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18The Impossibility of Moral ResponsibilityIn Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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165Replies to Noam Chomsky, Pierre Jacob, Michael Smith, and Paul Snowdon Mind and WorldPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 461. 1998.
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17The impossibility of ultimate moral responsibility?In D. Pereboom (ed.), Free will. Hackett readings in philosophy, . 2009.
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3SelvesIn B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, . pp. 541-564. 2009.
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1889Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychismIn A. Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and its place in nature: does physicalism entail panpsychism?, . pp. 3-31. 2006.
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52Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism, and on the sesmet theory of subjectivityIn D. Skrbina (ed.), Mind that abides: panpsychism in the new millennium., . pp. 33-65. 2009.
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334What Is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience?Philosophical Issues 13 (1): 279-315. 2003.This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008) I take 'content' in a natural internalist way to refer to occurrent mental content. I introduce a 'thin' or ‘live’ notion of the subject according to which a subject of experience cannot exist unless there is an experience for it to be the subject of. I then argue, first, that in the case of a particular experience E, its content C, and its (thin) subje…Read more
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402The depth(s) of the twentieth centuryAnalysis 70 (4): 607. 2010.many things were back to front in 20th century analytic philosophy
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96Panpsychism? Reply to commentators, with a celebration of DescartesIn A. Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and its place in nature: does physicalism entail panpsychism?, . 2006.Reply to commentators on the paper 'Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism'
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93Underestimating the PhysicalJournal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10): 228-240. 2019.Many hold that (1) consciousness poses a uniquely hard problem. Why is this so? Chalmers considers 12 main answers in 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness'. This paper focuses on number 11, and is principally addressed to those who endorse (1) because they think that (2) consciousness can't possibly be physical. It argues that to hold (2) is to make the mistake of underestimating the physical, and that almost all who make this mistake do so because they think they know more about the physical than…Read more
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69Conceivability and the Silence of PhysicsJournal of Consciousness Studies 24 (11-12): 167-192. 2017.According to the ‘conceivability argument’ [1] it’s conceivable that a conscious human being H may have a perfect physical duplicate H* who isn’t conscious, [2] whatever is conceivable is possible, therefore [3] H* may possibly exist. This paper argues that the conceivability argument can’t help in discussion of the ‘mind–body problem’ even if [2] is allowed to be true. This is not because [1] is false, but because we don’t and can’t know enough about the nature of the physical to know whether o…Read more
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28Narrative BypassingJournal of Consciousness Studies 23 (1-2): 125-139. 2016.In his target paper, John Welwood tells us that we have to beware of 'spiritual bypassing -- using spiritual ideas and practices to sidestep personal, emotional -- unfinished business--, to shore up a shaky sense of self, or to belittle basic needs, feelings, and develop-mental tasks, all in the name of enlightenment'. It's arguable that there is an equal danger of 'narrative bypassing' -- using the idea of one's life as a narrative to 'sidestep personal, emotional --unfinished business--, to sh…Read more
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3PrefaceIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. 2011.
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103The SelfWiley-Blackwell. 2005.This collection of philosophical papers reflects on the existence and nature of the self. A collection of philosophical papers devoted to the subject of the self. Reflects on key questions about the existence and nature of the self. Comprises contributions from leading authorities in the field: Barry Dainton, Ingmar Persson, Marya Schechtman, Galen Strawson, Bas van Fraassen, and Peter van Inwagen
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6Real Intentionality 3: Why Intentionality Entails ConsciousnessIn Real Materialism: And Other Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 279--297. 2008.
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27The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume: Revised EditionOxford University Press UK. 2014.In this revised and updated edition of The Secret Connexion, Galen Strawson explores one of the most discussed subjects in all philosophy: David Hume's work on causation. Strawson challenges the standard view of Hume, according to which he thinks that there is no such thing as causal influence, and that there is nothing more to causation than things of one kind regularly following things things of another kind. He argues that Hume does believe in causal influence, but insists that we cannot know…Read more
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74Realistic materialismIn Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics, Blackwell. 2003.
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101On "Humean"In Https://Www.Academia.Edu/, . 2013.In metaphysics, the adjective ‘Humean’ is standardly used to describe positions that deny the existence of any necessary connection or causal influence in concrete reality. This usage has been significantly reinforced by David Lewis’s employment of ‘Humean’ in the phrase ‘Humean supervenience’. It is, however, most unclear that this usage is appropriate, and Lewis himself raised a doubt about it
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11Chapter One. IntroductionIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-4. 2011.
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2237Mind and Being: The Primacy of PanpsychismIn Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, Oxford University Press. pp. 000-00. 2016.I endorse a 12-word metaphysics. [1] Stoff ist Kraft ≈ being is energy. [2] Wesen ist Werden ≈ being is becoming. [3] Sein ist Sosein ≈ being is qualit[ativit]y. [4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein ≈ being is mind. [1]–[3] are plausible metaphysical principles and unprejudiced consideration of what we know about concrete reality obliges us to favor [4], i.e. panpsychism or panexperientialism, above all other positive substantive proposals. For [i] panpsychism is the most ontologically parsimonious vi…Read more
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