Emmanuel Chaput

Malgré l’extrapolation parfois violente qu’opère Hegel, son traitement des découvertes physiologiques de Bichat montre à quel point il demeure soucieux de penser la compatibilité entre sciences empiriques et sciences spéculatives ou philosophiques. Loin de déduire un concept de la nature a priori indépendamment de toute considération pour les travaux de son temps, Hegel est au contraire un lecteur attentif des sciences en plein essor. Son système doit ainsi se comprendre à l’aune d’un dialogue constant avec les sciences dans lequel la philosophie se nourrit des nouvelles découvertes scienti ?iques tout en jetant une lumière nouvelle sur celles-ci. C’est un tel phénomène, résultat du dialogue qu’entretient Hegel avec Bichat, que j’expose ici en m’intéressant à la distinction bichatienne entre vie organique et vie animale et la manière dont Hegel reprend cette distinction en lui conférant une dimension résolument speculative.Despite the sometimes violent extrapolation carried out by Hegel, the way he treats Bichat’s physiological discoveries shows the extent to which he is concerned about the compatibility between the empirical sciences and the speculative/philosophical sciences. Far from deducing an a priori concept of nature with no consideration for the works of his time, Hegel is on the contrary an attentive reader of the burgeoning science. His approach must therefore be understood as a constant dialogue with science. Through this dialogue, philosophy draws on new scienti?ic discoveries while simultaneously interpreting them in a new light. It is such a phenomenon, resulting from the dialogue between Hegel and Bichat, that I examine here, with a particular interest in the distinction between organic life and animal life, as held by Bichat, and the way Hegel takes this distinction and confers on it a resolutely speculative dimension.

In this paper, I claim that to understand Hegel’s theory of psychiatric treatment, we must frame the relation between the psychiatrist and her patient using Hegel’s concept of genius as developed in the Anthropology section of the Encyclopedia (§405). As I argue, this notion of genius is both complex and ambiguous, since Hegel presents examples both of good and evil geniuses. What is interesting is that the psychiatrist can potentially correspond to both figures, which reveals what is perhaps Hegel’s greatest contribution to contemporary psychiatry as a practice: the imperative for the practitioner to reflect on its own motivation in the treatment, its own role of authority and, conversely, the condition of its patients.

Este texto considera la crítica de Ludwig Feuerbach a la filosofía del derecho de Friedrich Julius Stahl a partir de la noción de personalismo; estableciendo la diferencia entre el personalismo cristiano y el perfeccionismo social. Para Feuerbach la doctrina de Stahl se apoya en una versión teórica positiva que no expone filosóficamente los conceptos políticos sobre los cuales pretende fundamentarse. Los postulados sobre la persona humana y la persona divina se presentan aquí como uno de los momentos más contradictorios del proyecto de Stahl, y es allí donde Feuerbach enfoca sus comentarios más agudos.

In this paper, I explore Hegel’s concept of freedom as self-liberation. I consider the struggle between the soul and the body within Hegel’s Anthropology as an example of how conflict can act as a condition for asserting one’s freedom through self-improvement or Bildung. In this regard, there are reminiscent aspects of the famous ‘Lordship and Bondage’ dialectic within Hegel’s treatment of the body-soul relation. If the initial dominion of nature over the soul can be described as madness for Hegel, habit constitutes the mean through which spirit acquires its freedom.

This book is the result of a three-day conference held in April 2014 at the University of Montreal, Canada, discussing the relevance of the work of Hegel and Marx in today's world, particularly with regard to the ecological, economic, political and anthropological crisis facing humanity. Accordingly, the book an exploration of the specific nature of the crisis we face both in our everyday lives and in the realm of theory. However, if indeed the necessity of a proper critique is intimately linked to a state of crisis, the conceptual frame necessary to produce such a critique may itself be in crisis. Among the vast number of critical oppositions to contemporary capitalism, what are the keys available to understand the present forms of human conditions, alienation and exploitation? Controversies and divisions among the different tendencies within the critical tradition tend to highlight the point that there is also a theoretical crisis, which prevents a proper diagnosis of the actual crisis, and prevents, in turn, a proper plan of action from being established. Looking back to Marx and Hegel allowed a return, if not to the sources, at least to two unavoidable influences among the various critical approaches to capitalism. Be it with or against Hegel and/or Marx, the criticisms of modernity, post-modernity and capitalism cannot neglect the shadows of these thinkers. Both Marx's and Hegel's philosophical, sociological and political enterprises must be linked historically to the will to diagnose and solve what they saw as the most important crises of their own time, from, in Hegel's case, the spiritual crisis which followed the advent of modernity and its accompanying turmoil, to the social and political crisis caused by capitalism and the advent of a new industrial society, in Marx's case. Both intellectual ventures are at every turn haunted by the notion of crisis. This book will appeal to anyone interested in Hegel's and Marx's philosophical and political theories. Not only does it provide the historical context necessary to understand properly the relation between Marx and Hegel, but it also places the relevance of their teachings for the contemporary reader in perspective.

G. W. F. Hegel's interest in F. H. Jacobi's thought is persistent. It relies essentially on the issue of the nature of knowledge and truth, and the way we may apprehend it, either immediately or mediately. One of the central concepts at play in Jacobi's thought is that of perception as a hold on truth (Wahr-nehmen). Based on that concept of perception, extensively discussed in the second chapter ofThe Phenomenology of Spirit, I clarify and open new perspectives for the understanding of Hegel's critique of Jacobi.

Malgré l’extrapolation parfois violente qu’opère Hegel, son traitement des découvertes physiologiques de Bichat montre à quel point il demeure soucieux de penser la compatibilité entre sciences empiriques et sciences spéculatives ou philosophiques. Loin de déduire un concept de la nature a priori indépendamment de toute considération pour les travaux de son temps, Hegel est au contraire un lecteur attentif des sciences en plein essor. Son système doit ainsi se comprendre à l’aune d’un dialogue constant avec les sciences dans lequel la philosophie se nourrit des nouvelles découvertes scienti.

A philosoph and a sociologist inspired by Durkheim with whom he started L’Année sociologique, Célestin Bouglé (1870-1940) has been for a long time known for his Essais sur le régime des castes (1908) and his critique of Lapouge’s anthroposociology. His sociological interests however are intimately linked with his republican and solidarity ideals. This article explores the importance and the form of democracy in Bouglé’s political thought. On this topic, the influence of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) on Bouglé’s thought is important in order to understand the particularity of Bouglé’s solidarism by contrast with Léon Bourgeois’. This particularity is however for Bouglé an attempt to complete Bourgeois’ philosophy of solidarity rather than to confront it.