James Stacey Taylor

_Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics_ offers a highly distinctive and original approach to the metaphysics of death and applies this approach to contemporary debates in bioethics that address end-of-life and post-mortem issues. Taylor defends the controversial Epicurean view that death is not a harm to the person who dies and the neo-Epicurean thesis that persons cannot be affected by events that occur after their deaths, and hence that posthumous harms are impossible. He then extends this argument by asserting that the dead cannot be wronged, finally presenting a defence of revisionary views concerning posthumous organ procurement.

A common criticism of plurality voting is that it fails to reflect the degree of intensity with which voters prefer the candidate or policy that they vote for. To rectify this, many critics of plurality voting have argued that vote buying should be allowed. Persons with more intense preferences for a candidate could buy votes from persons with less intense preferences for the opposing candidate and then cast them for the candidate that they intensely support. This paper argues that instead of better reflecting voters’ weighted preferences, vote buying will lead to electoral outcomes that reflect them less accurately.

A common argument used to defend markets in ‘contested commodities’ is based on the value of personal autonomy. Autonomy is of great moral value; removing options from a person's choice set would compromise her ability to exercise her autonomy; hence, there should be a prima facie presumption against removing options from persons’ choice sets; thus, the burden of proof lies with those who wish to prohibit markets in certain goods. Christopher Freiman has developed a version of this argument to defend markets in votes. I argue that Freiman's argument fails, and that its failure illustrates the falsity of the widespread claim that the more options a person has available to her the better able she will be to exercise her autonomy. In Part 1, I outline Freiman's argument from ‘the presumption of voter liberty’ for legalising markets in votes. In Part 2, I argue that the option to sell one's vote in a legal market for them would be a ‘constraining option’ – an option which, if chosen, would be likely to lead to a diminution in a person's future ability to exercise her autonomy. In Part 3, I respond to objections to my arguments.

This is the first volume in which an account of personal autonomy is developed that both captures the contours of this concept as it is used in social philosophy and bioethics, and is theoretically grounded in, and a part of, contemporary autonomy theory. James Stacey Taylor’s account is unique as it is explicitly a political one, recognizing that the attribution of autonomy to agents is dependent in part on their relationships with others and not merely upon their own mental states. The volume is distinctive in its examples, which touch on the ethics of using inducements to encourage persons to participate in medical research, the ethical issues associated with the use of antibiotics, and the ethical basis for both patient confidentiality and informed consent

A standard objection to a market in political votes is that it will enable the rich politically to dominate the poor. If a market in votes was allowed then the poor would be the most likely sellers and the rich the most likely buyers. The rich would thus accumulate the votes of the poor, and so the candidates elected and the policies passed would represent only their interests and not those of the electorate as a whole. To ensure that the poor do not become de facto disenfranchised, then, markets in votes should be disallowed. This objection seems so straightforward and compelling that it has received almost no critical scrutiny. This is unfortunate, for close examination reveals that this argument is not as straightforward as it initially appears. Indeed, there are four different ways of understanding this objection. It could be understood as expressing: the concern that markets in votes would enable candidates to win elections who would otherwise lose them; the concern that they would enable the election of candidates opposed by the majority of the electorate; the concern that they would lead to the poor having disproportionately low political influence; and the concern that they would lead to the rich having disproportionately high political influence. I will argue in this paper that only and could plausibly ground objections to markets in votes. Moreover, these will only plausibly ground objections to unrestricted markets in votes; they will not ground objections to markets in votes per se. Thus, if we are to continue to object to markets in political votes we will have to do this on grounds other than that were they to be allowed the rich will politically dominate the poor.

How can healthcare systems gain self-sufficiency in their procurement and distribution of blood and blood products efficiently while maintaining a degree of relatively equitable access for patients? This is a question that, at first look, the World Health Organization has answered in detail by advocating for self-sufficiency through non-remunerated blood donation. This essay serves two purposes. First, it illustrates key differences between the WHO’s policy recommendations and the realities of healthcare. For example, it can be readily demonstrated that the WHO has no empirical foundation for their claim that blood and blood products from unpaid donors is safer or more efficient than other, more commercial, avenues of procurement. Indeed, the WHO appears to take an ideological stand against compensation for blood products, which the empirical data does not support. Whether donation for blood and blood products should be compensated is a pressing ethical issue of practical import, especially if it can be shown that more market-oriented procedures leads to greater self-sufficiency, as well as safer and easier access to blood products than other alternatives. Such policy decisions should be based on the best available empirical data and ethical argumentation, rather than on political ideological grounds. Second, this essay serves as an Introduction to a special thematic issue of HEC Forum, which aims critically to explore ethical arguments in light of the best available empirical data so as to orient the blood industry towards more efficient and effective, and morally honest, procurement procedures

The papers in this special thematic issue of HEC Forum critically and carefully explore key issues at the intersection of patient privacy and commodification. For example, should hospitals be required to secure a person’s consent to any possible uses to which his discarded body parts might be put after his treatment or should it only be concerned with securing his informed consent to his treatment? Should a hospital be required to raise the possibility of the commodification of such body parts, or should it only be required to address this issue if the patient asks about it? Should persons be paid to engage in medical research, or should they only be compensated for their time, on the grounds, perhaps, that such payment would be coercive or exploitative, for it might move some persons to agree to participate in research who otherwise would not have done? This number of HEC Forum illustrates the widespread implications of these issues upon which healthcare ethics committees are called to deliberate.

Petersen and Lippert-Rasmussen argue that persons who decide to be organ donors should receive a tax break, and then defend their view against eight possible objections. However, they misunderstand the Titmuss-style concerns that might be raised against their proposal. This does not mean that it should be rejected, but, instead, that when it is reconfigured to meet the Titmuss-style charges against it, they should support legalizing markets in human organs rather than merely offering tax breaks to encourage their donation