Reidar Maliks

This paper argues that, although no resistance or revolution is permitted in the Kantian state, very tyrannical regimes must not be obeyed because they do not qualify as states. The essay shows how a state ceases to be a state, argues that persons have a moral responsibility to judge about it and defends the compatibility of this with Kantian authority. The reconstructed Kantian view has implications for how we conceive authority and obligation. It calls for a morally demanding definition of the state and asserts that the primary personal responsibility is not to evaluate the morality of every single law but to evaluate the moral standing of the polity.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.Kant, the State, and RevolutionVolume 18, Issue 1Reidar Maliks DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000271Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. Kant, the State, and RevolutionVolume 18, Issue 1Reidar Maliks DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000271Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. Kant, the State, and RevolutionVolume 18, Issue 1Reidar Maliks DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000271Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation.

This article argues that Kant's republicanism provides a foundation for democratic procedures. The conclusion is reached through an investigation of Critique of the Power of Judgment, which allows us to interpret Kant's notion of the state as a self-determining organic community, and not merely an aggregate of individuals. The article rejects Isaiah Berlin's interpretation of Kant as an authoritarian thinker, and reveals a republican theory centered on liberal freedom expressed within a self-organizing political community