Mary Ellen Waithe

This article is the text of a Plenary Session lecture presented at the World Congress of Philosophy, Rome, 2024. In it I argue that archaeological evidence shows that the first written philosophy originated not in Greece, India, or China as is commonly believed, but, in Sumer, Mesopotamia, approximately 2600 BCE. The author, En Hedu’Anna, was a woman. I describe four writings by her, distinguish her views from then-prevailing Mesopotamian views about a variety of philosophic concepts and topics. I discuss her contributions to cosmology, scientific method, philosophy of religion, and principles of justice, amongst others. I relate her views on the just treatment of prisoners of war, transgenderism, and other seemingly contemporary philosophical issues. Lastly, I summarize evidence for what today would be called her Curriculum Vitae and her Impact Factor.

In this second issue of volume one, a welcome feature are those articles that bring to our readers, new historical information about women philosophers, new analyses of important positions supported by and questions addressed by select women philosophers, as well as articles that compare and contrast the views of several women philosophers on particular topics. This issue reflects on the context of women’s theoretical contributions, with articles that address the question of women’s agency and the historical account through which women were acknowledged (or not) as originators of or contributors to important theoretical developments within the mentioned disciplines. In recent decades an overwhelming amount of philosophical works by women has been made available by historians of philosophy. This issue reflects those strides towards recovering philosophical writings by women. Issue 2 of this volume is organized chronologically and starts with a paper from Jonathan Head: “Anne Conway on Heaven and Hell”. Conway’s The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (1690) offers representations of heaven and hell, revising our conventional image of hell. Conway presents hell in a way that she believes is more consistent with the postulate of a loving and just God. In part, Conway denies the possibility of eternal torment and emphasizes the benefits that suffering brings to a living being. Conway describes heaven as a realm of “perfect rest” where creatures enjoy unity and harmony with Christ and other heavenly spirits. This state involves an increasing understanding of the world, a continual process of perfection and harmony with other heavenly spirits. The article concludes with a description of Conway’s eschatology in the broader intellectual context of the revival of Origenist theology in its intellectual setting and in the changing framework of eschatological thought in the early Quaker community. Monica M. Mastrantonio discusses in her paper, “Lady Mary Wortley Montagu – a philosopher? The epistolary woman, because women could not be called Philosophers, Scientists, Entrepreneurs” aspects of a different and new transcultural worldview that reflects diversity and knowledge combined with philosophy in a new way. In the past, there were two roles with which Lady Mary Wortley Montagu was associated. One was her experience at the Turkish Embassy, where she highlighted cultural diversity. A second role she was associated with was international travel. Mastrantonio argues that Montagu was more than a literary aristocrat who could describe customs and traditions from abroad. Using Montagu’s complete letters, the author brings into discussion the fact that Montagu was also a vaccine entrepreneur and a journalist on political and urban issues, paving the way for discussions on philosophical questions. Many