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77Concepts are a functional kind. Comment on Machery's Doing Without Concepts.Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3): 217-18. 2010.This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery
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389Concepts: Stored or created?Minds and Machines 20 (1): 47-68. 2010.Are concepts stable entities, unchanged from context to context? Or rather are they context-dependent structures, created on the fly? We argue that this does not constitute a genuine dilemma. Our main thesis is that the more a pattern of features is general and shared, the more it qualifies as a concept. Contextualists have not shown that conceptual structures lack a stable, general core, acting as an attractor on idiosyncratic information. What they have done instead is to give a contribution t…Read more
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382A Simple Realist Account of the Normativity of ConceptsDisputatio 1 (19): 1-17. 2005.I argue that a concept is applied correctly when it is applied to the kind of things it is the concept of. Correctness as successful kind-tracking is fulfilling an externally and naturalistically individuated standard. And the normative aspect of concept-application so characterized depends on the relational (non-individualistic) feature of conceptual content. I defend this view against two objections. The first is that norms should provide justifications for action, and the second involves a v…Read more
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More than WordsIn Mikhail Philippe Kissine De Brabanter (ed.), Utterance Interpretation and Cognitive Models, Emerald. 2009.
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75Reference, knowledge, and scepticism about meaningSorites (19): 1-18. 2007.This paper explores the possibility of resisting meaning scepticism – the thesis that there are many alternative incompatible assignments of reference to each of our terms - by appealing to the idea that the nature of reference is to maximize knowledge. If the reference relation is a knowledge maximizing-relation, then some candidate referents are privileged among the others - i.e., those referents we are in a position to know about – and a positive reason against meaning scepticism is thus ind…Read more
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431Saving the DSM-5? Descriptive conceptions and theoretical concepts of mental disorders. MEDICINA & STORIA, 109-128.Medicina E Storia 2 (9-10): 109-129. 2016.Abstract: At present, psychiatric disorders are characterized descriptively, as the standard within the scientific community for communication and, to a cer- tain extent, for diagnosis, is the DSM, now at its fifth edition. The main rea- sons for descriptivism are the aim of achieving reliability of diagnosis and improving communication in a situation of theoretical disagreement, and the Ignorance argument, which starts with acknowledgment of the relative fail- ure of the project of finding biom…Read more
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424Saving the DSM-5? Descriptive conceptions and theoretical concepts of mental disordersMedicina E Storia 9. 2016.At present, psychiatric disorders are characterized descriptively, as the standard within the scientific community for communication and, to a certain extent, for diagnosis, is the DSM, now at its fifth edition. The main reasons for descriptivism are the aim of achieving reliability of diagnosis and improving communication in a situation of theoretical disagreement, and the Ignorance argument, which starts with acknowledgment of the relative failure of the project of finding biomarkers for most …Read more
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376Overcoming Expert Disagreement In A Delphi Process. An Exercise In Reverse EpistemologyHumana Mente 8 (28): 87-103. 2015.Disagreement among experts is a central topic in social epistemology. What should an expert do when confronted with the different opinion of an epistemic peer? Possible answers include the steadfast view (holding to one’s belief), the abstemious view (suspending one’s judgment), and moderate conciliatory views, which specify criteria for belief change when a peer’s different opinion is encountered. The practice of Delphi techniques in healthcare, medicine, and social sciences provides a real-lif…Read more
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495Lalumera, E. 2017 Understanding schizophrenia through Wittgenstein: empathy, explanation, and philosophical clarification, in Schizophrenia and Common Sense, Hipólito, I., Gonçalves, J., Pereira, J. (eds.). SpringerNature, Mind-Brain Studies.In I. Hipolito, J. Goncalves & J. Pereira (eds.), Schizophrenia and Common Sense, Hipólito, I., Gonçalves, J., Pereira, J. (eds.). SpringerNature, Mind-Brain Studies., Springer. forthcoming.Wittgenstein’s concepts shed light on the phenomenon of schizophrenia in at least three different ways: with a view to empathy, scientific explanation, or philosophical clarification. I consider two different “positive” wittgensteinian accounts―Campbell’s idea that delusions involve a mechanism of which different framework propositions are parts, Sass’ proposal that the schizophrenic patient can be described as a solipsist, and a Rhodes’ and Gipp’s account, where epistemic aspects of schizophren…Read more
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23Of standard of reference and accuracy: the problem of truth in imagingEuropean Journal of Nuclear Medicine and Imaging 43 (1): 52-54. 2016.The identification of a reference standard is a major problem in diagnostic imaging. This comment invites reflection on the notion by illustrating three philosophical approaches to truth and evidence.
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University of BolognaRegular Faculty
UNIPO- University of Eastern Piedmont
Alumnus, 2003
Bologna, Emilia-Romagna, Italy