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19Things that bother me: death, freedom, the self, etcNew York Review Books. 2018.The sense of the self -- A fallacy of our age -- I have no future -- Luck swallows everything -- You cannot make yourself the way you are -- The silliest claim -- Real naturalism -- The unstoried life -- Two years' time.
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19The impossibility of ultimate moral responsibility?In D. Pereboom (ed.), Free will. Hackett readings in philosophy, . 2009.
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18I and I: immunity to error through misidentification of the subjectIn S. Prosser and F. Recanati (ed.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 202-223. 2012.I argue for the following claims: [1] all uses of I are absolutely immune to error through misidentification relative to I. [2] no genuine use of I can fail to refer. Nevertheless [3] I isn’t univocal: it doesn’t always refer to the same thing, or kind of thing, even in the thought or speech of a single person. This is so even though [4] I always refers to its user, the subject of experience who speaks or thinks, and although [5] if I’m thinking about something specifically as myself, I can’t fa…Read more
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18Episodic EthicsRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60 85-116. 2007.I guess I wont send that note now, for the mind is such a new place, last night feels obsolete.
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17Freedom and Belief: Revised EditionOxford University Press UK. 1986.This is a revised and updated edition of Galen Strawson's groundbreaking first book, where he argues that there is a fundamental sense in which there is no such thing as free will or true moral responsibility. This conclusion is very hard to accept. On the whole we continue to believe firmly both that we have free will and that we are truly morally responsible for what we do. Strawson devotes much of the book to an attempt to explain why this is so. He examines various aspects of the 'cognitive …Read more
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16Galen Strawson, O niemożliwości całkowitej odpowiedzialności moralnejRoczniki Filozoficzne 65 (1): 109-129. 2017.Jedną z centralnych kwestii dotyczących problemu wolnej woli stanowi zagadnienie moralnej odpowiedzialności. Na ogół utrzymuje się, iż ma ono najdalej idące konsekwencje dla życia społecznego oraz prawa. Jak jednak argumentuje Galen Strawson, nie można odpowiadać moralnie za własne działania. Argument przebiega następująco: dana osoba podejmuje decyzję w oparciu o swój charakter, osobowość lub inne czynniki umysłowe. Z drugiej strony, za czynniki te nie można ponosić odpowiedzialności, wydaje si…Read more
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12Episodic EthicsRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60 85-116. 2007.I guess I wont send that note now, for the mind is such a new place, last night feels obsolete.
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12Real Materialism: And Other EssaysOxford University Press. 2008.Real Materialism is a collection of highly original essays on a set of related topics in philosophy of mind and metaphysics: consciousness and the mind-body problem; our knowledge of the world; the nature of the self or subject; free will and moral responsibility; the nature of thought and intentionality; causation and David Hume.
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12Chapter One. IntroductionIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-4. 2011.
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11Episodische EthikDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 56 (5): 651-675. 2008.Der Beitrag unterscheidet zwischen episodischen und diachronischen Persönlichkeiten. Episodische Persönlichkeiten leben emotional stark in der Gegenwart und verfügen im Gegensatz zu diachronischen Persönlichkeiten nicht über ein Narrativ, welches sie ihre Gegenwart und Vergangenheit als eine Einheit empfinden lässt. Der Autor führt vor, dass episodische Persönlichkeiten trotz ihres psychologisch nur schwach ausgeprägten Verhältnisses zu ihrer eigenen Vergangenheit moralfähig sind
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11Precis of Mental RealityMind and WorldPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 433. 1998.
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10Muddling Through: An Episodic Conversation on Self, Narrativity, Transience, and Other PleasantriesIn Andrea Altobrando, Takuya Niikawa & Richard Stone (eds.), The Realizations of the Self, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 135-163. 2018.In your article “The unstoried life”, you criticize the idea that having a ‘storied life’ is necessary for a Good life. Some authors would probably admit that having a storied life is perhaps not necessary in order to simply exist as an Individual, singular being, but they would probably not accept that what you call a ‘Whole human being’ is possible without such narration.
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8Stvarna intencionalnost 2. Zašto intencionalnost stvara svijest?Filozofska Istrazivanja 26 (2): 297-318. 2006.
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8Real naturalism v2Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy 1 (2): 101-125. 2013.
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7The Self?Wiley. 2009.This collection of philosophical papers reflects on the existence and nature of the self. A collection of philosophical papers devoted to the subject of the self. Reflects on key questions about the existence and nature of the self. Comprises contributions from leading authorities in the field: Barry Dainton, Ingmar Persson, Marya Schechtman, Galen Strawson, Bas van Fraassen, and Peter van Inwagen.
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6Real Intentionality 3: Why Intentionality Entails ConsciousnessIn Real Materialism: And Other Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 279--297. 2008.
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5Intencionalidad real 3: por qué la intencionalidad entraña concienciaTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 27 (3): 35-69. 2008.
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4SelvesIn B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, . pp. 541-564. 2009.
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4'All my hopes vanish': Hume on the mindIn Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume, Continuum. pp. 181. 2012.
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