Reidar Maliks

This article argues that Kant's republicanism provides a foundation for democratic procedures. The conclusion is reached through an investigation of Critique of the Power of Judgment, which allows us to interpret Kant's notion of the state as a self-determining organic community, and not merely an aggregate of individuals. The article rejects Isaiah Berlin's interpretation of Kant as an authoritarian thinker, and reveals a republican theory centered on liberal freedom expressed within a self-organizing political community

When Kant in 1793 rejected a right of revolution, he was immediately criticized by a group of radical followers who argued that he had betrayed his own principles of justice. Jakob, Erhard, Fichte, Bergk and Schlegel proceeded to defend a right of resistance and revolution based on what they took to be his true principles. I argue that we must understand Kant's Metaphysics of Morals, which came in 1797, partly as a response to these radical democratic writings. Exploring this forgotten controversy reveals that Kant did not betray his own principles when he denied a right of revolution, because he did not mean that persons have an unconditional duty to obey. This becomes clear when we read the final developments of Kant's thinking on individual liberty and republican government in light of the radical critique