•  16
    Criteria of Identity: Strong and Wrong
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1): 61-68. 2013.
    We show that finitely axiomatized first-order theories that involve some criterion of identity for entities of a category C can be reformulated as conjunctions of a non-triviality statement and a criterion of identity for entities of category C again. From this, we draw two conclusions: First, criteria of identity can be very strong deductively. Second, although the criteria of identity that are constructed in the proof of the theorem are not good ones intuitively, it is difficult to say what ex…Read more
  •  4
    Vincent F. Hendricks and John Symons, eds. Formal Philosophy Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 27 (4): 266-268. 2007.
  •  109
    A New Analysis of Quasianalysis
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2): 181-226. 2007.
    We investigate the conditions under which quasianalysis, i.e., Carnap's method of abstraction in his Aufbau, yields adequate results. In particular, we state both necessary and sufficient conditions for the so-called faithfulness and fullness of quasianalysis, and analyze adequacy as the conjunction of faithfulness and fullness. It is shown that there is no method of (re-)constructing properties from similarity that delivers adequate results in all possible cases, if the same set of individuals …Read more
  •  14
    Truth as translation – part a
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (4): 281-307. 2001.
    This is the second part of a paper dealing with truth and translation. In Part A a revised version of Tarski's Convention T has been presented, which explicitly refers to a translation mapping from the object language to the metalanguage; the vague notion of a translation has been replaced by a precise definition. At the end of Part A it has been shown that interpreted languages exist, which allow for vicious self-reference but which nevertheless contain their own truth predicate - this is possi…Read more
  •  11
    Truth and the Liar in De Morgan-Valued Models
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (4): 496-514. 1999.
    The aim of this paper is to give a certain algebraic account of truth: we want to define what we mean by De Morgan-valued truth models and show their existence even in the case of semantical closure: that is, languages may contain their own truth predicate if they are interpreted by De Morgan-valued models. Before we can prove this result, we have to repeat some basic facts concerning De Morgan-valued models in general, and we will introduce a notion of truth both on the object- and on the metal…Read more
  •  25
    Metaworlds: A Possible-Worlds Semantics for Truth
    In Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten (eds.), Principles of truth, Hänsel-hohenhausen. pp. 129-152. 2002.
  •  1323
    When betting odds and credences come apart: more worries for Dutch book arguments
    with Darren Bradley
    Analysis 66 (2): 119-127. 2006.
    If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. Hitchcock argues that this credence follows from calculating he…Read more