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9Real naturalism v2Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy 1 (2): 101-125. 2013.
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13Real Materialism: And Other EssaysOxford University Press. 2008.Real Materialism is a collection of highly original essays on a set of related topics in philosophy of mind and metaphysics: consciousness and the mind-body problem; our knowledge of the world; the nature of the self or subject; free will and moral responsibility; the nature of thought and intentionality; causation and David Hume.
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490Self-Awareness: Acquaintance, Intentionality, Representation, RelationReview of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2): 311-328. 2022.This paper endorses and expounds the widely held view that all experience involves pre-reflective self-consciousness or self-awareness. It argues that pre-reflective self-consciousness does not involve any sort of experience of ‘me-ness’ or ‘mine-ness’, and that all self-consciousness is essentially relational, essentially has the subject as intentional object, essentially involves representation, in particular self-representation, as well as ‘immediate acquaintance’, in particular immediate sel…Read more
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1704Realistic monism - why physicalism entails panpsychismJournal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 3-31. 2006.
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930Against NarrativityRatio 17 (4): 428-452. 2004.I argue against two popular claims. The first is a descriptive, empirical thesis about the nature of ordinary human experience: ‘each of us constructs and lives a “narrative” . . . this narrative is us, our identities’ (Oliver Sacks); ‘self is a perpetually rewritten story . . . in the end, we become the autobiographical narratives by which we “tell about” our lives’ (Jerry Bruner); ‘we are all virtuoso novelists. . . . We try to make all of our material cohere into a single good story. And that…Read more
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544Oh You Materialist!Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (9-10): 229-249. 2021.Materialism in the philosophy of mind — materialismPM — is the view that everything mental is material (or, equivalently, physical). Consciousness — pain, emotional feeling, sensory experience, and so on — certainly exists. So materialismPM is the view that consciousness is wholly material. It has, historically, nothing to do with denial of the existence of consciousness. Its heart is precisely the claim that consciousness — consciousness! — is wholly material. [2] ‘Physicalism’, the view intro…Read more
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7The Self?Wiley. 2009.This collection of philosophical papers reflects on the existence and nature of the self. A collection of philosophical papers devoted to the subject of the self. Reflects on key questions about the existence and nature of the self. Comprises contributions from leading authorities in the field: Barry Dainton, Ingmar Persson, Marya Schechtman, Galen Strawson, Bas van Fraassen, and Peter van Inwagen.
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675The mechanism—the secret—of the givenSynthese 199 (3-4): 10909-10928. 2021.There is, of course, The Given: what is given in experience. The ‘Myth Of The Given’ is just a wrong answer to the question ‘What is given?’ This paper offers a brief sketch of three possible right answers. It examines an early account by Charles Augustus Strong of why The Myth is a myth. It maintains that a natural and naturalistic version of empiricism is compatible with the fact that the Myth is a myth. It gives proper place to enactivist considerations. It is ) broadly in line with the Sella…Read more
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23The Impossibility of Moral ResponsibilityIn Gary Watson (ed.), Free will, Oxford University Press. 1982.
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46Replies to Noam Chomsky, Pierre Jacob, Michael Smith, and Paul Snowdon Mind and WorldPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 461. 1998.
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19The impossibility of ultimate moral responsibility?In Derk Pereboom (ed.), Free Will, Hackett Publishing Company. 2009.
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4SelvesIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 541-564. 2007.
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458Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychismIn Anthony Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?, Exeter: Imprint Academic. pp. 3-31. 2006.
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54Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism, and on the sesmet theory of subjectivityIn David Skrbina (ed.), Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium, John Benjamins. pp. 33-65. 2009.
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69What Is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience?Philosophical Issues 13 (1): 279-315. 2003.This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008) I take 'content' in a natural internalist way to refer to occurrent mental content. I introduce a 'thin' or ‘live’ notion of the subject according to which a subject of experience cannot exist unless there is an experience for it to be the subject of. I then argue, first, that in the case of a particular experience E, its content C, and its (thin) subje…Read more
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321The depth(s) of the twentieth centuryAnalysis 70 (4): 607. 2010.many things were back to front in 20th century analytic philosophy
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103Panpsychism? Reply to commentators, with a celebration of DescartesIn Anthony Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?, Exeter: Imprint Academic. 2006.Reply to commentators on the paper 'Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism'
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101Underestimating the PhysicalJournal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10): 228-240. 2019.Many hold that (1) consciousness poses a uniquely hard problem. Why is this so? Chalmers considers 12 main answers in 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness'. This paper focuses on number 11, and is principally addressed to those who endorse (1) because they think that (2) consciousness can't possibly be physical. It argues that to hold (2) is to make the mistake of underestimating the physical, and that almost all who make this mistake do so because they think they know more about the physical than…Read more
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77Conceivability and the Silence of PhysicsJournal of Consciousness Studies 24 (11-12): 167-192. 2017.According to the ‘conceivability argument’ [1] it’s conceivable that a conscious human being H may have a perfect physical duplicate H* who isn’t conscious, [2] whatever is conceivable is possible, therefore [3] H* may possibly exist. This paper argues that the conceivability argument can’t help in discussion of the ‘mind–body problem’ even if [2] is allowed to be true. This is not because [1] is false, but because we don’t and can’t know enough about the nature of the physical to know whether o…Read more
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30Narrative BypassingJournal of Consciousness Studies 23 (1-2): 125-139. 2016.In his target paper, John Welwood tells us that we have to beware of 'spiritual bypassing -- using spiritual ideas and practices to sidestep personal, emotional -- unfinished business--, to shore up a shaky sense of self, or to belittle basic needs, feelings, and develop-mental tasks, all in the name of enlightenment'. It's arguable that there is an equal danger of 'narrative bypassing' -- using the idea of one's life as a narrative to 'sidestep personal, emotional --unfinished business--, to sh…Read more
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74Realistic materialismIn Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. 2003.
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