de ce que l’on pourrait penser à première vue l’adoption de l’accessibilisme n’implique pas celle du mentalisme. Dans un second temps, nous montrerons po…Read more
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95The Legitimacy of Intellectual Praise and BlameJournal of Philosophical Research 40 189-203. 2015.We frequently praise or blame people for what they believe or fail to believe as a result of their having investigated some matter thoroughly, or, in the case of blame, for having failed to investigate it, or for carelessly or insufficiently investigating. for instance, physicists who, after years of toil, uncover some unknown fact about our universe are praised for what they come to know. sometimes, in contrast, we blame and may even despise our friends for being ignorant of certain ecological …Read more
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30The Value Problem of Knowledge. Against a Reliabilist SolutionProceedings of the Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy 85-92. 2007.A satisfying theory of knowledge has to explain why knowledge seems to be better than mere true belief. In this paper, I try to show that the best reliabilist explanation (ERA+) is still not able to solve this problem. According to an already elaborated answer (ERA), it is better to possess knowledge that p because this makes likely that one’s future belief of a similar kind will also be true. I begin with a metaphysical comment which gives birth to ERA +, a better formulation of ERA. Then, I ra…Read more
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73In support of the Knowledge-First conception of the normativity of justificationIn Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 246-258. 2017.The knowledge-first solution to the New Evil Demon Problem (NEDP) goes hand in hand with a particular conception of the normativity of justification, one according to which a justified belief is one that satisfies some sort of ought or should (Williamson forthcoming). This claim is incompatible with another, well accepted, view that regards the normativity of justification. According to this established view, a justified belief is rather something that is neither obligatory, nor forbidden (see …Read more
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La métaphysique, c’est la science de l’être en tant qu’être, ou bien?In Massin Olivier & Meylan Anne (eds.), Aristote chez les Helvètes. Douze essais de métaphysique helvétique., Ithaque. pp. 1-3. 2014.
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134The Value Problem of Knowledge: an Axiological Diagnosis of the Credit SolutionRes Philosophica 90 (2): 261-275. 2013.The value problem of knowledge is one of the prominent problems that philosophical accounts of knowledge are expected to solve. According to the credit solution, a well-known solution to this problem, knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because the former is creditable to a subject’s cognitive competence. But what is “credit value”? How does it connect to the already existing distinctions between values? The purpose of the present paper is to answer these questions. Its most importa…Read more
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1Virtue-Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge: Classical and New ProblemsIn Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 317-329. 2018.This first part of this chapter presents the virtue-reliabilist answer to the classical value problems of knowledge. According to this solution, the reason why knowledge is a better cognitive state than what falls short of it —viz. mere true and true+Gettierized beliefs— is as follows: when a subject knows, she deserves credit for her true belief. The second part of this chapter is devoted to showing that this solution cannot be extended to solve the " new " value problem, that is to say, the pr…Read more
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L'intéressantIn Emma Tieffenbach & Julien Deonna (eds.), Petit dictionnaire des valeurs, Ithaque. pp. 178-186. 2018.
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La justification des croyances testimoniales: le malentenduIn Jean-Marie Chevalier & Benoit Gaultier (eds.), Connaître: Questions d’épistémologie contemporaine, Editions D'ithaque. pp. 231-252. 2014.Ce chapitre discute de la justification des croyances testimoniales, c’est-à-dire de la justification des croyances que nous adoptons en nous appuyant sur le témoignage d’autrui. Plus précisément, la question à laquelle cette contribution s’intéresse est celle des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes de la justification des croyances testimoniales. Il y a deux manières classiques, et soi-disant antagonistes, d’y répondre: la réponse réductionnisme et la réponse non-réductionniste. L’objectif de…Read more
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University of ZürichAssistant Professor
Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |