James Stacey Taylor

In recent years, there has been a considerable increase in the degree of philosophical attention devoted to the question of the morality of offering financial compensation in an attempt to increase the medical supply of human body parts and products, such as plasma. This paper will argue not only that donor compensation is ethically acceptable, but that plasma donors should not be prohibited from being offered compensation if they are to give their informed consent to donate. Regulatory regimes that prohibit donor compensation thus unethically prevent the typical donor from being able to give her informed consent to donate.

In a recent paper entitled “The Case for Colonialism” Bruce Gilley argued that Western colonialism was “as a general rule” both beneficial to those subject to it and considered by them to be legitimate. He then advocated for a return to the Western colonization of the Third World. Gilley’s article provoked a furious response, with calls for its retraction being followed by the resignation of much of the publishing journal’s editorial board. In this paper I note that Gilley’s article meets none of the criteria required to justify its retraction, and that instead of retracting it it should be rebutted. I then argue that his arguments against those who oppose colonialism are all fatally flawed, and that he has provided no justification for his claims that colonialism was either beneficial to those who lived under it, or considered by them to be legitimate.

In this paper I argue that the free-market provision of health care is both practical and morally sound, and is superior in both respects to its provision by the State. The State provision of health care will be inefficient compared to its free-market alternative. It will thus provide less health care to persons for the same amount of expenditure, and so save fewer lives and alleviate less suffering for two reasons: state actors have no incentive to husband their resources effectively, and that in a non-market setting, special interest groups can capture resources through lobbying, perverting them away from their efficient allocation. Given these considerations of efficiency a utilitarian should morally prefer the free-market provision of health care to its State-based rival. Furthermore, even if one is not a utilitarian, the free-market provision of health care will be more morally sound than its State-based alternative because it will likely better respect the autonomy of persons, and will better refrain from imposing values upon persons. With these points in hand, I address two prominent objections to a free market system of health care

In a recent paper entitled “The Case for Colonialism” Bruce Gilley argued that Western colonialism was “as a general rule” both beneficial to those subject to it and considered by them to be legitimate. He then advocated for a return to the Western colonization of the Third World. Gilley’s article provoked a furious response, with calls for its retraction being followed by the resignation of much of the publishing journal’s editorial board. In this paper I note that Gilley’s article meets none of the criteria required to justify its retraction, and that instead of retracting it it should be rebutted. I then argue that his arguments against those who oppose colonialism are all fatally flawed, and that he has provided no justification for his claims that colonialism was either beneficial to those who lived under it, or considered by them to be legitimate.

Jacob Sparks has developed a semiotic critique of markets that is based on the fact that “market exchanges express preferences.” He argues that some market transactions will reveal that the purchaser of a market good inappropriately prefers it to a similar non-market good. This avoids Brennan and Jaworski’s criticism that semiotic objections to markets fail as the meaning of market transactions are contingent social facts. I argue that Sparks’ argument is both incomplete and doomed to fail. It can only show that some preferences are morally problematic, not that the transactions that they lead to are immoral.

Christopher Freiman, Jason Brennan, and Peter M. Jaworski have recently defended markets in votes. While their views differ in several respects they all believe that the primary justificatory burden lies not with those who defend markets in votes but with those who oppose them. Yet while the burden of proof should typically rest with those who wish to prohibit markets in certain goods this does not hold for the debate over markets in votes. Votes are crucially different from other goods in that for a market in them to exist, it is not enough that it be legalized; it must also be provided with institutional support so that the buyer of a vote would know that it has been cast as she wished. Defenders of markets in votes must thus provide positive arguments for the view that markets in votes should be institutionally facilitated—they cannot simply try to shift the burden of proof onto those who oppose them. This is bad news for those who defend the legalization of vote-buying, for none of the positive arguments that Freiman has offered in favor of the legalization of this type of vote-buying are sound.

The UCLA Medical Center has initiated a “voucher program” under which a person who donated a kidney would receive a voucher that she could provide to someone of her choosing who could then use it to move to the top of the renal transplantation waiting list. If the use of such vouchers as incentives for donors is morally permissible, then cash payments for kidneys are also morally permissible. But, that argument faces five objections. First, there are some goods whose nature allows them to be exchanged for similar goods but renders them monetarily inalienable. Hence, kidneys might be exchanged for kidneys but not sold for cash. Second, voucher programs respect donor autonomy, whereas the offer of cash payments does not. Third, the burden of proof lies with the advocates of cash payments for kidneys to show that their benefits would outweigh the costs of their legalization. Fourth, allowing cash payments for kidneys would stifle medical innovation. Fifth, allowing cash payments for kidneys would result in these organs being used as collateral to secure loans—and that this would disadvantage potential borrowers who did not want to risk their kidneys in this way. This paper will rebut all these objections.