letter writers of the 16th and 17th centuries were already feminists who were politically and artistically active in their time and wrote letters with precision and expertise. The letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu are an important aspect in building a transcultural worldview in which diversity and knowledge combine with philosophy differently than it was before. In this short but engaging article, “American Women in the Transcendental and Pragmatist Movements”, Carol Bensick provides an overview of two important philosophical movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Transcendentalism and the Pragmatism that emerged in part from that movement. In the course of identifying numerous women who contributed to both movements, Bensick examines how some of them were included in the early history of American philosophy, only to be omitted from later histories. Bensick argues that the recent designation of women philosophers as “feminist pragmatists” is historically an inaccurate identification and one that pragmatists did not use to describe themselves. The French philosopher Simone Weil, the Swiss Jeanne Hersch and the Spanish Maria Zambrano each examined how bodily elements function in the rational search for truth. In his paper Oblique Paths to Truth: Myth and Bodily Elements in Simone Weil, Jeanne Hersch and Maria Zambrano, Piergiacomo Severini examines popular “body” myths referred to by these philosophers and analyses the language they use to express that bodily elements precede consciousness and reason. Through these myths/stories we learn that truth cannot be known directly through objects. Instead, the “knowing subject” necessarily elaborates indirect paths to transcendent truth. Severini argues that the effort to reintegrate the human attachment to the marginal world is peculiar to women philosophers in the history of philosophy and thus points to an alternative path to the human search for meaning that differs from the mainstream of Western male philosophy. As a philosopher, Hedwig Conrad-Martius has been intensively engaged throughout her life in researching the question of what reality is and has contrasted her reflections with those of Husserl and others. In her contribution “Conrad-Martius: the ´Real-Reality of the World – in Dialogue with Aristotle, Aquinas and Husserl”, author Irene Breuer deals with Conrad-Martius’ concepts of reality as “real reality”, with being, existence and essence and relates them to the concepts in Aristotle, Aquinas and Husserl. She discusses once again the questions of the hypostasis of being – by which the author claims that this is about the noema itself, and about the emergence of being in particular. The author’s thesis is that although Conrad-Martius rejects transcendental reduction, Conrad-Martius does accept eidetic reduction and the positing of a sphere of primordial and given facts. Driving this sphere back into a transphysical realm, it can provide a ground for Husserl’s sphere of original facts, which itself remains beyond the reach of phenomenological enquiries. Consequently, the author concludes, Conrad-Martius and Husserl meet here in their investigations, and yes, they complement each other, at a point where “the real bursts into reality”. Join us in unveiling this universe of women’s ideas. We are happy to welcome our contributors and readers, as we improve our understanding of the history of philosophical ideas by adding new perspectives and new insights. We enter a new universe of praiseworthy ideas by women theorists, one that will doubtlessly contribute to a world description that is more accurate than a narrative written without these voices. Philosophy starts here.

