Anna Galeotti

The paper questions the view that the alleged lack of autonomy displayed by certain practices and cultural behavior may constitute a sound justification for limiting toleration of those practices. Not only is the concept of autonomy open to endless controversy, but it also entails a conflict with liberal public morality and often nurtures double standards. To this end, the paper first examines the assumptions and basis of the lack-of-autonomy approach; this analysis perforce leads the author to unravel the notion of autonomy and its rival conceptions. Second, it will be argued that liberal and democratic politics, though indebted to the value of personal autonomy in a fashion, requires only a purely political principle of autonomy. It is also contended that if comprehensive notions of autonomy are used instead of a purely political conception, unacceptable consequences for the public morality of liberal democracy may follow. Finally, the point will be illustrated with some examples drawn from multicultural politics

The author outlines a conception of toleration as recognition of differences which she argues to be more adequate than current liberal views in order to face issues arising from contemporary pluralism. The liberal conception of toleration as freedom from government's interference in certain areas is appropriate if pluralism is conceived of as a plurality of conflicting conceptions of the good. By contrast, if pluralism is understood as the plurality of groups and cultures, asymmetrically situated in democratic society, then the issues underlying toleration are seen as the contested claim of minorities for asserting their different identity in the public space. Public toleration of differences is thus viewed as a symbolic public gesture of inclusion of the different identities and their bearers into democratic citizenship on an equal footing as members of minority groups. The argument supporting public toleration is so founded on reason of justice.