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Bredo Johnsen

University of Houston
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    35
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    29

 More details
  • University of Houston
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor Emeritus
Harvard University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1972
Houston, Texas, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Mind
20th Century Philosophy
History of Western Philosophy, Misc
1 more
  • All publications (35)
  •  323
    On the Coherence of Pyrrhonian Skepticism
    Philosophical Review 110 (4): 521. 2001.
    Early in Outlines of Pyrrhonism Sextus Empiricus writes
    Pyrrhonian SkepticismHistory: SkepticismPyrrhonists
  •  63
    Kekes on foundationalism
    Philosophia 16 (2): 203-208. 1986.
    Foundationalism, Misc
  •  164
    Black and the Inductive Justification of Induction
    Analysis 32 (3). 1972.
    Justification of Induction
  •  4
    Steven Luper-Foy, ed., The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 7 (11): 452-455. 1987.
  •  132
    On Basic Knowledge and Justification
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (4). 1985.
    Robert F. Almeder believes he has discovered a ‘pressing problem': ‘stating the conditions under which we determine whether a person's basic belief is true without introducing an evidence condition for knowledge’. He believes further that this is ‘a problem needing resolution before any ultimately satisfying explication of basic knowledge can be offered’.My aim is to show that Almeder has failed to discover any problem at all, but I begin by asking: how could the question how we determine the tr…Read more
    Robert F. Almeder believes he has discovered a ‘pressing problem': ‘stating the conditions under which we determine whether a person's basic belief is true without introducing an evidence condition for knowledge’. He believes further that this is ‘a problem needing resolution before any ultimately satisfying explication of basic knowledge can be offered’.My aim is to show that Almeder has failed to discover any problem at all, but I begin by asking: how could the question how we determine the truth of another's basic belief have any bearing on the correct explication of the concept of basic knowledge?
    Epistemological States and PropertiesJustification
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