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5Intencionalidad real 3: por qué la intencionalidad entraña concienciaTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 27 (3): 35-69. 2008.
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8Stvarna intencionalnost 2. Zašto intencionalnost stvara svijest?Filozofska Istrazivanja 26 (2): 297-318. 2006.
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209Real intentionalityPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (3): 287-313. 2004.This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008)
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66The unhelpfulness of determinism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 149-56. 2000.
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17Freedom and Belief: Revised EditionOxford University Press UK. 1986.This is a revised and updated edition of Galen Strawson's groundbreaking first book, where he argues that there is a fundamental sense in which there is no such thing as free will or true moral responsibility. This conclusion is very hard to accept. On the whole we continue to believe firmly both that we have free will and that we are truly morally responsible for what we do. Strawson devotes much of the book to an attempt to explain why this is so. He examines various aspects of the 'cognitive …Read more
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On the Inevitability of Freedom from a Compatibilist Point of ViewAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 23 (4): 393-400. 1986.According to standard compatibilist accounts of freedom, human beings act freely just so long as they are, when they act, free from constraints of certain specified kinds. Such accounts of freedom are examples of what one may call Constraint Compatibilism (CC). I will argue that, properly understood, CC entails not only that we are virtually always able to act freely, but also that virtually all if not all our actual actions are free. The suggestion is not so much that this is a hitherto unnotic…Read more
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103David Hume: objects and powerIn Stewart Duncan & Antonia LoLordo (eds.), Debates in Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses, Routledge. pp. 231. 2000.
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88Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and ConcernmentPrinceton University Press. 2011.This book argues that in fact it is Locke 's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid.
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2The experiential and the non-experientialIn Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate, Blackwell. 1994.
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76Knowledge of the WorldNoûs 36 (s1). 2002.reprinted as 'Can We Know the Nature of Reality As It Is In Itself' in Galen Strawson, Real Materialism, 2008: Many hold that it is impossible in principle for finite creatures like ourselves to know anything of the nature of non-mental concrete reality as it is in itself, even if we can be said to know the nature of the qualitative character of our own experiences (as it is in itself) just in having them. I argue that there is no insuperable obstacle to knowledge of the nature of non-mental con…Read more
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192Intentionality and experience: Terminological preliminariesIn David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 41--66. 2005.
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232Self-intimationPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1): 1-31. 2013.Aristotle, Dignāga, Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Brentano, Sartre and many others are right about the nature of conscious awareness: all such awareness comports—somehow carries within itself—awareness of itself . This is a necessary condition of awareness being awareness at all: no ‘higher-order’ account of what makes conscious states conscious can be correct. But is very paradoxical: it seems to require that awareness be somehow already present, in such a way as to be available to itself as objec…Read more
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328Real materialismIn Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics, Blackwell. pp. 49--88. 2003.(1) Materialists hold that every real, concrete phenomenon in the universe is a wholly physical phenomenon. (2) Consciousness ('what-it's-likeness', etc.) is the most certainly existing real, concrete phenomenon there is. It follows that (3) all serious materialists must grant that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon. ‘How can consciousness possibly be physical, given what we know about the physical?’ To ask this question is already to have gone wrong. We have no good reason (as Prie…Read more
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167Fundamental Singleness: How to Turn the 2nd Paralogism into a Valid ArgumentRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67 61-92. 2010.[1] Experience is a real concrete phenomenon. The existence of experience entails the existence of a subject of experience. Therefore subjects of experience are concretely real. [2] The existence of a subject of experience in the lived present or living moment of experience, e.g. the period of time in which the grasping of a thought occurs, provably involves the existence of singleness or unity of an unsurpassably strong kind. The singleness or unity in question is a metaphysically real, concret…Read more
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248The secret connexion: causation, realism, and David HumeOxford University Press. 1989.It is widely supposed that David Hume invented and espoused the "regularity" theory of causation, holding that causal relations are nothing but a matter of one type of thing being regularly followed by another. It is also widely supposed that he was not only right about this, but that it was one of his greatest contributions to philosophy. Strawson here argues that the regularity theory of causation is indefensible, and that Hume never adopted it in any case. Strawson maintains that Hume did not…Read more
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918The identity of the categorical and the dispositionalAnalysis 68 (4): 271-282. 2008.Suppose that X and Y can’t possibly exist apart in reality; then—by definition—there’s no real distinction between them, only a conceptual distinction. There’s a conceptual distinction between a rectilinear figure’s triangularity and its trilaterality, for example, but no real distinction. In fundamental metaphysics there is no real distinction between an object’s categorical properties and its dispositional properties. So too there is no real distinction between an object and its properties. An…Read more
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4'All my hopes vanish': Hume on the mindIn Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume, Continuum. pp. 181. 2012.
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Intentionality, terminology and experienceIn David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2005.
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Stvarna intencionalnost 2. Zašto intencionalnost stvara svijest?: Real Intentionality 2: Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness? (review)Filozofska Istrazivanja 26 (2): 297-318. 2006.Intencionalnost je esencijalno mentalni, esencijalno zgodimični, te esencijalno iskustveni fenomen. Svaki pokušaj karakteriziranja intencionalnosti koji je izdvaja iz svjesnog iskustva suočuje se s dva nesavladiva problema. Prvo, obvezno je priznati da gotovo sve ima intencionalnost – sve do subatomskih čestica. Drugo, ima za posljedicu da sve što ima intencionalnost, ima je puno previše – možda beskonačno mnogo. Ključ zadovoljavajuće i istinski naturalističke teorije intencionalnosti jest reali…Read more
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'The I, the I'In Galen Strawson (ed.), The Subject of Experience Galen Strawson, Oxford University Press. 2017.Introduction to a collection of essays called The Subject of Experience, reflecting on self-consciousness, the sense of self, the 'I', the notion of the subject of the experience.
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Real 3 intentionality (Why intentionality involves the conscience)Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 27 (3): 35-69. 2008.
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