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35The intelligibility of spectrum inversionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4): 631-6. 1993.Christopher Peacocke has recently made an important and insightful effort to fashion a non-verificationist method for distinguishing sense from nonsense. The argument is subtle and complex, and varies somewhat with each of his three target ‘spurious hypotheses’: that if a perfect fission of one person into two were to occur, one and only one of the resulting persons would be identical with the original; that another person’s visual experience can be qualitatively different from your own when you…Read more
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140Dennett on qualia and consciousness: A critiqueCanadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1): 47-82. 1997.IntroductionIt is at least a bit embarrassing, perhaps even scandalous, that debate should still rage over the sheer existence of qualia, but they continue to find able defenders after decades of being attacked as relics of ghostly substances, epiphenomenal non-entities, nomological danglers and the like; the intensity of the current confrontation is captured vividly by Daniel Dennett:What are qualia, exactly? This obstreperous query is dismissed by one author by invoking Louis Armstrong's legen…Read more
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28Skeptical RearmamentCanadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3). 1985.In ‘Skeptism Oisarmed,’ L.S. Carrier asserts the following:… any reasonable person would accept premise only on the ground that both p and q are propositions for which we can get the requisite evidence.Premise, actually a premise schema attributed to Peter Unger, is the following:If A both knows p and knows that p entails q, then A can come to know that q.I suggest, contrary to Carrier's assertion, that many reasonable people, including many philosophers, would regard as a necessary truth knowab…Read more
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48Basic Theistic BeliefCanadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3). 1986.In several recent writings and in the 1980 Freemantle Lectures at Oxford, Alvin Plantinga has defended the idea that belief in God is ‘properly basic,’ by which he means that it is perfectly rational to hold such a belief without basing it on any other beliefs. The defense falls naturally into two broad parts: a positive argument for the rationality of such beliefs, and a rebuttal of the charge that if such a positive argument ‘succeeds,’ then a parallel argument will ‘succeed’ equally well in s…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
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Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
History of Western Philosophy, Misc |