This inaugural volume of the Journal of the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists aims with its Issue 1 to clarify methodological issues that emerge when we rediscover the history of women philosophers. It is devoted to the questions which go hand in hand with the rediscovery of the history of women philosophers and scientists, asking whether and how we should place these newly discovered texts within the traditional patriarchal context. We do not know yet whether women are making different ways into canonical thought, or whether we should abandon the idea of canonical thought at all. Submissions that we received for the first call for papers are subsumed under the theme “Beyond Borders.” Each article deals in some way with the writing or rewriting of women’s history, filling in lapsus in the historical canons of philosophy and related disciplines, addressing the gendered political intellectual tradition from modern India, engaging with the works and ideas of women thinkers. The light-hearted title of Karen Green’s article belies the seriousness of the question it poses. In “The Human in Feminist Philosophy: Or Woman Is a Social Animal, I’m Not So Sure about Man”, Green questions the adequacy of the structuralist account of language after critically assessing its role in feminist theory since the 1970s. Green argues that the hegemony of structuralism is as much a Western hegemony as the Enlightenment tradition of a transcendent subject. Texts historically written and published by women provide the raw material for an archaeology of the female subject, which, Green argues, leads to the discovery and exploration of the female subject. She offers an initial sketch of the results of such an exploration, concluding that many male theorists have portrayed humans as inherently self-centred and egoistic, while most female philosophers have assumed that humans are inherently social. Laura Kotevska’s contribution “Writing Women into the History of Philosophy: Contextualism Re-Examined” examines the advantages and disadvantages of contextualism as used as a methodology. Philosophical works by women have been neglected by historians of philosophy until recent decades. When such works were discussed, it was usually in the context of male philosophers with whom a female philosopher was associated in some way. Kotevska explores how different options for a contextualist history of philosophy can help explain a woman’s involvement in philosophy, or how they can undermine her intellectual authority and cloud our understanding of her work. To avoid some of the epistemically damaging results that can arise when a woman’s work is placed in her patriarchal context, Kotevska concludes with three suggestions for writing and teaching works produced by women, suggestions informed by the methodological considerations addressed in the essay. Priyanka Jha’s contribution addresses “The Shaping of the ‘Political’: Gendered Intellectual History of Ideas in Modern India (1880s–1940s)”. Her premise is that in most societies, women’s thought has been reflected in a significant and robust ‘political’ tradition, that this tradition of women’s political thought is situated in a larger universe of ideas than is commonly thought. Women have been and continue to be important interlocutors in debates about concerns and values that are central to the human condition. However, the kind of centrality and attention that should have been given to this school of thought as a “political tradition” has either been barely noticed or marginalized in comparison to other ideational currents. This act is not peculiar to postcolonial societies like India but has a global resonance and a universal scope. There are very few women who have been active as political thinkers or political philosophers worldwide. This paper locates the gendered tradition of political intellectuals in modern India by examining the works and ideas of women thinkers. In the paper on “Women and Freedom of Canonical Thought: A Propaedeutics”, Christine Lopes starts from the observation that in male or patriarchal canonical thinking there is no unified image and representation of women. She uses this broad space of presentation and calls this “the ways of women”. At the same time, she notes that even today we do not know whether women will bring different ways or possibly femininely coherent ways to canonical thought, or whether we can create women’s canonical thought or abandon the idea of canonical thought. For all, therefore, it can be stated that we are given the freedom to judge canonical thinking, to include or exclude ourselves, to adapt or not. The paper discusses some basic epistemological assumptions about such freedom. Bodil Hvass Kjems begins her reflections on “The Inclusion of Women in the Curriculum of Philosophy: Challenges and Solutions” with the fact that recent decades have made accessible an overwhelming number of philosophical works by women, but that the original conflict is still present. The sheer abundance of material is far from being adequately reflected in the curricula of philosophy departments. It therefore raises the question, as many do, of what the best argumentative strategy would be to make such inclusion successful. In doing so, the author references proposals, such as those of Sarah Tyson (2014), to frame the debate in the following way. For the author, the question is whether misogyny is an intrinsic feature of the (Western) philosophical tradition or merely an unfortunate development. That is, whether the response to the integration of women’s texts is corrective or transformative to the dominant model. In doing so, it assumes that both strategies, regardless of the ontological status of the philosophical discipline, promote engagement with women’s work in ways that revolutionise contemporary philosophical practice. In her article “Privacy, Feminism, and Moral Responsibility in the Work of Elizabeth Lane Beardsley”, Julie van Camp looks at the work of an important moral philosopher, Elizabeth Lane Beardsley. The article highlights Beardsley’s philosophical contributions. Using Beardsley as a case study, van Camp points to more general problems in recognizing the work of women philosophers and ensuring their rightful place in our professional dialogue. Van Camp considers sociological and professional factors that may partly explain why the work of women philosophers has not always received the attention it seems to deserve in professional dialogue. The article concludes with suggestions about efforts we can make to address these problems, including the selection of readings for our courses and the sources we consult for our own research and writings, as well as the preservation of records of conferences and other public gatherings that honor women philosophers.

