Anna Galeotti

The paper questions the view that the alleged lack of autonomy displayed by certain practices and cultural behavior may constitute a sound justification for limiting toleration of those practices. Not only is the concept of autonomy open to endless controversy, but it also entails a conflict with liberal public morality and often nurtures double standards. To this end, the paper first examines the assumptions and basis of the lack-of-autonomy approach; this analysis perforce leads the author to unravel the notion of autonomy and its rival conceptions. Second, it will be argued that liberal and democratic politics, though indebted to the value of personal autonomy in a fashion, requires only a purely political principle of autonomy. It is also contended that if comprehensive notions of autonomy are used instead of a purely political conception, unacceptable consequences for the public morality of liberal democracy may follow. Finally, the point will be illustrated with some examples drawn from multicultural politics

The author outlines a conception of toleration as recognition of differences which she argues to be more adequate than current liberal views in order to face issues arising from contemporary pluralism. The liberal conception of toleration as freedom from government's interference in certain areas is appropriate if pluralism is conceived of as a plurality of conflicting conceptions of the good. By contrast, if pluralism is understood as the plurality of groups and cultures, asymmetrically situated in democratic society, then the issues underlying toleration are seen as the contested claim of minorities for asserting their different identity in the public space. Public toleration of differences is thus viewed as a symbolic public gesture of inclusion of the different identities and their bearers into democratic citizenship on an equal footing as members of minority groups. The argument supporting public toleration is so founded on reason of justice.

In this 2002 book, Anna Elisabetta Galeotti examines the most intractable problems which toleration encounters and argues that what is really at stake is not religious or moral disagreement but the unequal status of different social groups. Liberal theories of toleration fail to grasp this and consequently come up with normative solutions that are inadequate when confronted with controversial cases. Galeotti proposes, as an alternative, toleration as recognition, which addresses the problem of according equal respect to groups as well as equal liberty to individuals. She offers an interpretation that is both a revision and an expansion of liberal theory, in which toleration constitutes an important component not only of a theory of justice, but also of the politics of identity. Her study will appeal to a wide range of readers in political philosophy, political theory, and law.