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74Realistic materialismIn Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. 2003.
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3PrefaceIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. 2011.
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109The SelfWiley-Blackwell. 2005.This collection of philosophical papers reflects on the existence and nature of the self. A collection of philosophical papers devoted to the subject of the self. Reflects on key questions about the existence and nature of the self. Comprises contributions from leading authorities in the field: Barry Dainton, Ingmar Persson, Marya Schechtman, Galen Strawson, Bas van Fraassen, and Peter van Inwagen
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6Real Intentionality 3: Why Intentionality Entails ConsciousnessIn Real Materialism: And Other Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 279--297. 2008.
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13Chapter One. IntroductionIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-4. 2011.
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37Real Intentionality V.2: Why Intentionality Entails ConsciousnessSynthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 279-297. 2005.Intentionality is an essentially mental, essentially occurrent, and essentially experiential phenomenon. Any attempt to characterize intentionality that detaches it from conscious experience faces two insuperable problems. First, it is obliged to concede that almost everything has intentionality—all the way down to subatomic particles. Second, it has the consequence that everything that has intentionality has far too much of it—perhaps an infinite amount. The key to a satisfactory and truly natu…Read more
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42Précis of Mental Reality (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 433-435. 1998.Replies to commentaries on the book Mental Reality by Noam Chomsky, Michael Smith, Paul Snowdon, Pascal Engel
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The self and the SESMETJournal of Consciousness Studies 6 (4): 99-135. 1999.Response to commentaries on keynote article.
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95Episodic EthicsRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60 85-116. 2007.I guess I wont send that note now, for the mind is such a new place, last night feels obsolete.
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341Mental RealityMIT Press. 1994.Introduction -- A default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- A note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- An account of four seconds of thought -- Questions -- The mental and the nonmental -- The mental and the publicly observable -- The mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 -- Monism -- T…Read more
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81The impossibility of ultimate moral responsibility?In Paul Russell & Oisin Deery (eds.), The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings From the Contemporary Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 363. 2013.
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5Intencionalidad real 3: por qué la intencionalidad entraña concienciaTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 27 (3): 35-69. 2008.
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8Stvarna intencionalnost 2. Zašto intencionalnost stvara svijest?Filozofska Istrazivanja 26 (2): 297-318. 2006.
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211Real intentionalityPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (3): 287-313. 2004.This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008)
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66The unhelpfulness of determinism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 149-56. 2000.
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18Freedom and Belief: Revised EditionOxford University Press UK. 1986.This is a revised and updated edition of Galen Strawson's groundbreaking first book, where he argues that there is a fundamental sense in which there is no such thing as free will or true moral responsibility. This conclusion is very hard to accept. On the whole we continue to believe firmly both that we have free will and that we are truly morally responsible for what we do. Strawson devotes much of the book to an attempt to explain why this is so. He examines various aspects of the 'cognitive …Read more
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On the Inevitability of Freedom from a Compatibilist Point of ViewAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 23 (4): 393-400. 1986.According to standard compatibilist accounts of freedom, human beings act freely just so long as they are, when they act, free from constraints of certain specified kinds. Such accounts of freedom are examples of what one may call Constraint Compatibilism (CC). I will argue that, properly understood, CC entails not only that we are virtually always able to act freely, but also that virtually all if not all our actual actions are free. The suggestion is not so much that this is a hitherto unnotic…Read more
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106David Hume: objects and powerIn Stewart Duncan & Antonia LoLordo (eds.), Debates in Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses, Routledge. pp. 231. 2012.
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93Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and ConcernmentPrinceton University Press. 2011.This book argues that in fact it is Locke 's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid.
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2The experiential and the non-experientialIn Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate, Blackwell. 1994.
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76Knowledge of the WorldNoûs 36 (s1). 2002.reprinted as 'Can We Know the Nature of Reality As It Is In Itself' in Galen Strawson, Real Materialism, 2008: Many hold that it is impossible in principle for finite creatures like ourselves to know anything of the nature of non-mental concrete reality as it is in itself, even if we can be said to know the nature of the qualitative character of our own experiences (as it is in itself) just in having them. I argue that there is no insuperable obstacle to knowledge of the nature of non-mental con…Read more
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