Emérita Quito was the first woman from the Philippines to complete a Ph.D. in Philosophy. Her early Scholastic training as an undergraduate was at the University of Santo Tomas expanded to include phenomenology and existentialism during her graduate studies at major European universities. Upon returning home she began to focus on the idea of developing a methodology for investigating indigenous Filipino philosophy. How does one reveal the concepts and principles underlying the belief systems within a country that has suffered a thousand years of occupation by foreign forces, that speaks with hundreds of different dialects across more than seven thousand islands spread across more than one hundred thousand square miles? This amazing philosopher published extensively not only in western philosophy, but on that indigenous to this island nation, prior to the incursions of western nations and the introduction to the Philippines of western philosophical views.

In this volume we provide rich examples of non-western philosophy written by women over the last four thousand years. We begin by defining the scope of our non-western terrain: philosophy created outside the Greco-Roman, Judeo-Christian traditions. The philosophers who are the subjects of inquiry here hail from places as distant as pre-colonial Africa, the Americas, Asia and Australia. Together with our expert contributing authors we demonstrate through inquiry and analysis how these women philosophers advanced human thought about profound issues, some to include the nature and treatment of women themselves.

This book presents the views of 22 women philosophers from outside the Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian worlds. These eminent thinkers are from Mesopotamia, India, Tibet, China, Korea, Japan, Australia, America, the Philippines and Nigeria. Six philosophers, the earliest of whom predates the Greek pre-Socratics by two thousand years, lived at “the dawn of philosophy”; another six from late Antiquity through the Classical period; five more taught and wrote during the Middle Ages up to the Age of Exploration, and yet five others were active during the modern period to the mid-twentieth century. Most belonged to major philosophical traditions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Zen, or Sufism. The chapters of the book describe the life and views of the philosophers, outline the fundamental features of their respective schools, and contain translations of their writings. The book is intended for scholars of philosophy and women’s studies who wish to expand their knowledge of non-Western philosophical traditions and is ideally suited for undergraduate education. Comprehensive multilingual bibliographies of carefully documented sources offer scholars many promising resources for further research.

Philosophy became known as a “man’s” profession over the past three thousand years. This is an account of how, in the case of Diotima of Mantinea, the histories of philosophy came to systematically ignore, overlook, doubt and declare false the fact that some philosophers had uteruses. The effect has been a massive hysterectomy –the removal from or ignoring of women’s contributions to Philosophy as related by the major histories and encyclopedias of Philosophy. This nearly discipline-wide hysterectomy has created the false impression that women cannot think philosophically. In this PowerPoint presentation I will present historical and archeological evidence relative to Diotima of Mantinea who may have been the first woman philosopher to receive a posthumous hysterectomy by later historians of philosophy.

aspirations, the rise of western monasticism was the most note worthy event of the early centuries. The importance of monasteries cannot be overstressed as sources of spirituality, learning and auto nomy in the intensely masculinized, militarized feudal period. Drawing their members from the highest levels of society, women's monasteries provided an outlet for the energy and ambition of strong-willed women, as well as positions of considerable authority. Even from periods relatively inhospitable to learning of all kinds, the memory has been preserved of a good number of women of education. Their often considerable achievements and influence, however, generally lie outside even an expanded definition of philo sophy. Among the most notable foremothers of this early period were several whose efforts signal the possibility of later philosophical work. Radegund, in the sixth century, established one of the first Frankish convents, thereby laying the foundations for women's spiritual and intellectual development. From these beginnings, women's monasteries increased rapidly in both number and in fluence both on the continent and in Anglo-Saxon England. Hilda (d. 680) is well known as the powerful abbsess of the double monastery of Whitby. She was eager for knowledge, and five Eng lish bishops were educated under her tutelage. She is also accounted the patron of Caedmon, the first Anglo-Saxon poet of religious verse. The Anglo-Saxon nun Lioba was versed in the liberal arts as well as Scripture and canon law.

Oliva Sabuco's New Philosophy of Human nature (1587) is an early modern philosophy of medicine that challenged the views of the successors to Aristotle, especially Galen and Ibn Sina (Avicenna). It also challenged the paradigm of the male as the epitome of the human and instead offers a gender-neutral philosophy of human nature. Now largely forgotten, it was widely read and influential amongst philosophers of medicine including DeClave, LePois, Harvey,Southey and others, particularly for its account of the role of the nervous system and cerebrospinal fluid in mind-body interaction. In this article I trace its early influence by tracing provenance of the editions produced during the lifetime of its author.

A History of Women Philosophers, Volume I: Ancient Women Philoophers, 600 B.C. - 500 A.D., edited by Mary Ellen Waithe, is an important but somewhat frustrating book. It is filled with tantalizing glimpses into the lives and thoughts of some of our earliest philosophical foremothers. Yet it lacks a clear unifying theme, and the abrupt transitions from one philosopher and period to the next are sometimes disconcerting. The overall effect is not unlike that of viewing an expansive landscape, illuminated only by a few tiny spotlights