Nancy Scheper-Hughes is one of the most prominent critics of markets in human organs. Unfortunately, Scheper-Hughes rejects the view that markets should be used to solve the current shortage of transplant organs without engaging with the arguments in favour of them. Scheper-Hughes’s rejection of such markets is of especial concern, given her influence over their future, for she holds, among other positions, the status of an adviser to the World Health Organization on issues related to global transplantation. Given her influence, it is important that Scheper-Hughes’s moral condemnation of markets in human organs be subject to critical assessment. Such critical assessment, however, has not generally been forthcoming. A careful examination of Scheper-Hughes’s anti-market stance shows that it is based on serious mischaracterisations of both the pro-market position and the medical and economic realities that underlie it. In this paper, the author will expose and correct these mischaracterisations and, in so doing, show that her objections to markets in human organs are unfounded

Markets have long had a whiff of sulphur about them. Plato condemned innkeepers, whose pursuit of profit he believed led them to take advantage of their customers, Aristotle believed that the pursuit of profit was indicative of moral debasement, and Cicero held that retailers are typically dishonest as this was the only path to gain. And even those who are more favorably disposed towards markets in general are frequently inclined to be suspicious of markets in medical goods and services. For example, Margaret Thatcher supported the legal prohibition of markets in kidneys despite being arguably the most pro-market Prime Minister the United Kingdom saw in the 20th century.

In 2013 the World Health Organization published a Report in which it was argued that countries should become self-sufficient in safe blood and blood products, and that these should be secured through voluntary non-remunerated donation. These two claims were putatively supported by a wealth of citations to peer-reviewed academic papers, the results of Royal Commissions and Public Inquiries in both Canada and the United Kingdom, and data collected from Non-Government Organizations. Yet not only do many of the sources cited by the authors of this WHO Report fail to support their conclusions, many support conclusions that are the opposite of those that they draw. The aim of this paper is not, however, to argue against the conclusions of this Report. Instead, it is to argue that its authors were culpably negligent in its writing, in that they failed to take reasonable care to ensure that their conclusions were supported by the evidence, and in so doing exposed third parties to risks of harm to which they had not consented.

Teck Chuan Voo and Soren Holm argue that “organs should be inheritable if they were to be socially and legally recognised as tradable property.”1 To support this view they first observe that “…legal recognition of objects as property… opens up the possibility of the legal recognition of the survival of the property rights and their inheritability after the death of the source/owner, even if those rights are intimately bound with the person.”1 They also note that if organs are tradable property then they could be sold by their current owners for removal by the buyer after the original owner dies. Having established that a person's property rights in her organs should be respected in this way if organs are tradable property, Voo and Holm hold that “[p]rima facie, organs should be disposable by testation”.1 They believe that this claim is supported by the same consequentialist reasons that support organs being recognised as tradable property: that this increases persons’ freedom and control over their organs, and increases transfers of transplantable organs to persons who need them. But while these reasons support recognising organs as tradable property, they do not support their being …

In recent years there has been much philosophical discussion over the question of whether the prohibitions on markets in such items as human body parts and gene sequences, and services such as human reproductive labor and sex, should be lifted. Yet despite the attention paid to this issue there are been surprisingly little discussion of the question of whether markets in certain items that are currently freely traded should be restricted or eliminated. In particular, there has been little discussion of the question of whether markets in items that could be readily used to deceive people should be restricted. I argue in this paper that one of the central moral values of the contemporary West – respect for personal autonomy – requires that such markets be restricted.

It is widely accepted that a person can be harmed by events that occur after her death. The most influential account of how persons can suffer such posthumous harm has been provided by George Pitcher and Joel Feinberg. Yet, despite its influence (or perhaps because of it) the Feinberg-Pitcher account of posthumous harm has been subject to several well-known criticisms. Surprisingly, there has been no attempt to defend this account of posthumous harm against these criticisms, either by philosophers who work on the metaphysics of death or by those who draw upon this account of posthumous harm in their work in other philosophical fields. This paper will rectify this omission, by defending this view against the criticisms it has been subject to—a defense that will both be of intrinsic interest to those who work on the metaphysics of death and that will remedy the lacunae in the wide-ranging philosophical literature that draws upon this account of how posthumous harm is possible.